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P R E F A C E T O T H E S E R I E S 
The first great Western Philosopher and one to whom all others 
bow—if not in agreement then at least with reverence—wrote nearly 
all his works in quasi-dramatic form. Plato's dialogues are theatricized 
conversations between his teacher Socrates and a host of adversaries, 
auditors, and associates. AlthoughJihey were neverjntended to_be 
pure dramas like those of Euripides or Aeschylus they do__manifest a 
few d jamat ic^e inen ts^^ plot, and character. While Plato's 
purpose was never to representatively portray human action or 
motivation, he certainly believed that dialectical exchange was not 
only the highest level of philosophical activity and the best 
philosophical method but quite evidently the best medium of 
exhibiting and explaining abstract philosophical concepts, theories, 
and arguments. Other stellar philosophers, most notably David Hume 
and George Berkeley, seem to have agreed with Plato on this point. 
On the other hand great playwrights appear to be exploring perennial 
philosophical concerns in a purely theatrical medium and in a non-
didactic way. Plato, Hume, and Berkeley want to edify and persuade 
with discursive reasoning while dramatists want to express and 
explore with theatrical devices. But what the dramatists express and 
explore, mainly, are traditional problems in philosophy: moral, 
political, and metaphysical problems experienced in existentially 
specific plots and characters. 
I 
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In my brief and undistinguished career as an actor I did roles in 
Shakespeare, Ibsen, and Miller. I noticed that although these and other 
authors were not doing philosophy they were undeniably preoccupied 
with philosophical dilemmas and issues. Questions about personal 
identity, ethics, rationality, religious faith, political authority, gender 
politics, and epistemology are raised and dramatically investigated in 
these three writers and countless others who write in the same genre. 
The five plays in this series represent my attempt to synthesize the 
aspirations of pure philosophy and the aspirations of pure drama at 
some level that transcends and incorporates each of them. What first 
moved me to make this attempt was a remark by the German 
Romantic philosopher Schelling that Art is the organ of Philosophy 
Nietzsche augmented Schelling's insight when he said "The more 
abstract the truth that you would teach the more you have to seduce 
the senses to it." These remarks gave me two related reasons for 
combining philosophy and drama. 
What did Schelling mean when he said that art is the organ of 
philosophy? He probably meant that art is the best medium or tool 
available to philosophy for asking and answering its questions. If this is 
what he meant then most philosophers would find the remark either 
scandalous or naive. The instrument or medium is of course reason and 
conceptual analysis, not imagination and aesthetic expression. That is 
why Aristotle's magnificent system of logic is titled The Organon. The 
Organon describes the methodological tool with which philosophers 
must carry out their operations of constructive and destructive 
argumentation. The organon (instrument) is logic, and logic is a formal 
system of precisely defined rules for valid and cogent reasoning. 
1 
p u n ' s m u y i 
How, then, can art be the organ of philosophy? If Schelling is right 
then most philosophers must be wrong when they describe what they 
think they are supposed to be doing when they are doing philosophy. 
In one way or another the five plays in this series end up on Schelling's 
side. Each play somehow agrees that philosophy's traditional canons 
of logic have been and ought to have been displaced by some other 
canon (probably though not necessarily an aesthetic one). Schelling's 
view has attracted some impressive company. Logical Positivists and 
their contemporary descendants, existentialists, and pragmatists agree 
at least that classical philosophy made promises it did not and could 
not keep. And scores of loosely called post-philosophical, post­
modern thinkers believe what poets, playwrights, novelists, painters, 
composers, and so on, have assumed all along: the deep puzzles and 
mysteries traditionally confronted by philosophy simply do not yield 
to deductive reason. Perhaps they do not yield to anything. Perhaps 
they can only be expressed and explored aesthetically. Their agonies 
can be transmitted—imaginatively, emotionally—in formalist or 
representational ways without ever being resolved. 
What did Nietzsche mean? He undoubtedly would have agreed with 
the spirit of Schelling's proposal but his claim goes beyond Schelling's. 
Nietzsche agrees that philosophy must find a new form of expression 
and a new medium of investigation but he extends his claim to teaching. 
The more abstract the truth that you would teach, he says, the more 
you have to seduce the senses to it. The senses can be seduced in many 
ways but paramount of all these ways for Nietzsche is art. And art, 
says Picasso, is the lie that helps us recognize the truth. To appease 
Nietzsche, Picasso should not have said the truth but your truth. 
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Still, the main consideration is pedagogical. Art is our most powerful 
teacher—something Plato recognized long ago. 
Prompted by Schelling and Nietzsche, I have tried to simultaneously 
accomplish two things in these five plays. I have sought to produce 
dramatic philosophy and philosophical drama. I mean, I hope to 
have produced in all five plays something which will stand on its 
own aesthetically, independent of its pedagogical value, and on the 
other hand I hope that each play will reflect Plato's desire to reproduce 
the dry processes and results of philosophical preoccupations in a 
lively, entertaining medium. Hence if the plays succeed they will be 
decent art containing philosophy and they will be decent instruction 
in philosophy presented artistically. 
Cartesian Dreams was my first attempt at playwriting. This was 
followed by Lives and Evils, then by Neecheemoos and Inuspi and then 
by Winter at Delphi. Plato's Retreat was written last in the series. On 
completing Lives and Evils I detected an increasing didacticism in that 
play compared to Cartesian Dreams. Neecheemoos and Inuspi represents 
a conscious reversal back to the pronounced aestheticism of the first 
play. This attempt to balance pedagogical and aesthetic interests has 
brought to light what is now for me the greatest challenge in writing, 
namely, to heartily endorse Schelling's dictum and Nietzsche's 
mortifying demand. If it is true that the more abstract the idea the 
more sensuous must be its representation then the task of representing 
the most abstract ideas must be an impossible one. Abstraction and 
aesthetic sensuality seem to be antipodes: like a negative correlation, 
each factor seems to recede as the other increases. Finding a synthesis 
of abstraction and sensuality, of didacticism and aestheticism, has been 
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the source of my greatest despair and my greatest delight. I have 
published some pure philosophy and some pure poetry. Each of course 
has its own peculiar demands and difficulties. Neither, however, 
presents the challenge of poeticized philosophy. I trust I have 
overcome these challenges to some degree, at least to the extent that 
the abstract and the didactic do not lose their conceptual sharpness 
and logical rigor when they are transduced into poetry and that the 
sensual and poetic do not lose their aesthetic charm and artistic 
expressiveness when they are laced with logic. 
Indeed, I still do not know if Cartesian Dreams floated into my 
awareness as philosophy theatricized or as theatre with philosophical 
content. Descartes, struggling with his doubts about whether or not 
his senses might be deceiving him, suddenly presented himself as a 
perfect character for drama. I knew that he belonged in theatre 
(perhaps vaudeville), as did the quirky Queen Christina of Sweden. 
How could a writer not put these two absurd, comedic, and tragic 
characters on stage together? So I did and most of my students loved 
it. I was hoping they would read Cartesian Dreams in order to better 
understand Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy but to my 
surprise many of them read Descartes in order to better understand 
my play. At that point my project was born. 
Truthfully, I thought I was just appropriating two brilliant and 
fascinating historical characters from the world of letters for the 
purposes of art. As the play slid off the tip of my pencil, however, I 
realized that its two lead protagonists were locked as much in 
philosophical labor as they were in love's toil and turmoil. Art and 
philosophy were inseparable from the outset. 
^ 
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Lives and Evils is much less theatrical than Cartesian Dreams. It was 
consciously written for teaching purposes, inadvertently sacrificing 
aesthetic intensity to pedagogical practicality. It was in writing this 
second play that I became fully conscious of the tension between 
didacticism and aestheticism: the excluded middle of either/or 
became a tantalizing temptation (since neither/nor is not in my 
vocabulary). The project was almost abandoned: either art or 
philosophy but not both. But Nietzsche, whom I damn and praise in 
his incendiary brilliance and prodigious febrile talent, kept taunting 
me. The result was Neecheemoos and Inuspi. I set out to write this play 
with the extreme aestheticism of Cartesian Dreams in mind and the 
reactionary didacticism of Lives and Evils in mind. I had hoped to 
write a play which in being read or viewed would leave pedagogy and 
art indistinguishable. I thought I had fusion. But readers of 
Neecheemoos and Inuspi (which, I add, is my favorite play of the five) 
frequently said they did not know what the play was "about". 
Evidently I did not have the synthesis I thought I had. Consequently, 
of the two plays before it and the two after it Neecheemoos and Inuspi 
was the only play to have thoroughly rewritten so it would be more 
"about" something studied in philosophy courses. Plato's Retreat was 
gutted and rewritten so it would be less "about" something. All in all 
I believe that in each play the no-man's land on the terrain of excluded 
middle between 'either' and 'or' was stormed and bridged from 
opposite directions. After Neecheemoos and Inuspi came Winter at 
Delphi, a strange mix of classical mythology, grand opera, burlesque, 
and the foundations of philosophy—not to mention philosophy's 
justification. Philosophy is actually put on trial in Athens. Winter at 
C 
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Delphi and the re-write of Plato's Retreat were both (I trust) written 
while I was camped on the Lawn of Included Middle—something 
demanded by Art but prohibited by Logic. 
Two features strike me as I review the evolution and content of these 
plays. 
First, I make few philosophical assertions of my own in the first two 
plays but more through the last three. Cartesian Dreams and Lives and 
Evils are philosophically inconclusive. They chart philosophical 
territory but no claim is staked. By the end of Winter at Delphi and 
even more clearly by the end of Plato's Retreat I give the philosophical 
content of the play an authorial stamp of approval or rejection. I 
make no apologies for that. It means only that whether or not my 
conclusions in philosophy are interesting I am increasingly using art 
as a medium for constructing my own philosophical judgements. 
Second, and far more interesting, is the fact that all these plays are at 
bottom about love. If there were one thread to make a quilt of these 
plays it would be love. If find it astonishing and you will find it 
unbelievable that it was never my intention in any of these plays to 
write a love story. They just fell into place that way. Descartes and 
Christina are mystified by love as they discuss metaphysics; Plato and 
Erothymia are consumed by love while working out a theory of 
justice; Neecheemoos sips nightly love potions with the man she loves 
while raising questions about the epistemological foundations of the 
European civilization that displaced her own; a fallen gay priest 
ponders the mysteries of love and lust while teaching theodicies, and 
so on. This thematic continuity, though, is not as interesting or 
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significant as the then-unconscious thoughts which caused it. 
Certainly the plays can be read at one level as love stories and nothing 
more. I have to ask myself, however, why these different plays on such 
diverse topics as the mind-body problem and the problem of evil 
should all have been plotted around love. The answer is found in the 
leading female character in each play. 
Over its two-and-a-half-thousand year history philosophy has been a 
labor of reason. Systematic logical and conceptual methods have been 
deployed by philosophy in its assault on mystery. Arbitrarily, the 
official beginning of philosophy has been set around 585 BCE, when 
the polymath genius Thales asked questions about the first principle 
of the universe. He asked a stunningly original question in what we 
now call metaphysics. Equally stunning, though, was the way he 
answered it. He asked "What is the arche?" What is the basic stuff, or 
cosmic substance, underlying and supporting the multifarious, 
changing things we witness with our senses? What is the unchanging 
reality out of which the world was made that supports the appearances 
it generates? Thales is identified as the first philosopher because he 
tried to answer his question not by going to oracles, not by repeating 
Greek myths or traditions, not by consulting poets, but by 
constructing logical arguments based on public evidence. He used 
objective evidence available to everyone to form a conclusion testable 
by anyone according to rational criteria. Mainstream philosophy since 
then has furthered Thales' ambitions by using impartial, objective, 
rational methods to answer the most basic questions about the 
universe and the place of humans in it. Was the universe created? If 
so what was the agent of creation? Do humans possess a non-physical 
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aspect which can survive bodily death in a disembodied state? If so, 
how is that aspect connected to our bodily aspect and what happens 
to it after it is disconnected? If not, what is a mind and a person? 
What are the limits of what we can know? What is the best possible 
life? What are the best rules to abide by collectively to maximize 
goodness in our lives? Who should make and enforce these rules? 
A most startling fact about the labor of reason is that until very 
recently it has been carried almost entirely by men. Even skeptical 
critiques of reason (themselves eminently reasonable) have come 
almost exclusively from men. Explaining why this is so requires deep 
and careful thinking that goes far beyond jejune feminist notions of 
'oppression' and so on. I shall not pursue any explanation here. I only 
wish to notice that the history of philosophy has been the history of 
reason at work on puzzles, questions, and mysteries beyond the scope 
of natural or social science and the most enduring and important 
work in this area has until recently been done by men. 
The fact is that male philosophers, great and not-so-great, have 
largely neither understood women nor have they enthusiastically 
courted their advice in metaphysics and epistemology. Even Plato in 
his qualified argument for gender equality thought of capable 
women as diminutive men. Aristotle thought of them as rationally 
defective. Greek culture, however, wisely made a female Goddess the 
patron of Wisdom. And philosophy is the love of that. 
I ended up with love stories in all five plays and I note with surprise 
that each plot pivots around a strong female character who, while not 
perfect, has something more to teach the male character than he has to 
teach her. Usually she has to teach him that rationality has its limits. 
Christina, Sophie, Neecheemoos, Erothymia, and Athena all share a 
deep respect for the potent instrumental efficacy of logic and science. 
Not one of them is foolish enough to deny objective reason its rightful 
and demonstrated value as a distinctly human capacity. But each 
assigns reason to a subordinate or at least cooperative role in relation 
to the other distinctly human powers that each of us must bring to 
bear on the issues and questions pressing upon our human subjectivity. 
I could speculate on why this insistence on limiting rationality comes 
consistently from women but I would prefer to let the female 
characters speak for themselves. I would note only that these anti-
Platonic and anti-Cartesian women speak their minds to Plato, 
Descartes, and others from an eventual position of clarity and 
strength. Moreover they speak from love to men they regard as rare 
heroic geniuses. Misguided geniuses, perhaps, with their devotion to 
logic in metaphysics, but rare and heroic nonetheless. There is no 
doubt that all these women love intensely and that by each play's 
conclusion they are powerful, centered, competent women. There is 
equally no doubt that their clear and solid love is what eventually 
leads their philosophically overweighted men to stances which reason 
could not provide them. In some cases the female characters must first 
discover or possibly recover their wholeness as women before they can 
guide their intellectual titans. Christina and Erothymia must first 
demonstrate their intellectual superiority—after all they are squaring 
off with Plato and Descartes. Having planted their feet solidly on 
terra firma feminae Erothymia and Christina then fertilize but sharply 
delineate their love's logic, supplementing but not displacing reason 
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with powers and capacities formerly feared and misunderstood by 
both Plato and Descartes. 
I believe that their fear and misunderstanding of lust, love, and 
passion led Plato and Descartes to unintentionally write some of the 
most comical material in the history of western Philosophy on those 
subjects. Descartes on the passions is hilarious. That is because while 
he probably loved a few women and respected most others he never 
understood them and so never learned a thing from them. Why is it 
that for Descartes the mind-body problem is metaphysical while for 
Christina it devolves around what to wear: a bikini or a suit of 
armor? And why is it, in Lives and Evils that Sophie is more 
concerned to hold the philosopher's hand while he dies of AIDS than 
to solve the theoretical problem of evil and suffering? 
Whatever the answer, the central female characters in these plays do not 
want to become imitative duplicates of the men they love nor would they 
even if they wanted to. They add something distinctive to masculine 
philosophy. They do not usurp or belittle it nor do they capitulate to 
it. They supplement it and in so doing modify it. With this aspect of 
my plays I am extremely happy. To ignore women like Christina, 
Sophie, Neecheemoos, Athena, and Erothymia will leave philosophy 
arrested and deformed. I love each of these intriguing women—they 
have in common some superlative qualities for which I have nothing 
but reverence. I would happily be led and loved by any one of them, 
although to me the most fascinating of the five is Neecheemoos. 
Neecheemoos, which means 'dear one' or 'sweetheart' in Cree, 
incarnates thousands of years of windswept wisdom in her aboriginal 
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hair and blood. She is illiterate but glowingly intelligent and 
intuitively profound. She knows nothing about science, logic, 
economics, or arts and letters. Moreover she doesn't need or want to. 
She just loves Inuspi and his strange European ways. She knows that 
Inuspi (the Cree name for her Irish husband) is ill and that his 
sickness is nothing less than western civilization itself—the very 
sickness which eventually killed her. She possessed, in Inuspi's words, 
"the most beautiful heart that was ever broken". She represents the 
aboriginal spirit and culture that was violently uprooted and 
displaced by European colonialism and its attendant evils of greed, 
cultural imperialism, environmental degradation, technical 
domination, and spiritual scholasticism. Her remarkable femininity, 
unadorned by rhetoric and academic pettifoggery, is an unwavering 
indictment of western epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and 
politics. Inuspi, as well-intentioned and as far ahead of his time as he 
was, realizes too late that everything he needs to cure himself of his 
pathology went with Neecheemoos to her grave. If western 
philosophy had only one of the five female characters to listen to I 
think it should be Neecheemoos. She could barely speak English, 
and Inuspi spoke in halting Cree, so together they invented a new 
language (and with it a new state of mind), the language of the love-
land Keyamawisiwin, in which the western categories of capitalistic 
acquisition, sin, egotism, institutionalization (of law, medicine, 
education, and religion), and repression dissolve into the informal 
tribalistic laws of happiness engendered from the earth, the heart, the 
genitals, and when it is appropriate the head. Male philosophers and 
those female philosophers who are trying to become what male 
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philosophers should no longer be ought to take a deep draught of 
Neecheemoos's potion Okimawask: that-by-means-of-which-we-
love-each-other. The ingredients of Okimawask are a secret known 
only by women. 
13 
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PLATO'S RETREAT: INTRODUCTION 
Alfred North Whitehead's remark that Western Philosophy is a series 
of footnotes to Plato has been repeatedly quoted to the point of 
tedium. Nonetheless, it remains true that Plato set the agenda for 
western philosophical discourse: he defined its goals and ideals, he set 
its problems, and he imparted to subsequent philosophers the central 
world-view with which they had to contend. Even the Presocratic 
period looks like a number of conceptual strands waiting to be woven 
into a systematic whole by Plato. 
Erothymia is Plato's greatest challenge. She is the wild, passionately 
sensual, hyper-intelligent woman who dethrones the essentials of 
Platonism and who, if she had loved Plato in history as she did in 
Plato's Retreat, would probably have steered Western Philosophy onto 
another course. 
Plato's Retreat is the name of a defunct New York sex club where 
swingers gathered for public consensual eroticism in every 
conceivable mode and combination. Erothymia is Plato's "retreat" in 
almost that sense. She also provides a "retreat" in the sense that writers 
have a retreat or religious seekers make a retreat. In the end she 
provides a sanctuary for Plato's floundering logic, which she herself 
assaulted and immobilized. Finally, she led Plato's "retreat" from 
Sicily, a tactical retreat in the military sense, which preserved Plato's 
resources for other winnable political battles on the field of reason. 
Plato's Retreat should be read alongside one of Plato's most important 
dialogues, The Republic. This is the first major treatise on social and 
political philosophy (and much else besides) in western history. For 
IE 
some, it is still the last word. One thing is certain though: no student 
of philosophy can ignore it. It is also the best single introduction 
written by Plato to his own philosophical system. And somehow, it 
touches on every major problem in philosophy. 
The Republic is an inquiry into the nature and value of communal and 
individual justice. It asks in Ten Books what principles and structures 
form the best possible, happiest society and the best possible, happiest 
person, and tries to prove that just societies and persons are always 
happier than unjust ones. The treatise opens, significantly, with what 
seems to be an idle conversation between an old man (Cephalus) and 
the central character in all Plato's dialogues (Socrates). Socrates 
questions Cephalus about his views on carnal pleasure and its role in 
an emotionally/cognitively/spiritually prosperous life. Cephalus 
replies that many of his old-aged friends bemoan the loss of those 
pleasures—what would have been the ancient equivalent of sex, drugs, 
and rock 'n roll—but that he himself is relieved to be freed from their 
tyranny. Cephalus makes an interesting argument: if sex, drugs, and 
rock 'n roll are the elements of the good life, then as their attraction 
and pleasure fade it should follow that old people would become 
unhappy. He is old but he is not unhappy, hence the loss of carnal 
pleasures cannot be the cause of unhappiness in old age. Such loss 
would cause unhappiness only for those who wrongly believed, in the 
first place, they were the primary elements of a good life. So it is how 
well you lived your life—and not the amount of carnal pleasure it 
contained—that makes old age bearable. 
Cephalus also notes that wealth does not make him happy. When 
asked what kind of a life he lived to make his old age bearable, 
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Cephalus replies that he tried to be a moderate, decent man, honest 
and fair in his dealings with others. You must mean you were a just 
man, says Socrates, and an inquiry into the essence and value of justice 
begins. Cephalus departs, leaving the debate open for the more agile 
and philosophically astute minds of Thrasymachus and Glaucon. 
This opening passage is very telling. It informs us that this one life of 
ours will someday end in death. We must all ask while we live it what 
will make it good, purposeful, worthwhile. We must all ask whether 
or not huge amounts of sensual pleasure and money will make it 
good. Plato later forces us to ask the same question about fame. 
Cephalus has suggested that while sex, money, and fame are 
undeniably sources of pleasure there may be other kinds of pleasure 
more lasting and more central to the good life, a theme Plato will 
make central to the argument of The Republic. 
Throughout the remainder of Book One, many attempts are made by 
a number of speakers to define justice. All of them collapse under 
Socrates' penetrating elenchus (examination, inquiry). In Book Two a 
powerful argument is laid out by Glaucon, so powerful that the 
remaining eight books of The Republic are devoted to refuting it. I will 
return to this presently. All I want to say at this point is that the entire 
argument is constructed on Plato's vision of the kallipolis (the "finest" 
or "most beautiful" kind of state). Plato's Retreat is written around 
Plato's actual attempt to actualize the ideas in his Republic. 
Plato sailed three times to the Sicilian City-state {polis) of Syracuse at 
the invitation of its ruler, where he hoped to organize the state's 
constitution around his theory of justice. This play is set during his 
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first trip. Three renowned members of Plato's Academy—his 
prestigious centre of learning in Athens—are with him. They are 
Eudoxus (an astronomer/ mathematician), Speusippus (a biologist) 
and Xenocrates (a legal theorist). Each represents a contending place 
in The Republic's argument: Plato wants to find a functional niche for 
each of them in his society. It is not until Plato thoroughly encounters 
the fiery, mesmerizing Erothymia that the conversational play takes a 
dramatic turn and Plato's argument is undone. In actual fact, Plato's 
three attempts to found the ideal society ended in failure. And in 
actual fact, Erothymia never existed. The premise of my play is that the 
attempts to found the Republic in Sicily were bound to fail because 
Plato underestimated everything Erothymia represents. His reply to 
Glaucon (represented in the play by Erothymia) is plain wrong. 
Erothymia proves it in fiction, but Plato's failure proved it in Sicily. 
We will have to understand Plato's unified argument before seeing 
where it goes wrong. It is a brilliant but lengthy argument which I shall 
try to condense at my own peril. It begins soon after Cephalus exits. 
The dominant question is: Do just people have a better life than 
unjust people, or is it the other way around? This question cannot be 
answered until we know what justice really is, because our concept of 
justice will mold and color every estimate of its value. What, then, is 
the correct account or theory of justice? Plato carefully lays out two 
popular theories of justice he thinks are disastrously wrong. 
Today we would see it as catastrophic if these two theories were 
indeed wrong, because one or the other of them is identical to pretty 
well everyone's reflective account of the nature and therefore the value 
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of justice, whether they are aware of it or not. So if these portrayals of 
justice are catastrophically wrong then the general view of how to live 
and what to live for would also be catastrophically wrong, to the point 
that nearly everyone is wasting his or her life. 
The single most essential point common to both these popular 
theories is this: nothing is just or unjust until it is said to be so by 
someone. There are no rules of just and unjust, of Tightness and 
wrongness, until someone makes them. Rules of right and wrong are 
not discovered, but constructed. Plato calls this the conventionalist 
view of justice. Nothing is good or right or just by physis (by nature), 
only by nomos (by convention). Like the rules of football, they are 
strictly arbitrary. Nothing is legal or illegal in football until some rule 
declares that it is and the same goes for social and legal rules. It 
therefore makes no sense to ask if the rule is good or bad on other 
grounds, since the rule itself defines what is good or bad. 
This conventionalist account horrified Plato. It entails that the rules 
defining right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust, legal and 
illegal, are free to vary according to the whim and will of the rule 
makers, dictated only by the rule-maker's interest. This is exactly what 
Thrasymachus thinks with his might-makes-right theory. He argues 
that the strongest define what is just, enforcing the rules they make to 
their own advantage. They don't make the rules because the rules are 
just; the rules are just simply because the mighty say they are. The 
justness of the rules cannot be established by criteria independent of 
the rules themselves because the rules themselves define justness. This 
means that standards of justice are completely relative to where they 
are made, and by whom. If one group of rule-makers says polygamy 
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is right then it is right for everyone within the domain of the rule-
maker's influence. If another rule-maker says it is wrong, then it is 
wrong within that rule-maker's domain of influence. The best life, 
under this view, is that in which one acquires and keeps the power to 
make self-serving rules. 
Glaucon has an even more compelling conventionalist theory of 
justice. In his account, the rules are not made by a small group of the 
strongest to its own advantage but by all of us to our personal 
advantage. His social contract theory of justice, now widely adopted 
by serious philosophers, is what Plato attacks throughout The Republic. 
Glaucon's fundamental premise is that each one of us wants to 
maximize our own pleasure and minimize pain. We all seek our own 
advantage at the expense of others. We are all driven by an innate 
competitive drive to get more than, or "outdo", others in rhe pursuit 
of what we take to be our own pleasurable advantage. The good we 
seek is the satisfaction of our selfish desires. We are all in the same 
position, however, so we all know that everyone else is seeking their 
own advantage at our expense—everyone else is willing to inflict harm 
on me to get what they want (money, power, fame, sexual compliance, 
etc.) just as much as I am willing to inflict harm on them, if I can get 
away with it, to get what I want. The ideal situation would be for each 
of us to get all we want for ourselves without paying the price of being 
harmed by others in return, but (most important) all of us would 
much rather avoid being harmed by others in their pursuit of what 
they want than to achieve inflicting harm on others in the pursuit of 
our personal advantage. The badness of being harmed far outweighs 
the goodness of inflicting it. Since we are all in the same situation, and 
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everyone knows it, we are all in a position of mutual constraint. I 
realize I would be better off if you agree not to hurt me while I pursue 
my own interests, and you realize you would be better off if I agree not 
to hurt you while you pursue yours, so we both make a deal, in our 
mutual interest, not to harm each other. This is a tacit bargain, an 
intuitive contractual compromise, which puts brakes on each other's 
self serving desires, allowing each of us to get some of what we want 
while avoiding what we most don't want. Whatever bargain we strike, 
whatever contract we make for the joint conduct of our lives will be a 
set of rules that together define what is just and unjust. We will also 
agree on what the penalty will be for breaking the rules. 
Of course, it would be to my advantage to break the rules whenever 
I can as long as I don't get caught and pay the penalty. Glaucon 
thinks each of us would do this if we could, and we would be better 
off if we could. It would be better to be unjust, but undetected. 
Glaucon's "proof" of this is drawn from a comparison of two 
extremes. Compare, he says, two pure cases: the perfectly unjust 
(lawless) man thought to be just and the perfectly just (law-abiding) 
man thought to be unjust. He claims the unjust man would be 
completely happy, the just one completely miserable. This shows that 
it is the fear of unpleasant consequences alone that keeps us more or 
less just, not any respect for justice. Remove the bad consequences 
and we would all be unjust. 
Plato has the formidable task of proving Glaucon wrong. Glaucon's 
theory of the nature of justice is totally wrong, Plato argues, and his 
theory of the value of justice is consequently spectacularly wrong. If 
Glaucon only knew what the real essence of justice was—as Plato 
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believes he does—he would see that a just life, even if it is perceived 
by others to be unjust, is the happiest, mosr superior life. 
Plato proposes that we examine someone who is "perfectly good" and 
thereby read off the nature of justice from his goodness. It would be 
simpler, though, to first scrutinize a perfectly good society to see what 
justice is and then return to the good individual. (Plato thinks the 
essence of justice will be the same in societies and individuals, but it 
would be easier to discern in larger social terms). If the society is 
perfectly good it would exhibit the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, 
Courage, Moderation and Justice. His proposal is to mentally map 
out the structure of the ideal society, find the virtues of Wisdom, 
Courage, and Moderation in it, and then analyze whatever excellence 
remains. That would be Justice. 
The best society would be one in which everyone co-operated to help 
everyone else satisfy simple needs. Human needs are not all simple, 
however, so many different trades and professions will be necessary 
to provide for everyone's luxurious needs. A luxurious city would be 
at risk of invasion, so a military class would have to be formed to 
protect it (and to invade other lands when it is necessary for the 
maintenance of luxury). In addition to that, business and trade 
would have to be regulated within the ciry-state—something the 
military class would also have to do. But who decides when the 
military class will go to war? Who decides what the business rules 
and regulations will be? Someone has to govern. Plato therefore 
creates a third ruling class in addition to the working-producing class 
and the fighting-enforcing class. 
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In the best society wisdom will be found in the ruling class, because 
the natural function of reason is to wisely guide and regulate the lower 
passions and appetites as well as the fighting spirit. For the appetite or 
the militant aspect of a society to control the part that naturally 
deliberates, knows, and makes regulations would be absurd. The ideal 
society would put the wise and knowing part in charge. Courage, in 
a well-ordered society, would be manifest in the warrior class—the 
one whose job it is to protect, to invade, and to enforce the state's 
internal laws made by the wise and knowledgeable rulers. Moderation 
(also described as self-control) is a kind of discipline which consists 
primarily in the willingness of the working and military classes to be 
ruled by the decisions and regulations of the rulers and, equally, in the 
willingness of the rulers to wisely exercise their power to govern. So it 
is a simultaneous submission to authority by the ruled and imposition 
of legitimate authority by the rulers. 
Justice is also a quality exhibited by the composite state and not by 
one of its three classes. Justice, in its original Greek sense, is a 
condition of lawfulness and orderliness in the relation among 
elements in a whole. In a just, orderly system the whole functions 
efficiently because each of its elements functions efficiently, doing 
what it is supposed to do and doing it well. In a justly organized 
system all the elements are coordinated under some regulating 
principle, and each element does its own proper task without 
interfering with or usurping the work of another element. Plato is 
unwavering in his insistence that everyone should do the work they 
do best and only that work. In his kallipolis the working class limits 
itself to its own proper work (this includes all exchanges of goods and 
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services for money, so the working class is not just composed of 
cobblers, bakers, farmers, etc., but also doctors, lawyers, engineers, 
teachers, etc.). The fighting class does nothing but prepare to fight 
and engage in policing. The rulers only rule and deliberate. This 
means above all, that the workers and soldiers do not have the right 
or power to rule. Nor do they have any voice in who will be picked 
to rule. Plato thinks that for the ruled to select the rulers is absurd, 
rather like school children deciding who will do the teaching or 
patients voting for who will do the doctoring. This argument is 
premised on Plato's anti-democratic assertion that people are 
naturally unequal when it comes to innate intelligence, talent, and 
character. Obviously, no innate qualities will ever come to fruition 
without careful, knowledgeable guidance—hence Plato's obsessions 
with education—but no amount of nurture will alter innate nature. 
Large numbers of people are born with talents and dispositions for 
working in the trades and professions and consuming the goods 
produced from their labor. These are the masses. A smaller number 
have the rarer qualities of extreme courage, endurance, intelligence, 
and prowess necessary to protect the interests of the masses and to 
execute the directions of the rulers. The very best of the military class 
are qualified to become rulers. By "very best" Plato means the most 
intelligent, the most educated, and the most virtuous: the rulers 
would have to be moral saints, geniuses, and polymaths all at once. 
Justice requires that everyone perform the function they are best 
suited to perform. Since talent, intelligence, and character are not 
distributed equally not everyone can rule, not everyone can fight, and 
not everyone can work. Plato draws two fascinating corollaries to this: 
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if you are not fit for a job, you cannot do it; if you are fit for a job, 
you must do it. This includes women fit for the military and for 
ruling. It also includes parenting: only those who are fit to raise 
children will be required to do so. 
Suppose you were going to take an airplane trip to Europe. You discover 
on boarding that the airline has a new policy: the mechanics will be 
allowed to fly the plane, the pilots and navigators will serve the wine, 
and the flight attendants will service the engine (which was designed 
by the baggage handlers). Would you get on this airplane? Of course 
not. Again, would you get on an airplane whose captain was elected 
by the passengers on the basis of speeches, promises, and advertising? 
Again, of course not. You would want an experienced captain who has 
proven to experts that he or she is qualified to a very high standard to 
be captain. The captain would have to prove that he is intelligent, that 
he knows more about aerodynamics and aeronautical engineering 
than everyone else on the aircraft, that he is decisive and cool in 
emergencies, that his judgments are sound, that he can inspire respect 
and obedience from the crew, that he inspires confidence in the 
passengers, and that once he has demonstrated all these other things, 
he is supremely good at taking off, cruising, and landing airplanes. A 
well ordered, justly regulated aircraft requires that it be run by a 
captain of superior talent, knowledge, and virtue and that the captain 
does nothing but command. The just state is no different. 
Plato argues forcefully that ruling is a techne. The English words 
'technique' and 'technical' come from this Greek root. These words 
suggest that good ruling is a craft requiring expertise and technical 
knowledge, just like airline piloting, doctoring, or carpentry. Techne 
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is sometimes translated as 'art', but to Plato 'art' would have meant 
'skill', and skill is technical expertise at something. Hence, if ruling 
is a techne, then no one can rule except those who have proven 
themselves to possess an unsurpassable amount of aptitude for it. 
They must somehow demonstrate through a series of progressively 
more demanding tests over a period of fifty years that they are the 
finest of the finest. If there were a Nobel Prize for statesmanship, 
leadership, and legislative wisdom, only the winners would be 
candidates for ruling. 
The rulers in the ideal state would have to demonstrate exceptional 
intellectual gifts. They would also have to be exceptionally superior in 
virtue—virtuous in self-control, courage, justice and wisdom to the 
highest degree. They would have received the most complete and 
rigorous education possible in the arts and sciences. And they would 
have demonstrated an unusual talent for leadership and diplomacy 
after a fifteen-year apprenticeship in managing different civic 
departments. If, and only if, a man's or woman's talents and gifts are 
proven by objective tests to be at the highest level of superiority would 
they be asked to rule. They would agree to rule not for money, power, 
or fame, but because they know that in a just society they have an 
obligation to do so. In a just society the best must rule, and this 
means the wisest, the most knowledgeable, the smartest, and the most 
skilled at the techne of ruling. A society is completely just, says Plato, 
when the state is governed by a Philosopher King or Queen, when 
wisdom rules and rulers are wise. 
How is wisdom proven? Plato's answer raises the most controversial 
theory in his corpus of thought (indeed, the most controversial theory 
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in the history of philosophy). His answer forms the heart of his system, 
a heart broken by Erothymia. That heart was his Theory of Forms. 
The concept of wisdom contains many elements. A wise person has 
considerable experience in living and learning (even though 
experienced and learned people are not always wise). They also have 
unusual practical insight—a hefty dose of common sense about what 
is strategically sensible, what is appropriate to what, what is fair, and 
so on. But again, insightfulness is not always a guarantee of wisdom. 
Wisdom is made complete by knowledge. The wise man or woman 
knows something that most people don't know, and the wisest man 
or woman has more knowledge at the highest level than anyone else 
does. The wisest person knows what is most real. 
Three Books of The Republic are devoted to a Theory of Reality 
(metaphysics) and an aligned Theory of Knowledge (epistemology). 
In these two interdependent theories Plato uses his favorite recurrent 
metaphor, that of a hierarchical scale or ladder. He locates everything 
on some scaled progression from least to most, lowest to highest: love, 
justice, pleasure, goodness and (most importantly) knowledge and 
reality. His hierarchy of reality is a scale of Being (one could also say 
Perfection). The ascending scale from least real to most real is divided 
in half. The lowest half is populated by the familiar world of empirical 
objects, the world of appearances known through sense experience. It 
is a constantly changing and impermanent world of separate material 
things in space and time. It is imperfect because it is material, since 
material things are subject to alteration and eventual decomposition. 
Opposed to it on the upper half of the line is the non-material, more 
real heaven of permanent immutable Forms. The Forms are the 
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timelessly unchanging realities which provide the ground for all 
being, value, and knowledge. The most perfect Form of all is the 
Fotm of the Good, which, if it had creative power and person-like 
characteristics, would be something like the God of Christianity: that 
which is the source of all lesser being(s) and that into which all lesser 
being is ultimately absorbed. 
Plato's division is really a separation of reality into the two categories 
of the empirically known natural world and the rationally known 
supernatural world. The first is populated by mutable material objects 
that are imperfect manifestations of the perfect immutable, 
immaterial objects called Forms. Plato gives this example. There are 
numerous sensed instances of beautiful things, actions, and states-of-
affairs in the natural world. We are able to identify these multiple 
instances as beautiful in some imperfect degree because there is an 
unchanging universal essence of Beauty, which imparts the quality of 
Beauty to them. This is the Form of Beauty, from which the many 
more or less beautiful things in the sensed world derive their nature. 
There is only one standard of Beauty but many beautiful things. 
Every instance of knowledge must have something that is known 
about, all knowledge has a reference—the object of what is known. 
The more perfect the object of knowledge is, the more the 
knowledge is perfect, similarly with the less perfect. If what is known 
is shifting, insubstantial, and imperfect the level of knowledge will be 
correspondingly shifting, insubstantial, and imperfect. In fact, Plato 
does not call thinking at the lowest level knowledge at all. He calls it 
mere opinion—thinking that something is real as opposed to 
knowing that it is not. As his famous parable of the cave shows, 
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thinking at such a low level is a kind of imprisonment, the senses 
being the jailer. 
The complete wisdom of the ruler, then, includes knowing the 
transcendental Forms. This gives the ruler the exclusive authority to 
make laws, rules, and policies for the benefit of the ruled, because in 
knowing the Form of Justice the ruler knows better than anyone else 
what best regulates a happy, integrated society. 
Plato argues that each individual psyche (soul) is made up of parts 
homologous with the three social classes. The biggest part of the soul 
is the irrational appetitive part, driven by powerful blind desires for 
carnal pleasure. This part does not think, it just wants. The finest part 
of the soul, the part that is divine and immortal, is the rational part. 
This part calculates, deliberates, and knows, so its role is to govern 
and direct the appetites. Between the rational part and the appetitive 
part is the third part called the spirited patt. It can variously be 
described as Will , Temperament, or Passion. Like an obedient, well-
trained constabulary in a smoothly functioning society, it executes 
and enforces the directions of the ruling deliberative part. The 
complete human psyche is thus a composite of three things, loosely 
describable as Body, Mind, and Spirit. Wisdom resides in the mind, 
courage in the spirit, moderation in the submission of body and spirit 
to the mind, and justice in the non-interference of each part in the 
proper functioning of the others so that the soul functions as a unified 
whole rather than a disunited clash of warring parts. 
Now Plato is in a position to reply to Glaucon. Having provided an 
account of the essence of justice radically different than Glaucon's, he 
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argues that a just life, communally- and individually, is qualitatively 
and intrinsically better than any unjust one. The virtue of justice, he 
will show, is its own reward. Then he will try to demonstrate in a 
crowning argument that a just life will ultimately bring infinitely 
greater rewards as well, even if those rewards do not come to us in our 
brief mortal tesidence in this world. Plato develops these arguments 
with Glaucon's three-fold division of goods in mind. 
Glaucon had asserted in Book Two that there are some things we 
would describe as good, but we would never desire them for their 
own sake. Painful medical treatments for example, would never be 
sought out unless they produced some consequential good. Their 
goodness is merely instrumental, for the sake of something else. Some 
goods are sought, however, not because they bring about some other 
good but simply for their own intrinsic goodness. Art and sex may be 
thought of as so intrinsically good that they are engaged in for no 
purpose beyond themselves. Obviously art may also be sold and sex 
may be engaged in to make babies, in which case they would be 
mixed goods, providing both instrumental and intrinsic goodness. 
Glaucon places justice in the first class, the merely instrumental class, 
claiming that no one would willingly be just unless it either 
promoted good consequences or circumvented bad ones. Plato does 
not agree, saying that justice is in the "finest" mixed class, good both 
in itself and for the sake of its consequences. He attempts to prove, 
first, that justice is intrinsically good. 
The first argument exploits Plato's ladder metaphor. Imagine a 
ladder with five rungs. The lowest rung represents the most unjust 
person, the highest one the most just. In between are three more 
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gradations. Plato's portrait of the personality type occupying each 
run of the laddet of justice is stunning in its brilliance. His profile of 
the most unjust person is a chillingly accurate analysis of the 
criminally sociopathic personality: completely without reason, 
lawless, a slave to animal appetites and fantasies, and an abusive 
tyrant. The just person, at the other extreme, is an enlightened, 
morally sound lover of truth. Plato asks us to consider, on the basis 
of appearances alone, who has the better life. The sane verdict, he 
thinks, would consistently favor the most just person. 
The second argument is generated from considerations about the 
differential quality of pleasures. Each part of the soul has its own 
unique desires, which in being satisfied yield their own quality of 
pleasure. The appetitive patt desires the carnal pleasures associated 
with food, sex, drink, material things, and the aesthetic titillation of 
the senses. Because these pleasures can be easily obtained through the 
medium of money, Plato names it the money-loving part. The 
spirited part acquires its satisfaction through competition, free of 
monetary considerations. It loves the honor and fame that comes 
from heroic conquest. Courage and victory in war or in the Olympic 
games would be the pre-eminent circumstances in which the honor-
loving part acquires its pleasures. The rational part of the soul desires 
truth and philosophical enlightenment. It does not love money or 
fame. This truth-loving part of the soul seeks knowledge and 
understanding for their own sake, experiencing its own peculiar 
satisfaction when it acquires them. Plato rightly claims that the 
money-lover will certify his own pleasure as the best, the honor-lover 
will say his is the best, while the truth-lover will make the same claim 
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for his. Who is in the best position to judge? Naturally, the person 
who has experienced all three kinds of pleasure. If those who have 
experienced of all three consistently judge the pleasures of science and 
philosophy to be qualitatively superior to the other two then that 
judgment must be accepted as authoritative. Plato believes that such 
judges do in fact render such a judgment about the pleasures of 
reason, so they must be better or "higher" pleasures. Further, since 
just people are ruled by their rational part, they must have 
qualitatively better lives than those ruled by spirit or appetite. 
The third argument is based on how real pleasures are. The 
appetitive pleasures, in their endlessly renewable cycle, are unreal and 
illusory. A reduction in pleasure is painful but a reduction in pain is 
pleasurable. Hence, on the pleasure-pain continuum there is a 
midpoint where reduced pain and reduced pleasure intersect, and 
this point is contradictory mixture of both pleasure and pain, which 
is impossible. The rational pleasures, however, are stable and 
enduring, unaffected by chance and circumstance, because the objects 
of rational pleasure are timelessly permanent and unchanging. The 
pleasures of the mind are more real than those of the flesh or spirit. 
Again, the just person in whom the tational part is fully developed 
and in a regnant position is the happier person. 
Plato deploys these three arguments to demonstrate the intrinsic 
goodness of justice. But he has further promised to prove that a just 
life also procures superior consequences. Here he takes Glaucon's 
argument head-on. He argues that whatever worldly benefit emerges 
from the practice of injustice is infinitely outweighed by its bad 
consequences in the world to come. There, virtue will be rewarded 
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eternally while vice will be punished a hundred times over. Then, 
exonerated from vice, the unjust person will have to be reborn until 
his soul is liberated from appetitive and spirited desires. The whole 
purpose of human life, it seems, is to reach the final blinding 
encounter with the Form of the Good and, freed from the bonds of 
worldly, bodily desire, to spend eternity in its blissful presence. 
So goes the last of The Republics arguments. These are the arguments 
forming Plato's blueprint for a new constitution in Syracuse. His first 
sailing provides the setting in which proponents of legal theory, 
metaphysics, mathematics, and biology engage in a dialectical struggle 
to formulate the principles and structures on which their kallipolis will 
be founded. Plato's Retreat opens on top of the active volcano Plato had 
put ashore enroute to investigate. "The forces of nature go deep," says 
Plato as they peer over the lip of the simmering crater. Plato knew they 
went deep, but he premised his argument on the belief that reason 
could plumb their depth and subdue their fury. My argument is that 
reason cannot do this. In historical fact, Plato's actual failure in 
Syracuse was due, I believe, to this weakness in his argument. Reason 
lacks the power to otganize and govern the passions and appetites. It 
can't. Nor should it. This play concludes, in agreement with Hume, 
that "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions." The only 
thing, I would say, that controls a passion or appetite is a stronger 
passion or appetite. Logic and abstract thought do not have the energy 
to force the conformity of passion and appetite to its dictates. 
The only way I could see to refute Plato dramatically was to give to 
the female character Erothymia more rational capacity and more 
passionate intensity than Plato had. I believe only a woman with 
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greater intellectual gifts than those possessed by Plato could have 
caused him to relinquish his "Platonism". She had to prove to him 
first that he was wrong, but she engaged his passions in order to do so. 
I gave her a more nimble and sharper mind than Plato's but, 
significantly, I had to give Plato an expansive sensual appetite and 
boundless passion in order for Erothymia to find him challenging. 
Curiously, I also had to give Erothymia an initially disordered 
personality which, in being cured, transforms her chilling Social 
Darwinism into a more humane contractarianism, thanks to Plato 
and Alethea. 
'Erothymia' is a name of my own fabrication, coming from the two 
Greek words eros and thymos. Eros is one of the six continents on 
love's map. Erotic love is undiluted, shameless desire, the love of the 
animalistic rut. I'm sure this is the kind of love Plato opposes to 
philein which is the love that drives us to embrace wisdom. As I have 
described it elsewhere, "Erotic love is frenzied love, drive and 
sustained by sexual desire; it is passionate, obsessive, irrational, and 
promiscuous" (O'Connell, Dilemmas and Decisions, 1994). Closest to 
it, and frequently in bed with it, is romantic love {amor), in which a 
specific person is obsessively idealized and sacrificially adored. Eros is 
impartially genital while amor is personally "spiritual". Erothymia, in 
loving Plato, discovers amor and learns to incorporate her eros into it. 
Thymos, the second component of her name, is the Greek word for 
the third part of the soul, the spirited part. This is a very interesting 
and fecund concept, which I have sketched out in the play. We could 
describe the spirited part as Will, the kind of spirit that is "willing 
when the flesh is weak", or whatever it is that is low when one's spirits 
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are low. Erothymia has an over-abundance of high spirit. She is a 
hyper-intelligent spirited woman, and her spirit is driven by erotic 
lust, which is ironically unfulfilled until she meets Plato and learns to 
integrate it with love. 
Erothymia incarnates everything Plato fears as a threat to justice, to 
lawful orderliness in the polls and the psyche. The passions and 
appetites are the boiling elements of the psyche Plato thinks should 
be subdued and directed by cool reason and logic with compliant 
thymic assistance. Erothymia, however, is a romantic pragmatist. For 
her, feeling and sensation will always assert their hegemony and ought 
to, making reason a purely instrumental device that intelligently 
secures for the appetites and passions what they desire. In this respect, 
Erothymia is Glauconian in outlook. She also acknowledges the 
technical power of reason and respects its limited capacity for 
mastering the world in science and logic. Leaping outside its proper 
domain of pragmatic application into Plato's bloodless, bodiless 
heaven of abstract, purely formal transcendental "realities", however, 
elicits nothing but ridicule from her. Justice is thus not some kind of 
space-less, time-less "essence" hovering in disembodied perfection 
outside the natural world. It is entirely in this world and of this world, 
created by self-interested reason to advance the irrepressible aims of 
the appetites and passions. An active thymos is nothing more than 
aggressive ambition to succeed in these aims. 
Notice that I have not created a stereotype in Erothymia. Her mature 
romanticism, if one wants to call it that, is not due to a weak or 
incompetent mind. She does not overwhelm Plato's "masculine side" 
with het "feminine side". She challenges his passions, yes, but she 
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defeats him philosophically. Her test of his reason is at two levels. She 
first wants to make sure that his mind and will are as strong as she 
insists they must be in a worthy lover. If he can resist her temptations 
he will be minimally worthy, given that his temptations are intense. 
But second, she uses Plato's most beloved instrument to beat him at his 
own game. With razor-sharp logic she attacks and dissects the heart of 
his system. Calmly and benevolently she destroys his Theory of Forms 
(and with it every subsequent theological theory of supernaturalism). 
Plato wins her game and she wins his. Each comes to respect and love 
each other's immense strengths of mind and character. 
Erothymia, with some help from Alethea, pulls Plato's head out of the 
clouds and reconnects it to his hearr, to his genitals, and to the earth 
on which he stands. She leaves him bereft of his otherworldly 
consolations: the transcendental forms and a place for his soul to rest 
while maggots consume his bodily remains. In purging him of 
supernatural beliefs, she undermines the foundation of western 
theology and rationalist otherworldly metaphysics. She did to 
Platonism what Queen Christina was later to do to Cartesianism. 
But we must notice something else. Erothymia comes to revere justice 
as much as Plato does. She is also in awe of Plato's courageous rejection 
of conventional marriage and his unpopular promotion of gender 
equality, such as it was. She has no chip on her shoulder about science 
or logic, indeed she admires it when it is used pragmatically to solve 
crimes or to build faster, better boats. She knows that Plato reasons 
well, as much as Christina later knew that Descartes would reason 
well, but these two impressive women did not reject reason. They 
merely gave two major western philosophers a different account of it 
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and of its range of application. I note too, with relief, that while they 
tuined Platonism and Cartesianism, they loved Plato and Descartes. 
With love they saved them. 
Why did Erothymia love Plato? And why did Plato love her? Because 
each had in great breadth and depth what was de-centered in the 
other. Reason and passion achieved a synthetic balance in theit 
respective spirited wills. Each blessed with the highest degree of 
intelligence, each possessed of the greatest extent and magnitude of 
desire and passion, Plato and Erothymia were fated to clash and bond. 
In one of his greatest dialogues, The Symposium, Plato gives us an 
unforgettable metaphor for love. He quotes a Greek Myth, in which 
it is said that human beings were originally a double-sexed fusion of 
male and female. In anger, Zeus cut everyone in half, severing the 
female part from the male part. Each part ran in different directions, 
and love is the search for our missing, sundered half. Until we find it 
and cleave to it we will not be happy. Plato was Erothymia's better 
half, and she was his better half. Each better half joined itself to the 
other better half, with the result that, in being united, the union of 
the two better halves was made even better by the goodness of each. 
I wish, for the sake of philosophy's two-and-a-half millennia, that a 
real Erothymia had knocked loudly on the door of Plato's Academy. 
The story of philosophy might then have looked forward to as happy 
an ending as Plato's Retreat had. But no Erothymia showed up. I don't 
know if Plato even had a girlfriend. If he had, and if she had been 
Erothymia, Descartes would not have died in another drama set two 
thousand years later 
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Plato's Retreat 
CAST OF CHARACTERS (In order of appearance) 
Plato, a Greek Philosopher 
Eudoxus, Xenocrates, and Speusippus, Plato's companions 
Dion, an army general 
Erothymia, niece of Dionysius the Elder 
Several crew members 
Alethea, an Athenian scholar 
Dionysius the Elder, ruler of Syracuse 
Dionysius the Younger, the Elder's son 
Several assembly members and soldiers 
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Program Note 
Plato's Republic, one of the greatest works by one of Western 
Philosophy's greatest practitioners, is concerned primarily with the 
nature and role of justice in a good life. Plato examines justice in each 
individual's psyche and in political groupings. The political aspects of 
his theory intrigued the Ruler of Syracuse, in Sicily, and Plato was 
invited by the ruler to make an attempt to install the Republic's 
political philosophy in his city-state (polis). Plato sailed to Sicily three 
times in an effort to bring his version of the ideal society into 
existence. My dramatization records Plato's failure. I have made 
considerable use of the poet's license to change actual historical events 
and sequences, while preserving the arguments of the text. 
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ACT ONE 
It is 380 BCE. Plato is enroute from Athens to Sicily, where he will visit 
Dionysius the Elder, ruler of Syracuse. He is accompanied by Speusippus 
(a biologist), Xenocrates (a constitutional and legal theorist), and 
Eudoxus (an astronomer-mathematician). They have stopped at an 
island, where Plato is furthering his research into volcanoes. 
Scene One 
House lights to black. Bouzouki music up. There is a red, circular 
glow centerstage against a background of black, dotted by tiny white 
shimmering lights. The background slowly changes to indigo, then 
lavender. As Scene One continues, the background will change to 
light salmon pink, then pale orange. Enter Plato, Eudoxus, 
Speussipus, and Xenocrates, silhouetted against the lavender 
background. The four of them crawl up a ledge and peer upstage into 
the red glow. Steam rises from behind the ledge. Music down. 
Plato: The forces of nature go deep. 
El ldOXUS: Are you talking about the volcano, Plato, or about 
everything? 
Plato: My good Eudoxus, you know I like metaphors, even 
though I distrust them. Metaphors are the clamps of 
language. But I am interested in volcanoes on a 
factual basis too. 
E u d O X U S : So is that why they call you a philosopher? Because 
you want to know everything? 
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Plato: Yes, I want to understand things mathematically in 
the way you do. And I want to understand biology in 
the way that Speusippus does. How, for example, do 
those lilies live in this lava? 
Speusippus: How does anything live at all? My study of plants 
and animals keeps bringing me back to that. (They 
all turn and sit, facing the audience.) 
Plato: And the questions posed by Xenocrates are some of 
the most difficult and most pressing of all. What do 
you say Xenocrates? What do you want to know? 
Xenocrates: As a constitutional and legal theorist, I want to know 
which constitutions and which laws will guarantee 
the finest polis fot human beings to flourish in. I 
want to know what the best life is for each of us, and 
then see the political structures and principles that 
would nurture such a good life for all of us. 
Plato: Bravo, Xenocrates. We should apply ourselves to the 
daunting task of doing just that and make 
preparations now to begin it. We will be at the court 
of Dionysius the Elder in Sicily after just two more 
days of sailing. You all know and share my fondest 
wish—to establish a supremely good polis. I deeply 
want to found the ideal city-state, and the ruler of 
Syracuse is giving us that chance. (Hissing and 
rumbling sounds come from the crater. They all peer 
over its lip.) 
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Xenocrates: So that will be our goal—to think out what kind of 
constitution we should install in Syracuse when we 
get there. 
Eudoxus: What's that? Is it about to erupt? 
Plato: I don't think so. 
Eudoxus: I am phobic about the unpredictable. 
Plato: Shame on you, Eudoxus. In the material world, 
unpredictability and randomness are dominant 
principles. Nothing is stable, everything is capricious. 
Eudoxus: We should go back to the ship. Speusippus, what do 
you say? 
Speusippus: If it blows, it blows. Something equally threatening 
could just as easily kill us on the ship. Lightning, for 
example. I say we go on talking. I think Xenoctates 
agrees. 
Xenocrates: Absolutely. I say we should make it our goal to think 
out what kind of constitution we should install when 
we get to Sicily. 
Eudoxus: Wait a minute! What's that over there? 
Xenocrates: Over where? 
Eudoxus: There. That speck on the horizon. 
Xenocrates: I don't see it. 
Plato: There it is. Is it a ship? 
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Speusippus: I think so. It's heading this way. 
E u d O X U S : Pirates? 
Speusippus: Likely. We should go before they see us. 
Plato: Where would we go? If we put out of the harbor they 
will certainly see us. We should stay here. (More 
hissing and rumbling.) 
E u d O X U S : And do what? 
Xenocrates: We could talk about what we ultimately want to 
accomplish in Syracuse. Do we not want to 
conceive and nurture rhe best possible society, the 
kallipolis? Do we not want to produce a blueprint 
for the ideal state, then impliment it with the help 
of its ruler Dionysius? 
Speusippus: What does that mean? I think it means that we must 
reason out the structures and principles that would 
guarantee a political state we could identify as 
completely good. A kallipolis, as you say. 
E u d O X U S : In other words, a polis which is unsurpassably fine or 
beautiful or excellent. But this is not the time or 
place to start. We have a rumbling volcano to one 
side of us and possible pirates to the other. Look, that 
ship is getting closer. It's coming right for us! 
Plato: I think they've seen us. We should hide. 
Xenocrates: Where? 
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Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
Plato: 
Speusippus: 
Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
Speusippus: 
Plato: 
Behind a lava mound. Then we could start talking. 
No, on second thought we should let them know we 
are here. Then they will not think we are hiding 
something valuable or that we are afraid of them. 
They've seen our ship in any case. (He takes off his 
shirt and waves it.) Here! We are up here! 
They see us. They are lowering their sail and breaking 
out the oars. 
Let's not move. Let them come up here to us. So 
much for Xenocrates' kallipolis. 
We can talk while we wait. There is still time. I have 
an idea. Let's isolate the one quality, the one 
dominant excellence, that would characterize the 
finest and most superior kind of polis, and then 
organize the constitution of Syracuse around it. 
What would that be? 
Yes, a society of the highest value, of the greatest 
worth, something superior, the best of the best. But 
it must be realistically possible and not merely ideal. 
It would have to be the quality that provides the 
greatest amount of goodness and well-being to each 
of its participants. 
We have a name for it already. The right word is 
dikaiosune. If a polis, or even an individual, has the 
quality of dikaiosune, it will have the most important 
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characteristic for a smooth and happy existence. If it 
has that quality, we could say it is dike, and its 
dikaiosune makes it good. (Eudoxus exits quickly.) 
Xenocrates: I have been thinking about that for many years. I 
agree that this is exactly the right question. What is 
dikaiosune? What makes something dike? I know 
several words for describing the usual meaning of 
dikaiosune but I want to know what its essence is. 
Particularly, I want to know what causes something 
to be dike. (Eudoxus re-enters.) 
E u d O X U S : They're coming. There are four of them. 
Plato: Xenocrates, what words can you use to express the 
meaning of dikaiosune? 
E u d O X U S : I said they are coming! 
Plato: So? We can talk while we wait for them. Xenocrates? 
Xenocrates: There are several words, but none of them can 
individually depict it. Something is dike if there is a 
certain orderliness to it, some organization to it. 
Speusippus: Do you mean something like an army? 
Xenocrates: Yes, like an army, or a family, or a team, or even a 
gang of outlaws, and especially a society. 
Plato: And certainly a person. A person's psyche is dike if it 
is organized and ordered. 
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Xenocrates: Absolutely, Plato. Dikaiosune would have the same 
structure in persons as it does in a polis or anything 
else. But I don't think we are clear yet about it. What 
does orderliness or organization mean? 
E u d O X U S : As a mathematician, I would identify it as a kind of 
harmony or proportion in a system of inter-related 
parts. If a system is dike, it is in a state of proportion 
or balance. As you say, it is ordered or orderly. We 
can talk of the dike of nature, or of a company, or 
even of a machine, for example. 
Plato: Well said. It sounds as if something is dike if all its 
various parts function together in an integrated way, 
or unified way. Perhaps that is just another way of 
saying that it is balanced and proportionate and 
harmonious and integrated. Above all, integrated. It 
has integrity. It is a unit, like an integer. 
Speusippus: But what accounts for this orderliness and 
integration? Things can be disordered and 
disintegrated. They can be lacking a principle of 
organization. What, then, brings about unification 
and co-ordination in a person or in a society, or in 
anything that requires a co-operation of parts to 
achieve its purpose? 
Plato: Now we are getting closer. Let us say that 
equilibrium in a system is brought about when the 
parts or different functions in the system are 
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regulated by some governing principle, by some 
regulation or rule that oversees the system. 
Xenocrates: A regulation is like a law or principle. 
Plato: Yes. Something is dike if it is lawful and orderly. It 
must be ruled and regulated by the right laws and 
principles. (More hissing and rumbling.) 
E u d O X U S : Could we say that something is dike if it is right 
according to the law and wrong if it isn't? And what 
about the opposite? Something lacks dikaiosune if its 
balance and orderliness is disrupted by any deviation 
from the ruling principle. Then the system is out of 
balance, it's disharmonious. 
Plato: Now we have it. Dikaiosune is the same thing as lawful 
orderliness. The exact word for this is justice. Justice 
is lawfulness, balance, regulation, co-ordination. Look 
at what is in 'justice'. In a just condition, everything 
is adjusted. Everything is justified. Everything is 
lawfully governed. Of course, the laws or principles 
may not be good ones, but they are what provide the 
lawful order. Consequently, we must ask what the 
best rules are and what the best order is. How are 
they formulated? Where do they come from? 
Speusippus: On our ship, they come from the Captain. 
Xenocrates: But how does the Captain make them? 
E u d O X U S : And how does he know they are good ones? How 
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does the crew know they are good? And let me ask 
this: why should the crew obey them? 
Plato: We are going too fast. I wanted us only to get clear 
on the meaning of the wotd dikaiosune. We have 
decided that it means 'justice', and 'justice' is a 
word for a condition of lawful regulation, or a state 
or orderliness imposed by a ruling principle. We 
need to slowly inquire into the origins of lawful 
rule, in to the essence of just regulation, and into its 
goodness if it is indeed good. Who knows? Perhaps 
disorganization and lawlessness are advantageous. 
(More steam rises from the volcano.) 
Speusippus: I hear something down there. 
Eudoxus: Listen. (They listen. Offstage are faint voices.) 
Speusippus: It's them. (He crosses and peers offstage.) Who is it? 
Dion: (Offstage) Who is there? 
Speusippus: Travelers from Greece. We have no weapons. 
Erothymia: No weapons? Are you fools? 
Plato: What is a fool? 
Erothymia: (Enters with Dion and two crew members.) A fool is 
someone who thinks his assets protect themselves. 
Plato: Perhaps a fool is someone with assets he believes need 
protecting. We have no assets, so nothing needs 
protecting. 
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E r o t h y m i a : Let's see about that. (She unsheathes her sword and 
thrusts it at Plato's groin. Then she places it broadside 
on his testicles.) You say you have no assets to 
protect? Nothing I could slice off? 
Pla to : (Calmly, evenly.) You would do me a favor if you did. 
Just do it quickly, cleanly, and completely 
E r o t h y m i a : Who in the name of Zeus are you? 
P la tO : We told you. Travelers from Greece. 
Ero thym ia : Give me your money. I want your jewels too. 
Pla tO : We have neither. 
Ero thym ia : You don't know who you are toying with. I wouldn't 
do that if I were you. Where is your money? 
Pla tO : I told you. We don't have any We don't need it, so we 
don't use it. 
Ero thym ia : I see...you want to play games. Let me simplify things 
for you. Either hand it over or I will kill you here and 
now. 
Pla to : You would be better advised to castrate me. 
Ero thym ia : What are you talking about? 
Pla to : If you kill me, you will never know if I am telling the 
truth or not about the money. Suppose I have a 
fortune. If you do me in, you will never know about 
it. For all you know, it could be buried on this island. 
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As well, if I am dead you would never be able to 
apologize for distrusting my word. 
Erothymia: I don't apologize to anyone. And I distrust everyone. 
Plato: Fine. Would you please stop fooling around and get 
this over with? Just kill us and leave. You are wasting 
our time. 
Erothymia: Is he real? (To Speusippus) He must be bluffing. But 
he hides his fear very well. 
Speusippus: He's not afraid. None of us are. 
Eudoxus: We probably would be if we had something to hide. 
But he is right—we have no money or property. It's 
not even our boat. 
Erothymia: Whose boat is it? 
Xenocrates: The captain's. He is donating it and his time to us. 
There is no currency on the ship either. 
Erothymia: What are you doing here? 
Plato: We are doing research into this volcano and we are 
discussing the nature of justice. 
Erothymia: You are all demented. Nobody does that. Now I 
know you are playing me for a fool. I'm losing my 
patience with you. All of you are liars. 
Plato: Do you hate liars? 
Erothymia: I kill them when I catch them lying to me. 
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Pla to : Do you always tell the truth? 
Ero thym ia : It depends. But when I tell you I'm giving you my 
word, my word is good. I tell the truth. 
Pla to : So why don't you kill yourself when you lie? 
Ero thym ia : Lying is normal. It's an aspect of life in the jungle. It 
is necessary for survival. Nature thrives on deceit and 
treachery. 
Pla to : So why would you ever tell the truth? 
Ero thym ia : I speak truthfully and keep my word with someone I 
love. 
Pla to : Love? You probably don't know a thing about it. If 
that is true then you never tell the truth. 
Ero thym ia : Careful, mister. I sliced off heads for less than that. 
Pla to : You're lying. 
Ero thym ia : Prove ir. 
Pla to : You don't love me. 
Ero thym ia : So? 
Pla to : You lie to everyone, unless you love them. That's 
what you said. You don't love me, therefore you are 
lying to me. 
Ero thym ia : You are very clever. 
Pla to : That's nothing. An eight year-old can figure that 
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much out. You appear to me to be more than eight 
years old. 
Ero thymia : You are not only clever, you are lippy too. 
Plato: And you like that. 
Ero thymia : Sort of. I like smart, confident men. 
Plato: I'll tell you what. Put down that ridiculous sword and 
stop your pathetic disguise. I'll show you intelligence 
and confidence. I like dialectic, so I would like to see 
how well you do. I will guarantee that I can defeat 
you in a debate. You must promise that when I do, 
you will leave us alone. 
Ero thymia : And if I don't? 
Plato: You can castrate all of us. 
Ero thymia : (Putting down her sword.) You have a deal. (She 
speaks more and more seductively. She undoes some 
upper buttons on her tunic, partially exposing her 
ample breasts. She faces Plato and massages his 
testicles.) You don't want to lose these, do you? 
PlatO: I told you, it doesn't matter. 
Ero thymia : All right. What do you want to debate? None gets the 
better of me. I always win. You will cave in before 
you know it. 
Pla tO: My friends and I were debating the nature of justice. 
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E r o t h y m i a : Go for it. (She licks her lips sensuously, fingers the 
buttons on her tunic, seductively exposes a thigh, 
grinds her hips slowly) I said go for it. What is justice? 
Pla to : I agreed to a debate, not a burlesque show. 
Ero thym ia : This is how I win arguments. 
Pla to : I already know that. You will attempt to elevate my 
lust until I want you more than I want to win the 
debate. I'm supposed to agree with you in order to 
have you. It won't work. Besides, I've chosen 
abstinence. Now give me a theory. 
E r o t h y m i a : Sir, you are smarter than I thought. Let's get rid of all 
these people. I know I can get you to capitulate. 
Dion, hand me the wineskin and take everyone 
except him back to the boat. 
P la tO : Impossible. I need witnesses to verify my victory. You 
are a liar, remember? You will prevaricate on what 
really happened. 
Ero thym ia : Fair enough. At least get them out of sight, but not 
so far that they can't hear us. 
Pla to : Agreed. Now give me a theory. 
Ero thym ia : Dion, take them over there. The wineskin please. 
(Dion hands her the wineskin and they all exit. 
Music up.) Sit down. (Plato reclines on a lava 
mound.) Here, let me make you comfortable for our 
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debate. (She removes her tunic and places it under 
Plaro, then she straddles him and cups her breasts to 
his cheeks. She dribbles some wine on her nipples.) 
Lick it off. You will love it. 
Plato: No thank you. I am waiting for a theory. This is 
already boring. 
Erothymia: Boring? Try this. (She puts the wineskin to his lips 
and he drinks.) Now this. (She takes a long drink and 
kisses him, forcing wine into his mouth.) Wasn't that 
nice? 
Plato: I'm not impressed. What about a theory? This is 
supposed to be a debate, if you recall. 
Erothymia: Do I feel some excitement here? (She undulates on 
his lap.) 
Plato: I'm a philosopher. Now get off me and try some 
logic. You are pitiful. 
Erothymia: Getting a bit testy, mistet? If you want to know what 
justice is, go and look it up in a dictionary. 
Plato: A dictionary would say that something is just if it 
conforms to the law. That tells me nothing. 
Erothymia: I like criminals. I like outlaws. 
Plato: You are off the point. Give me a theory of the nature 
and origin of justice. How does harmony and balance 
arise in a person or in a society? 
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E r o t h y m i a : From laws. Laws create order and dikaiosune is order. 
Pla to : Where do the laws come from? 
Ero thym ia : In my world, the law is whatever I say it is. 
Pla to : Really? Is that your theory? Are you saying that might 
makes right? 
E r o t h y m i a : Mister, your questions are making me aroused. Why 
aren't you excited yet? (She gives him more wine and 
increases her pelvic gyrations.) 
Pla to : I am excited. I'm excited by the thought that you 
might actually have an idea. Something to discuss. 
Something to defend. 
Ero thym ia : (Pouting and teasing.) Might makes right. 
Pla to : There are two ways to interpret that. The masses 
interpret it one way, usually the wrong way. 
Ero thym ia : (Still seductively.) Oh, you don't say. Why don't you 
tell this little simpleton all about it? What does it 
mean, mister philosopher? 
Pla to : The statement that might makes right can be either a 
factual claim 0 1 it can be a normative claim. The 
factual claim is ttue and the normative claim is false. 
E r o t h y m i a : Oooh...tell me more about it, mister philosopher. 
Pla to : It so happens that, as a matter of fact, those with the 
power make the laws. Certain people, or groups of 
EC 
p i j i t d ' i j i u j s u t 
people, have power or control over many others. 
Some are able to dominate others and impose their 
will on them. Their might may sometimes come 
from brute force and intimidation, but it more often 
comes from great wealth, or charisma, or superior 
skill and intelligence, or even from some alleged 
divine power. In your case it comes from erotic, 
seductive energy. But no matter how they get it, 
these people have the power to make laws. In a 
democracy, they are elected by the many to do so. As 
a factual claim it is true but uninteresting that the 
power to make rules and laws is concentrated in the 
hands of the few. 
Erothymia: Oh, you are so right. My theory is correct. Shall I 
hack them off now? 
PlatO: But that is not your theory. 
Erothymia: Tell me what my theory is, mister. 
Plato: Yours is the normative claim. 
Erothymia: This is sooo thrilling. Tell me what I really think. 
PlatO: Let me ask you something. Do you think the laws are 
just only because someone makes them, or is it 
possible that someone makes them because they are 
just. 
Erothymia: Oh, what an exciting question. The first, of course. 
(Music down.) 
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P la to : This is your normative theory. It says that a few 
people hold all the power and they make laws to 
their own advantage. It may be only one person, but 
usually is more than one. Justice is nothing more 
than what they say it is. Lawfulness is nothing other 
than what the powerful decide to impose on the 
many who follow. Those with the might define the 
righr. Those with the might do not merely identify 
and define the right through the laws they make, 
the create the right. The regularity and lawfulness in 
a society is coerced and enforced by fear, seduction, 
or bribery. You are saying that just as a child must 
do what it is told to do by its parents only because 
its parents tell it to, the many must submit to 
whatever rules the powerful tell them to. Might 
defines right. This is true even of the Gods. 
According to your normative claim, whatever the 
Gods command is right only because the Gods 
command it; they could command whatever they 
want and it would be right for no reason other than 
the fact they commanded it. Do you see? They do 
not command what is right, rather, what they 
command is right...according to your theory. 
Justice, or what you call a condition of regulation 
by rules, is nothing more than what the most 
powerful say it is. The mighty make the rules, and 
justice is whatever the rules define it to be, all to the 
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advantage of the rule makers. (More steam rises. 
There is a rumbling sound. Plato stands up and 
looks nervously over the lip of the volcano.) 
Ero thymia : Should we leave? Is it dangerous? 
Plato: Everything is dangerous. But this volcano will not be 
erupting for quite some time. We are safe. You were 
saying that justice is a condition created when the 
strong make rules to their own advantage. 
Ero thymia : My, my. What an impressive theory. Is that what I 
really think? 
Plato: Yes, I believe so. 
Ero thymia : And you disagree with it? 
PlatO: Most emphatically. 
Ero thymia : So if I can prove it true, you lose your jewels. I mean 
those jewels. 
PlatO: Or if I can prove it false, then you must leave. 
Ero thymia : I'll get you to agree to my theory. More wine? (She 
circles both nipples with her fingers. If you agree that 
this whatever-you-call-it-theory is true, you can have 
me. (She lifts her tunic, exposing herself to Plato.) 
Oooh, what's this? Something you want? 
Pla tO: (Indifferently) Your theory is false. 
Ero thymia : Why? 
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Because rules can be assessed for their goodness and 
justness apart from who makes them. 
According to whom? 
According to reason. 
You are cute when you reason. You seem to have a 
powerful mind. I like that. 
It's more powerful than your pitiful efforts to distract 
me. 
You want me. Don't you? 
No, I don't. How many times do it have to repeat 
myself? You are wasting your energy and mine. Your 
theory is false. 
Prove it. (She redoubles her efforts at seduction. She 
stands and sways her hips closer to Plato's face. She 
fondles her breasts.) You like this, don't you? 
For the love of Zeus, woman! Put on your clothes 
and use your mind! You have one, don't you? You are 
boring! 
You are quite a bastard. (With great menace.) Now 
try to prove the theory wrong so I can lop off your 
lovelies. 
I just did. I said that rules and laws can be assessed 
for their goodness and justness independent of who 
makes them. That entails that there is a standard of 
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justice over and above the fact that rules are made by 
the powerful. Look, suppose a ruler makes a law that 
is not to his own advantage but to the advantage of 
the weaker. If you define justice as whatever-is-to-
the-advantage-of-the-stronger, we have the strange 
result that whatevet-is-to-the-advantage-of-the-
stronger is also whatever-is-sometimes-to-the-
advantage-of-the-weaker. Now if you will put on 
your clothes, I will ruin your theory completely. 
(She puts on her clothes.) Here is an even more 
serious problem. Would you not agree that an army 
commander might sometimes issue a bad order? 
Erothymia: I suppose. 
Plato: So an order is not good just because the commander 
orders it? 
Erothymia: I suppose that must follow. 
PlatO: Similarly, a ruler may sometimes make an unjust rule 
or law? 
Erothymia: Again, I must reluctantly agree. 
PlatO: So being ordered by a ruler and being just cannot be 
the same thing? 
Erothymia: I suppose. 
Plato: A law can therefore be assessed for its just natute 
independent of who makes it. We can see that 'might' 
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does not equal 'right'. We must search elsewhere. 
And by our agreement you must go. (The volcano 
rumbles. More steam rises.) 
Erothymia: But that was not my theory. You said it was. All I said 
was "go look it up in a dictionary". I never put it 
forward as my theory...those were words you 
imputed to me, but I never said they were mine. 
PlatO: You are devious. 
Erothymia: I told you not to trust me. I'll tell you what. I'm 
starting to find this interesting, and I am starting to 
find you fascinating. Let's drop this game for an even 
better one. I'm not as stupid as I pretend to be, but I 
am still holding the sword. Just to add a little luster 
to all this I should give it to you, but there is an old 
saying that one should never give a sword to a man 
who cannot dance...and I have yet to find out if you 
can dance. So for now let's do it this way: I want to 
get serious with you. I find you the most challenging, 
interesting man to cross my path in quite some time. 
I'll drop the charade and raise the stakes. I do have a 
mind, and I want to use it against yours. I'll give you 
a real theory...one I have actually thought through. 
Fair enough? 
Plato: What are the stakes? 
Erothymia: If you win, I put down the sword. If I win, I do 
whatever I want. 
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Plato: How about this? If I win, you put down the sword 
forever. If you win, you become a member of our 
research group. 
Erothymia: And I suppose one of the rules of your group is "no 
weapons", right? 
Plato: That's right. 
Erothymia: How do we decide who wins? 
Plato: One of us says "You win". 
Erothymia: It's a rotten deal for me. 
Plato: You don't see it yet, but it's a perfect deal for you. 
Better yet, why don't we drop the whole idea of 
winning and simply have a serious conversation, just 
for its own sake, just for the purpose of finding truth? 
Erothymia: What is the point of that? 
Plato: (He puts his hands on her shoulders and looks 
deeply into her eyes, speaking slowly and firmly) 
Just try it. You will discover something new. If you 
agree, we should call the others back so they can 
learn and contribute too. Truth is beautiful. The 
shared search for it is the greatest pleasure available 
to us. It will gratify you more than anything you 
have ever experienced. It's what you really hunger 
for. Let me satisfy you. 
Erothymia: Call them over. 
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PlatO: All of you, come back here. This is something you 
should share. (Enter all.) We are going to listen to 
her. She has a theory of justice. 
Speusippus: We heard the previous argument, such as it was, so 
you don't need to repeat it. It is merely the popular 
view of justice. But I hope you pursue this line of 
thought further, because there is a valuable insight in 
it I could endorse. The popular view contains the 
idea that whatever justice may be, it is created 
arbitrarily. It presupposes that nothing is just or 
unjust by nature, but by some kind of conventional 
decision. 
Erothymia: Sir, that is exactly where I am going with my 
argument. Justice is socially created, so social 
circumstances can change it from time to time and 
place to place. There is no objective quality that 
makes something just, no unchanging essence of 
justice we can discover in things. No, justice is 
variable and conventional, so what is just to some is 
not necessarily just to others. 
Plato: Can you expand that idea into a more thoughtful 
theory of justice? 
Erothymia: I will. I will argue that justice is the result of an 
arbitrary agreement, but instead of coming from the 
powerful few it comes from all of us. 
Xenocrates: I want to listen carefully to this. Are you going to 
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present a version of the social contract theory of 
justice? 
Erothymia: Yes, I want to explain the origins, natuie, and value 
of justice in those terms. 
El ldOXUS: To simplify, why don't we say that dikaiosune is 
lawfulness? How does lawfulness originate, what is its 
nature, and what good is it? 
Erothymia: Let me begin by asking Dion something. You call 
many things 'good', do you not? 
Dion: Certainly. I can say I had a good lunch, or that this 
man is good, or that this knife is a good one, or that 
truth telling is good. 
Erothymia: Wouldn't you say that some things are good simply 
because they are conducive to other goods. I mean, 
we do not value them in themselves. We value them 
for the goods they bring about. Bitter medicine, for 
example, is good because it is for the sake of 
something else we hold to be good. 
Speusippus: There are many examples of goods like that. We call 
them instrumental goods. Then there are many 
goods we value in and for themselves. Think of 
pleasures like drinking wine or listening to music. 
Think of friendship which serves no purpose except 
itself. 
Xenocrates: We should call those goods intrinsic goods. 
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I see a third kind of good too, a mixture of the other 
two. They are goods which are valued for themselves 
and for their results. I would imagine that exercise 
and learning would fall in this third class. 
The question is, which class is justice in? What kind 
of good is lawfulness and acting rightly? 
I assert that justice is like bitter medicine: it is good 
only because it produces something better, but by 
itself it is worthless. Most people would agree that 
justice is an unwelcome burden, something we would 
never pursue unless we were forced to pursue it for 
the sake of something else. No-one really respects 
justice—they merely endure its demands in order to 
avoid something worse and perhaps get something 
better. The value of justice is all in its pay-off. 
What is the pay-off? 
Peace-of-mind and personal security. 
Now I am lost. You need to explain that thoroughly. 
Very well, with everyone's permission I will speak at 
length about the origins, the nature, and the value of 
justice. To begin with, I will place justice in the first 
class of goods by saying that it has no inherent value. It 
is good only for the results it brings, but by itself it is 
pursued grudgingly and it is endured more as a burden 
than as something inherently good. Do you all agree? 
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Pla lO: Certainly not. I place justice in the best category. It is 
good both for the benefits it confers and by itself. 
However, let me hear out your argument, and then I 
will respond with mine. 
Erothymia: My argument is simple. It begins with the 
observation that within every human being there is a 
natural element. It is governed by instinctual fears 
and desires, seeking only to preserve and reproduce 
itself. It is pre-civilized and amoral, recognizing no 
rules except self-protection and aggressive 
acquisition. Uncontrolled, it serves nothing but itself 
by whatever means it can: homicide, infanticide, 
cannibalism, deceit, betrayal, theft, or what have you. 
That natural element is void of shame and sympathy. 
It is pre-mora\, lacking any sense of right or wrong. 
And I repeat, it is in all of us; it is nature, pure and 
simple, and we can never divest ourselves of it. 
Speusippus: I think of that element in humans as raw and blind 
ambition to get ahead and stay ahead of others. It 
goes beyond nature. In other words, humans are 
innately competitive. Nature is not greedy, but 
humans are—everyone wants to outdo everyone else 
and everyone wants to exploit everyone else to get 
ahead. For some reason, humans are hoarders. 
Erothymia: That's another good way to put it, as long as you 
remember that the drive to compete against and 
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exploit others is blind and inevitable. We can't stop it. 
Our innate, elemental motive is greed. We all want to 
have more of everything. Until we acquire the purely 
human qualities of shame and guilt, we will do 
anything in our power to attain it. 
E u d O X U S : And as a mathematician, I can tell you that even a 
child can calculate that not everyone can have 
everything. Indeed, if one person had everything, 
everyone else would have nothing. Everything must 
be summed and divided. 
Speusippus: Eudoxus, you speak rightly. But let's not put it so 
formally just yet. She is only making the point that 
everyone wants to exploit others, by whatevet 
means, in order to get more for themselves. This pre-
civilized part of ourselves is bound by no morality. 
But listen well: I know that you are the same as me, 
and you know that I am the same as you. We all 
want to win by exploiting others. So, you and I are 
in the same boat: you want to exploit and harm me, 
and I want to exploit and harm you. We both know 
that about each other. 
E r o t h y m i a : There is more than one very smart person in your 
group. I'm loving this. Let me say that we both know 
one more thing. We both know that in addition to 
wanting to exploit and harm each other, we both 
want to avoid being exploited by the other. In fact, 
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the desire to avoid being harmed is stronger than the 
desire to outdo others, because if you severely harm 
me I get nothing of what I want. 
Xenocrates: Exactly, we both want to impose restraints on the 
others natural aggression and greed so each of us can 
get at least some of what we want. 
Dion: She does it with sex. 
Erothymia: Shut up, Dion. You can't follow this. So we forge an 
unwilling bargain not to exploit and harm each other 
in order to get at least some of what we want. It's a 
kind of forced co-operation or uneasy truce for our 
personal advantage. 
Xenocrates: And it has to be «zforced. It's a compromise we would 
rather not agree to. Nobody gets all of what he wants, 
and in exchange he avoids what he doesn't want. 
Speusippus: Just as there is no sporting event without a set of 
rules, there is no dikaiosune without this forced 
agreement. This contract basically spells out the rules 
of competition. 
EudOXUS: Yes, they are acceptable rules only if everyone 
agrees that they serve their own selfish interests. 
(More steam and rumbling. Plato looks ovet the 
ledge.) 
Plato: Gentlemen...friends...I may be mistaken. Pethaps-
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Eudoxus: —I think I see the logic of this. An example occurs 
to me. Let me try this out on Plato, since he looks 
perturbed by your argument. (Plato gestures toward 
the red glow.) Suppose that you have an olive-grove, 
and so do I. I want your olives and you want mine. 
Would you let me steal your olives? 
Plato: (He looks over the ledge, then back to Eudoxus. He 
returns to sit with the others.) Pardon? 
Erothymia: Would you let me steal your olives? 
Plato: Of course not. 
Erothymia: Would I let you steal mine? 
Plato: Undoubtedly not. 
Erothymia: Isn't it more important to keep the olives you already 
have than to steal mine? 
Plato: Yes, yours may make me richer, but without mine I 
could starve. 
Erothymia: And I am in the same position? 
Plato: Yes, your options are the same. 
Erothymia: So even though you want my olives, in order to make 
sure you keep yours wouldn't it be wise for you to 
promise not to steal mine if I promise not to steal 
yours? 
Plato: I hesitate, but I must agree. 
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Erothymia: And the same goes for everyone else and for 
anything they own? Isn't everyone better off if we all 
agree not to steal, even though we would all prefer 
to have all the olives? Or, let me put it this way. 
What would it be like if we didn't promise to refrain 
from stealing? 
Xenocrates: I would lose some of my olives to you, and him, and 
him, and perhaps steal some back. Or maybe lose 
all my olives to the best thief, and not be able to 
steal them back. 
EudOXUS: More than that, Xenocrates. Each of us would live 
under constant fear of attack. We would constantly 
risk injury to ourselves and our olive-groves. The 
money we could have spent on improving our 
groves will have to be spent on defense. And we 
would all have many spoiled olives. Besides, 
nobody has the power to steal and defend all the 
olives; eventually others would band together and 
kill him. 
Erothymia: Your name is Xenocrates? 
Xenocrates: Yes. 
Erothymia: So, Xenocrates, you see how the social contract 
arises. I agtee this is the fight theory, but I want to 
put it in a slightly different way. I would say that in 
a state of nature, nearly everyone realizes that he or 
she is simply too weak to exploit others with 
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impunity. They would do it if they could, but they 
can't. What do you think prevents them? 
Xenocrates: Oh, I would say a lack of power. 
Erothymia: Yes, but why do so many lack power? Are they 
naturally powerless? Is it like a true state of nature, 
where there are a few dominant figures within a 
species and many submissive ones? 
Xenocrates: Well, in a state of nature the dominant ones are 
usually the most aggressive. 
Erothymia: And cunning, and so on. In humans there are many 
factors beyond aggression and shrewdness that 
contribute to personal power. The strongest are most 
often full of self-confidence, charm, intelligence, 
single-mindedness, fearlessness, and so forth. They 
also have the resources to dispense to others what the 
others want, so wealth is power. Wealth buys 
anything and anyone. 
Xenocrates: What do you think people most want? 
Erothymia: Men want women and women want powerful men. 
Speusippus: In any case, you want to add something to the theory. 
What is it? 
Erothymia: I am saying that the social contract atises not so 
much to curb each other's greed but to curb the 
power of a few. The weak majority bands together to 
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restrain the power of the dominant few. The many 
know that the powerful elite needs them to thrive, so 
the many makes rules in their own intetest. 
EudOXUS: I disagree. I think we are all basically equal in 
power. Anyone can kill, maim, or rob anyone else. I 
agree with Speusippus. We all tacitly make a 
covenant of mutual resttaint because everyone else 
is a competitor, not just a few. 
Erothymia: We could get bogged down in a debate on that finer 
point. But I think we agree on the larger point: it 
would be in everyone's self-interest to support the 
rule that I will not rob you if you do not rob me. 
Now here is the biggest problem: we all seek our 
own advantage, so it would be to my advantage to 
make a promise with everyone else not to steal their 
olives and then break my promise while they keep 
theirs. The promise is to my advantage as long as 
you keep it and I don't. So I should appear to be 
trustworthy while actually being deceitful. 
Speusippus: But you know that your competitor would think 
exactly the same way. So in order to prevent a 
relapse back into the situation that made the 
agreement necessary, you will both have to think of 
a way to force each other to keep the agreement, 
because it is to everyone's advantage that everyone 
else keep the agreement. 
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Xenocrates: I suppose we should just have faith that all human 
beings are rational enough to see that, and that they 
will act in accordance with reason. 
Erothymia: That wont work. The more people who keep the 
agreement, the more likely it is that someone will 
break it. To prevent that from happening, there must 
be some penalty included in the agreement for 
anyone who breaks it. 
Xenocrates: Who will enforce the penalties? 
Erothymia: We don't need to worry about that. Each society 
can, and does, create its own mechanisms. For now, 
we have what we need—a theory of the origins and 
nature of dikaiosune. (More rumbling and hissing.) 
Eudoxus: Should we go? 
Erothymia: Please, don't go. I need this. I have never felt so alive. 
I have a question. 
Plato: What is it? 
Erothymia: Aren't we all criminals at heart? Aren't we all naturally 
unjust? Isn't that why we need a contract? 
Plato: How could I prove we are nor? What's behind your 
question? 
Erothymia: Love. (They all look at each other in puzzlement, 
except Plato, who stands to address Erothymia.) 
Plato: Love will unravel your argument. If you know what 
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love is and how to love you don't need a contract. 
Love transforms the natural criminal into a 
supernatural savior. 
Erothymia: Nonsense. You are a deluded romantic. Lover's 
crimes are the most spectacular crimes of all. They 
break hearts instead of pocketbooks and careers. 
Plato: So why your question? 
Erothymia: I was...it's just that.... 
Plato: It's just that you suspend your beliefs about human 
nature when you love. That's why you said your word 
is good, but only to those you love. When you love, 
you have trust and truth. You are wondering if this is 
a temporary loss of realistic good sense. Or is it the 
glimpse into a better way? 
Erothymia: What is love? (Plato looks at her aloofly.) Answer me! 
What is love? Speak to me, or I'll get that sword out 
again. 
Plato: The only love with which you are familiar is a form 
of insanity. 
Erothymia: The love with which I am familiar is cruel and 
painful. Consequently, sir, I do not trust it. I engage 
in sex instead. It's a straightforward contract. I'll give 
you something you want in exchange for something 
I want. Whenever, wherever. If you make it 
worthwhile for me, I'll be back for more. 
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Plato: What is your point? 
Erothymia: My point is that we are all criminals, especially in 
love. 
Plato: Give me a reason to believe that. 
Erothymia: What? That we are all naturally unjust? 
PlatO: Yes, and relate it to love. 
Erothymia: I can. Let's use our imagination. Let's imagine that 
you could do whatever you want to whomever you 
want without paying a penalty. No penalty whatsoever. 
Suppose you were so incredibly smart that you could 
do anything without being detected...almost as if 
you were invisible. And suppose I could give you 
drugs with the power to extinguish all shame and 
guilt. In fact, they would make you feel good no 
matter what you do. You could swindle, lie, rob, 
pursue perversions, commit adultery—anything you 
please—and you would have nothing but good 
feelings. Most important, suppose you would never 
get caught. There would be no price to pay...none. I 
assert that anyone in such a position, including you, 
would be unjust. The natural part of anyone comes 
out when their fear of detection and reprisal is 
removed. Remove the fear, and they act naturally. 
Why do you think so many people commit crimes 
and engage in perversions when they are drunk? The 
fear is gone. But even in sober thought, that's when 
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people cheat on exams, on their taxes, on their 
customets, and on theit spouses. If the probability of 
detection is low, about the only thing that stops 
them is their fear of a guilty conscience. But my 
drugs would take care of that—they would disable 
any socially programmed sense of guilt or shame. 
If I loved you, I would remain truthful and faithful 
to you whether you knew it or not. And not out of 
a sense of guilt either. I would do it because virtue is 
its own reward. 
Phewey! If you had the chance to cheat on your spouse 
without detection and without remorse you would do 
what any other man or woman would do. You would 
do it. You would tell lies and engage in deception. 
Not me. 
I don't believe you. Moreover, you should. The 
unjust life, free of all penalties, is the best life of all. 
I'll back you on this one too. 
A moment please! Are you recommending the unjust 
life? Surely not! 
Wholeheartedly. 
You are actually advocating criminality and injustice? 
Absolutely. I am saying that the outlaw, unjust life is 
the happiest one. To get whatever you want, by any 
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conceivable means, is the best way to live. And don't 
give me the simpleton's answer that crime never pays. 
It always handsomely pays those who are smart 
enough to hide their criminality and avoid detection. 
Everyone, in their heart, would agree. It's the many 
who know they can't get away with it who extol 
decency and righteousness. But secretly they wish 
they could exploit and dominate others. 
Surely you are not trying to tell me that the criminal 
who escapes retribution is a happy person. 
That's exactly what I am saying. The best life is the 
unjust life that pays no penalty. Look at us! We are 
pirates. We kill and steal, but never get caught. We 
have no remorse over the fact that we get what 
everyone else wants. We have money, good wines, 
great clothes. We have sex with whomever we want, 
whenever we want. Best of all, we get others to do 
whatever we ask them to. We have power, and 
among us my word is the law. 
What about your victims? 
What about them? 
Do you have sympathy for them? 
Sympathy is for idiots. To be happy requires 
ruthlessness. I have no sympathy for anyone who 
would do exactly the same thing to me if they 
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could. Do you think animals feel sorry for their 
victims? Of course not. It's kill or be killed. 
Plato: And yet you over-ride these sentiments when you 
love. You appear to have a conflict. Part of you is 
drawn to love and justice, but another part is drawn 
to exploitation and injustice. Which part do you 
trust more? Which part do you admire more? 
Erothymia: I can't answer that right now. 
Plato: Mmmm, that's interesting. You must have quite an 
internal struggle going on. 
Erothymia: More than one. 
Plato: What do you mean? 
Erothymia: Nevet mind. I don't want to talk about it. 
Plato: About what? 
Erothymia: Don't push me, mister. 
Plato: Fine, I won't. We have an argument to attend to. 
Erothymia: I've ptetty well stated my theory. Now, how about 
your response? I want to keep on thinking. I want to 
hear you reason this out. 
Plato: Do you really believe in reasoning things out? 
Erothymia: I don't know if I believe in reasoning things out, but 
I do know that I enjoy it. It does something to me. It 
is...I mean...when you....I get...you make me... 
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PlalO: Say it. 
Erothymia: I don't want to. I can't. 
Plato: You get aroused. You get sexually excited. 
Erothymia: You! Don't you ever...(She stops herself. Paces 
slowly. Goes to the lip of the volcano. Turns and 
looks at Plato, then turns back to the volcano.) 
How did you know that? 
PlatO: I know you very well. 
Erothymia: Dion, take everyone back to the ship. Treat them as 
guests. (All exit.) Tell me, mister philosopher, why 
am I like that? Is it a problem? 
Plato: Not really. It's a symptom of another problem. 
Erothymia: What other problem? Tell me, can you fix my 
problem mister philosopher? 
Plato: Yes, I can. But not now. 
Erothymia: Ooooh, mister philosopher, please tell me what's 
wrong with me and fix me. Tell me why this gets so 
inflamed by intelligence. (She lifts her tunic and faces 
him.) Look, there is nothing underneath. Do you 
want it? (Plato turns his back to her.) 
Plato: I told you, I'm celibate. 
Erothymia: You're a pervert. Either that, or you are afraid of me. 
Or is it that you are not a man? 
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You are starting to bore me again. I practice celibacy 
so I am not distracted from thinking. Romantic love 
and sex are seething swamps of irrationality and 
emotional disarray. They should be cured more than 
condoned. Now please, get away from me and go 
back to your ship. I have work to do. 
You have not proven my theory wrong yet. And I still 
have my sword. 
It can be done, but it will take some time. I would 
have to delay my trip by at least one full day and you 
would have to sacrifice a day of piracy. We would 
both have to stay until tomorrow. Imagine how 
unhappy you would be without someone to rob. 
Watch your words, buster. Would you like me to 
sleep on your ship? 
Sleep wherever you want. Just don't bother me. 
What, no sex? 
Sometimes you don't listen. 
Don't you realize that every man in the Mediterranean 
wants me? Don't you realize what you are turning 
down? 
My dear woman, I realize exactly what I am turning 
down. That is why I am turning it down. 
Idiot! Are you playing games with me? You had better 
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think twice before you do! 
Plato: We will resume the argument tomorrow. Good 
night. I will put off my voyage by a day. 
Erothymia: You think you can dispense with me in a day? Ha! 
Where in Hades are you going, if I may ask? 
Plato: To the court of Dionysius the Elder in the polis of 
Syracuse in Sicily. (Erothymia looks astounded.) 
Erothymia: You are lying. That's impossible. 
PlatO: Why are you so surprised? What is so strange about 
going to Sicily? 
Erothymia: What are you going to do there? 
Plato: Consult with the ruler about a new political 
constitution based on my theory of justice. 
Erothymia: Oh really? What is your name? 
Plato: Plato of Athens. And yours? 
Erothymia: Xanthippe. 
Plato: I know another Xanthippe. You are quite unlike her. 
Erothymia: You don't say. (Music up.) 
Plato: I do say. Now would you please go back to your ship? 
Erothymia: Where are you going to sleep? 
Plato: I may not sleep. I will stay right here until tomorrow. 
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Erothymia: So will I then. 
Plato: You know the rules. Stay here if you wish, but don't 
bother me. I have some hard thinking to do. 
Erothymia: As you wish. You do not know what you are passing 
up. 
PlatO: Goodnight. 
Erothymia: Goodnight. (She removes her tunic and rolls it into a 
pillow. Music up as the lights fade. Plato goes to the 
lip of the crater and looks in, lost in thought. Slow 
fade of all lights except a red glow from the crater. 
Erothymia lies down. Plato mumbles to himself. 
Fade music.) 
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Scene Two 
The next morning, on the volcano. Music. Plato is still looking down 
into the crater. Erothymia stirs and puts on her tunic. Lights up. 
Fade music. 
Erothymia: Did you sleep at all last night? It's a hard theory to 
refute, isn't it? 
PlatO: In many ways it is. But it is still false. It takes into 
account an undeniable and powerful element in 
human nature, but it doesn't go far enough. There is 
more to the human psyche than you allow, so your 
theory of justice is not only incomplete, but wrong. 
Justice is much more than a self-interested pact 
between outlaws. I agree we all bear the state of 
nature within us, but we all have the potential to 
develop another part which is divine. 
Erothymia: Do you ever stop thinking? 
PlatO: Not if I can help it. Well, sometimes I do. I have to 
get away from it all on occasion. 
Erothymia: Why? How? 
PlatO: I have a hunch your name is not Xanthippe. 
Erothymia: Don't change the subject. Why do you need to find a 
refuge from thinking? 
Plato: Many reasons. 
Erothymia: Name some. 
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Plato: It's tiring. It's frustrating. It's isolating. Sometimes I 
dream of just raising olives and dancing in the tavernas. 
Loving wisdom can sometimes break my heart. 
Erothymia: Do you drink to stop from thinking, or do you think 
to stop from drinking? 
PlatO: I think when I drink. It's a different kind of thinking. 
Shouldn't we get on with our conversation? 
Erothymia: I have an idea. You asked me yesterday to relate my 
theory to love. Why don't we talk about love, and 
why don't you refute my theory by showing me that 
my views on love are wrong. They are deeply 
interconnected...justice and love. 
Plato: I wrote a book on love. I'm still not sure what it is. 
There are so many kinds of love, but I am still not 
sure what they all have in common. I'm looking for 
the form of love. 
Erothymia: Why don't we limit it to erotic love then? I am 
extremely interested in that. 
Plato: No kidding. What is it? 
Erothymia: It's not love at all. It's no more than sexual commerce. 
Love has nothing to do with it. I don't even like it. 
Plato: Are you saying that it is impossible for sex to coexist 
with love, or just that they often don't as a matter of 
fact? 
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Sex is use. It's mutual exploitation. It's bait. It's 
something you ttade for something else. It's a 
weapon. By definition, it's loveless. That's probably 
why I can never...never... 
Never what? 
Never mind. Leave it alone. 
Sex is your bargaining chip? 
Of course. It's something I have and something you 
want. I'd be stupid to give it away without getting 
something in return for it. 
You get pleasure in return. 
I get—forget it! Maybe this way of approaching 
your subject was a bad idea. Let's take another tack. 
No, I insist. It's a good one. In a way, it encapsulates 
and focuses the issues we are discussing. A true 
theory of sex would entail a larger theory of justice. 
We should call Speusippus up here. He can explain 
something. (Plato crosses offstage.) Speusippus, 
come here! We need you! (To Erothymia.) He is a 
biologist and he sees sex in purely biological terms. 
I agree we must understand it at that level, but not 
only at that level. There is another level which 
refutes your theory. Hete he comes. 
How does this relate to a theory of justice? 
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Plato: It will explain why we do, in fact, treat each other the 
way we usually do, but it will also illuminate how we 
ought to treat each other, even though we usually 
don't. (Enter Speusippus.) Speusippus, what are the 
biological dynamics of sex? 
Speusippus: For us, sex is the need to impregnate as many females 
as possible—to populate the world with as many of 
our offspring as we can. For her, it is the need to be 
impregnated by the highest quality males. Males make 
advances to all women in the hope they can mate 
with all of them and women solicit advances from all 
males in the hope they can mate with the fittest few. 
Men compete with each other for the greatest number 
of young fertile women, and women compete with 
each other for the smallest number of select, superior 
men. Males want reproductive fitness in females; 
females want power and prestige in men. Each sex 
seeks its own advantage through the other. It's constant 
competition, constant negotiation. It's a tradeoff. 
Erothymia: And what does love have to do with that? 
Speusippus: Nothing. It's a transaction. If you want to know 
about love, ask Plato. I'm just explaining biology. In 
those terms, sex is something you ladle out to us as 
long as we are willing to pay the highest price for it. 
The more reproductively fit you are, the more we 
pay. Pleasure is just a byproduct, just an incentive. 
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Erothymia: I know. All the rules, all the etiquette, are nothing 
more than mutual constraints, imposed by each sex 
on the other to its own advantage. Sex is warfare, but 
even war has its rules for the protection of both sides. 
And everyone tries to break them, especially in the 
treacherous trenches of sexuality. 
Speusippus: Men, for example, do not want to squander energy 
and resources on another man's offspring, so they 
demand fidelity and virginity from women with 
whom they mate. Women demand it from men so 
resources are available exclusively to their own 
children. And yet both sexes commit adultery when 
they can do so without consequence. Men do it to 
spread theit seed around and women do it when they 
find a more dominant man. It's all for the seeds. For 
our own seeds. 
Erothymia: So justice in the sexual sphere, this condition of 
opposed desires balanced by implicit rules, is really a 
set of compromises in the battle of the sexes. Each 
side is working for its own advantage, and thetefore 
anyone on each side would break the rules if he or 
she could do so without being caught and without 
paying a price. But look how many try. Lies, 
deceptions, broken promises—everyone engages in 
them to their own advantage. They just aren't smart 
enough to consistently pull it off. However, I applaud 
them when they do. It is better to be unjust and 
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undetected than to be just. I say break all the rules 
and be smart about it. You'll be much happier. 
And you want to extend that to all areas of life? Not 
just sex? 
You bet I do. Power and wealth are everything. Those 
who are feared the most are most happy. Those who 
by stealth and cunning have the most are the most 
happy. Those who have fame, money, and power say 
they are much better off than those who don't. And 
those without a public name or wealth of any kind 
seem to agree that they are worse off. They are 
envious. 
Your point is clear, and it forces me to be clear. I 
know most people agree with you. But they are 
wrong. (Enter Xenocrates.) 
Keep going. I will pick it up and follow you. 
Look at it this way. I say that virtue is its own reward, 
but most people think that virtue for its own sake is 
for simpletons, for naive dreamers and fools. They 
say that virtue is romanticized because so many are 
cowardly or otherwise incapable of injustice. They 
say that diakaiosune should be pursued only to one's 
own advantage. Honesty, for example, is only a good 
policy for the wily businessman. 
They say that being lawful and doing the right thing 
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should be no more than deceptive appearance because 
it will help get you what you really want. If I pretend 
to care about you, or if I can deceive you into 
thinking I am honest with you, or loyal to you, or 
that I will honor my word with you, it will be to my 
advantage for you to believe it so I can exploit you 
later. Then I will be better off, as long as I can keep 
the exploitation hidden. There is no intrinsic value to 
these virtues. Their value lies in entirely in the good 
consequences they bring about when they ate deftly 
used. That's what most people believe. They believe 
that nice people finish last, at the bottom of the heap. 
Now what do you say Plato? Isn't the man or woman 
who admires honesty, charity, justice, self-control, 
and so forth, merely some kind of innocent idiot, 
sitting there like ripe fruit waiting to be plucked by 
the first predator to see it? Maybe the many are right. 
These believers in virtue are nothing more than food 
and fodder for the powetful, ambitious few who, 
without shame or guilt, use them to satisfy greed and 
lust, our only true motivators. 
Erothymia: That's how sex works. I will not love you. I will 
pretend to, however, because I want something from 
you. It's just business. I will get you to desire me 
through all kinds of artifice and deception, then 
deliver what you want only after I extract something 
from you. And I should. 
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Xenoc ra tes : You are giving away your trade secrets. 
P l a l O : Again, you put the case clearly, but I know it is 
wrong. The just person is happier, regardless of the 
consequences of his justice. To challenge myself, I 
will take the most pure and complete cases of people 
who are just and unjust, then ask you to compare 
them in happiness. Let us compare a person who is 
completely dikawsune with one who is not. 
E r o t h y m i a : To make the comparison pure, why not compare a 
thoroughly just person with a thoroughly unjust one, 
but grant that the just person is believed to be unjust 
by everyone? 
Xenoc ra tes : And further that the unjust person is believed to be 
just by everyone. 
Pla to : That's what I was going to suggest. In that way, we 
can more easily decide that virtue is its own reward, 
independent of the social rewards that follow from 
merely being perceived as just. And we can more 
easily see whether vice is its own punishment, 
independent of the social sanctions that follow from 
being perceived as unjust. I will show that the good 
person who seems unjust to others is immeasurably 
more happy than the unjust person who seems just to 
others. If I can show this in such a way, I believe I 
shall have removed all doubt. 
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SpeilSippilS: Better yet, you could compare two hermits who get 
no social consequences whatsoever. Why not compare 
a solitary saint with an isolated criminal and ask who 
is happier? We should compare unknown saints with 
solitary sinners. 
PlatO: No, my case is stronger in the first way. The saint 
must suffer in some way while the sinner must gain 
in some way. Then virtue would definitely win out— 
the vittuous person would be truly happy in spite of 
bad consequences, while the person of vice would be 
truly unhappy in spite of good consequences. 
Erothymia: I already know who is happier. 
Plato: No, you only think you do because your concept of 
happiness is deficient. 
Erothymia: You can't admit it, but yours is the same as mine. 
Plato: It's radically different, just as my concept of love is 
radically different. 
Erothymia: Prove me wrong then. 
PlatO: What I observe is that both your arguments have 
something in common. In your first argument you 
said that dikaiosune is imposed by the most powerful 
on the many. The rules are made and enforced by the 
mighty. Yout second argument says that the rules are 
made by everyone in each person's own interest. But 
the two arguments are the same. They both assert 
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that dikaiosune is a conventional creation of human 
will. As to which wills construct the rules, I am 
indifferent. I intensely disagree with both arguments, 
and I want to prove both of them false. You also 
argue that being dikaiosune for its own sake is naive 
and simple-minded. But I want to prove that due to 
your gross misunderstanding of the nature of justice 
you must necessarily fail to see that it is inherently 
good, and that people who have it are thoroughly 
happy even if the rest of the world is not aware of the 
just person's condition. Let me give you a preliminary 
insight that may help you understand my argument 
when I state it. Please remind yourselves that we have 
so far been discoursing only on social dikaiosune, 
without mentioning the nature and value of 
dikaiosune in the individual psyche. When we shift 
our attention to the dikaios soul we get a very 
different picture, and we would see that a rational 
person would choose dikaiosune as an inner 
condition for its own sake. 
Speusippus: But why? Surely this kind of self-regulation, or this 
state of inner lawfulness, is nothing more than 
society's impression on the individual psyche. Surely 
people keep themselves restrained by laws and rules 
only out of fear of punishment. It's nothing more 
than a socially programmed conscience. 
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Precisely not. I will show you that a wise, healthy 
person would want this inner lawfulness and 
orderliness because that person knows that it is the 
way to the most fulfilled and happy life. With your 
permission I will refute her argument by 
demonstrating two truths and by drawing out all their 
implications. The first truth is: There is a universal, 
unchanging essence of dikaiosune discoverable by 
reason after long, hard intellectual effort. The second 
is that after reason discovers this essence and when a 
polis or a psyche conforms to it, the result is genuine, 
lasting well-being and happiness. I will show that 
justice is real by nature, not by conventional conttacts, 
that reason can discover it, and that its embodiment 
in cities and souls makes for the best possible life. 
Is this going to be boring? 
Has it been boring so far? You said something about 
titillation. 
So titillate me. 
I will, if you will be quiet and listen. 
Ooooh, such a nasty little man. Will we ever get to 
love? 
Indirectly You will be able to make some obvious 
inferences and analogies. (There is a barely audible 
rumble from the volcano. Eudoxus is heard offstage.) 
IE 
PLATO'! AUTUAT 
Eudoxus: Plato! There is another one coming! (Enter 
Eudoxus.) Look! Another ship is coming! It's headed 
this way. 
Erothymia: It's at least an hour away. Plato, send this man down 
to my ship and fetch my crew. Tell him to bring them 
all back here. 
Plato: Why? We don't know who they are. 
Erothymia: We don't need to know. Please, do it quickly. No 
questions. 
Plato: Eudoxus, please fetch all the others and bring them 
here. (Exit Eudoxus.) Then what? 
Erothymia: I'm going to show you how I operate. When they get 
here we will all be hiding, except for you. You tell 
them we have all gone exploring. Just delay them. No 
more questions. 
Plato: What are you up to? 
Erothymia: I said, don't ask. Now, what is the nature of our 
disagreement about justice? What are these two 
arguments that are going to save your testicles? 
Plato: Briefly? 
Erothymia: Please. 
Plato: You are surely wrong when you say that self-
interested agreements define justice. Justice is not a 
human creation. It is an objective essence or nature 
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Erothymia: 
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inherent in all just actions and laws and persons and 
societies. I call it the Form of justice. When you 
intellect apprehends the real, universal nature of 
justice you will immediately see that to conform to 
the Form of justice in your actions and in your 
personality will result in stable and authentic 
happiness. Those are my two arguments. 
They sound far-fetched to me. They hatdly make 
sense. There is a reality called justice? This Form is a 
real thing? 
You can't see it, can't touch it, just like all the other 
Forms. You can know it only through reason. Forms 
are not grasped or discovered through sense 
experience. 
I really don't understand. Really, I'm not pretending 
to be dense. Wake up my mind here, or anything else 
you please, and explain this to me. What do you 
mean by 'Form'? What is the Form of justice? 
Forms are indestructible, unchanging, timeless 
objects of the highest level of knowledge. I could also 
say they are perfectly stable, meaning they never 
change and they exist eternally. They are perfect 
paradigms, represented in the world by the many 
instances which imperfectly embody them. 
Erothymia: And they are real?. 
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P la tO : More real than you and me. More real than anything 
you can see or touch or hear. 
E r o t h y m i a : How can they be real if you can't see them? 
P la to : They are objects of pure thought. You can't see or 
touch or hear your psyche, can you? But you know it 
is real, maybe more real than your body, because 
your psyche cannot be destroyed and it exists 
externally. At least you can intelligibly consider that 
possibility, which means that it is at least possible for 
something unobservable to be real. I want to prove 
that possibility true. 
Ero thym ia : I don't think you can do it. 
Pla tO : It will be difficult. But you will be forced by my 
argument to concur, will you not, that if there are 
timeless, eternal objects, and that if those most 
advanced in mental discipline can perceive them with 
the eye of their soul, then they would have 
knowledge of the true nature of justice, for example? 
Moreover, they would have timeless, universal 
knowledge, wouldn't they? 
E r o t h y m i a : I can see no other conclusion. 
Pla to : So I must prove there are timeless objects of 
knowledge, objectively independent of the knower. 
I'll start simply. Think of the plan, or design, for this 
ship. The design for this ship is a blueprint, existing 
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somewhere in a naval architect's cabinet. Many ships 
can be made from this one design, can they not? 
Erothymia: In fact, many have been. 
Plato: Are all these ships exactly the same? 
Erothymia: Not exactly. Some are slightly different weights ot 
colors, some have different smells, and so on. 
Plato: Are there some ships which imitated the blueprint at 
one time, but which no longet exist, and others 
which have not yet appeared that will imitate it? 
Erothymia: Absolutely. 
Plato: So the many tangible ships we call real can change 
and disappear while the blueprint stays the same. 
What would you say is more perfect, the ships we see 
on the ocean, or the blueprint from which they came? 
Erothymia: I don't know. You did not sail from Greece on a 
blueprint. 
Plato: But the blueprint must be more perfect. Without the 
concept or the idea for the ship there would be no ship 
at all. The ships are contingent on the concept they 
instantiate. Also, the ships we see do not embody the 
concept perfectly—they only approximate it, some 
closely, some remotely. That is why they sink and 
need replacing. But most of all, the bluepnnt is 
nothing but the mathematical form of each ship. It is 
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a collection of formal equations, measurements, and 
geometric shapes. These shapes are not made of 
wood or canvas. The formulas give shape to the 
materials. Now listen: the formulas endure, but the 
material ships don't. The blueprint, or form of the 
ship is not subject to change and decay in the way the 
ships are. So the Form is immutable while the ships 
come and go. What then is more perfect and more 
real, the ships or the Form of the ships? 
Erothymia: By your reasoning, the Form. It outlives the ships, it 
cannot be altered, and without it the ships would not 
exist. But what if I rip up the blueprint! Haven't I 
destroyed the form of the ships? 
Plato: Where was the concept or idea for these ships before 
it was drawn on the architect's desk? 
Erothymia: In his mind. 
Plato: If you ripped up the blueprint, the form would 
remain as an idea in the architect's mind wouldn't it? 
Then surely the blueprint is more perfect than the 
many perishable things that imitate it it, and the idea 
or concept of the blueprint in the architect's mind is 
more perfect than the blueprint on his desk. Can 
anything be more perfect than that? 
Erothymia: No, except when the architect dies, the formal idea 
dies with him. 
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Plato: Suppose the Form is objectively real, independent of 
the architect's mind who thinks it. 
Erothymia: I don't understand that. 
PlatO: Look at it this way. If I organize some grapes or these 
three pebbles into groups of three, you can see triads 
with your eyes, can't you? Now I am breaking up the 
groups of three, but I will write a symbol of any 
group of three in this sand. But watch, I am erasing 
the symbol. Does three-ness still exist? 
Erothymia: Yes, it still exists as a thought in your mind. 
PlatO: Does it still exist when I don't think of it? 
Erothymia: It must. 
Plato: Would it still exist if no-one were to think it? 
Erothymia: No-one? I'm not sure. 
PlatO: Look, the Form of three-ness does not perish. It must 
be universal and everlasting. What about other things? 
You surely agree there are many beautiful things. None 
of them is perfectly beautiful, and none of them lasts 
forever. But what is the essence of beauty itself? Does 
it cease to exist when the many tangible beautiful 
things cease to exist? I would say no. Beauty itself is 
non-perishable and non-tangible, meaning it is timeless 
and immaterial. The form of the beautiful itself is the 
cause of beauty in the many changing appearances of 
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beauty, all of which come and go, in the same way 
that the idea of a ship is the cause of that ship. 
Erothymia: But ideas exist only in minds. How can they be 
independent of our minds? 
Plato: Eternal forms are in our minds, because our minds 
are eternal. 
Erothymia: You haven't proven that. I'm not satisfied. 
Plato: If I can prove that there is at least one eternal mind, 
would you then agree that it would not be difficult to 
at least conceive of that mind creating other eternal 
minds containing eternal ideas? 
Erothymia: I would. Try to prove it. 
Plato: Would you please lift your finger? (She lifts her 
finger). What made your finger move? 
Erothymia: I did. My muscles did. 
Plato: What made your muscles move? 
Erothymia: Oh my, a lot of muscles are moving. My thoughts are 
making them move. My thoughts are being propelled 
by your thoughts. 
PlatO: So a non-physical thing was the first cause of the 
visible, physical movement in your finger? 
Erothymia: It seems so. 
10? 
H U T O ' l J U T J K J I T 
Plato: Now look around you. Isn't everything moving, either 
rapidly or slowly, but still moving? No-one can deny 
that. And I ask you, if then; were no original source 
for motion itself, would anything be moving at all? 
Erothymia : I don't agree. Everything gets its motion from 
something else in motion, and the sequence just goes 
on without end. 
PlatO: Yes, it may be without end in the sense that there was 
no first initiator of motion in time, but surely there 
must be a first principle of motion, something which 
sustains the endless succession of movements and 
imparts the property of movement to everything in 
the endless succession. 
Erothymia : I will reluctantly agtee to that. 
PlatO: Could this principle itself be moving? 
Erothymia : No, or it would just be another part of the succession. 
PlatO: So we can say that the fitst principle of motion is 
some kind of psyche. It is not moving, so it does not 
change. Since it is a psyche, it would also have to be 
non-material. Finally, since motion is eternal, it 
would also have be eternal. Let us conclude that the 
first cause of motion is immutable, immaterial, and 
indestructible. Tell me, do you see order in the world? 
Erothymia : Certainly. There is numerical ratio, regularity, 
repetition, natural laws, and so on. 
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Plato: 
Do you see order and regularity in motion? 
No doubt. 
And do you not see degrees of order in nature, and 
degrees of order in human society? 
Sometimes more, sometimes less, but yes. 
Do you think the world could be self-ordering? 
How could it be? One and the same thing cannot be 
both the ordered thing and the ordering thing. 
Something distinct from the world must give order 
to it. 
If we call the world the totality of changing or 
moving things, the principle of order could be 
nothing other than its first cause—the origin of 
motion. And that, we agreed, was eternal, changeless, 
and indestructible. Here then is my argument: there 
is an eternal, unchanging psyche that imparts motion 
and order to the changing world. The ideas or 
patterns by which the cosmic psyche imparts this 
order are themselves changeless, eternal, and 
indestructible. I call them timeless Forms. They are 
the immaterial, eternal patterns or paradigms that 
give everything a shape or structure or, let us say, an 
essence. There is a Form for everything with an 
identifiable nature: a Form of beauty, mathematical 
Forms like three-ness and equality, a Form of ship-
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hood, of humanity, of justice, and so on. After great 
intellectual labor, these Forms can be known by us. 
The timeless, unchanging Forms are the objects of 
rare philosophical knowledge. We can even define a 
philosopher as a knower and lover of Forms. 
Ero thymia : By all that moves, Plato, you have a wonderful mind. 
It moves me immensely Why does that happen? Your 
words and arguments are aphrodisiacs to me. You 
could take me now if you want to, and you haven't 
even won the argument. Come and show me your 
other powers. 
PlatO: How repulsive! I think carefully for you all night and 
you respond like a rutting goat! 
Ero thymia : There is something erotic in strong minds and 
powerful ideas. 
PlatO: Well get your excitement somewhere else. Leave me 
alone. 
Erothymia : You bastatd! You are ignoring me! (She picks up the 
sword.) I could do you in right now. 
Plato: Go ahead. Don't you trust your ideas? (Enter all.) 
Erothymia : We'll talk latet. All of you, hide behind the mounds 
with me. I want to show this man something. 
EudOXUS: The strangers are not far behind us. They are 
following us up here. 
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Erothymia: Plato, you greet them. We are going to hide. Just talk 
to them and find out where they are from. We will do 
the rest. 
Dion: Here they are. 
Erothymia: Quick, let's go. (They all disperse and hide. Plato 
paces in front of the volcano. Enter four crew from 
the third ship.) 
Plato: Hello. Where do you hail from? 
1st Crew: The island of Naxos. And you? 
PlatO: I am making passage from Athens to Sicily. 
1st Crew: We are returning to Naxos. Are you on your way to 
Sicily, or returning? 
Plato: We have not been there yet. (Erothymia leaps from 
behind the mound. Dion and his two crew members 
surround the newcomers.) 
Erothymia: Nobody move. We want all your money. Quickly. 
Who is carrying the money? You, tell us where it is. 
(She slashes the shoulder of the first crewman.) We 
are not fooling. Hand it over, or your whole arm 
comes off. 
1st Crew: It's not here. 
Erothymia: I know you have some. If you are on a return trip to 
Naxos you must have something. 
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PlalO: Wait. (He grabs the blade of Erothymia's sword.) You 
are not going to do that. 
Erothymia: Let go of the sword. 
PlatO: You can slash my hand if you want to, but I'm not 
letting go. Not until you let them go. 
Erothymia: I am taking their money. 
2nd Crew: It's aboard the ship. 
Erothymia: Let's get it then. 
3rd Crew: Only our commander can give you access. 
Erothymia: Fine, which one of you is the commander? 
3rd Crew: We left het on the ship. She's still there. 
Erothymia: She? 
3rd Crew: Yes, she. 
Erothymia: Your commander is a woman? 
Plato: That's what he said. Now sheath your weapon and 
attend to this man's wound. 
Erothymia: I am the only woman who can command a crew. 
Who does she think she is? 
Xenocrates: You ate quite evidently mistaken. Plato, what should 
we do? If we leave this crew in the hands of 
Xanthippe she will kill all of them. Then she will kill 
their captain. 
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Plato: What is your commander's name? 
1st Crew: Alethea. 
Plato: Which of you does she trust? 
1st Crew: All of us. 
Plato: Send him to get her. (The fourth crew makes a move 
to exit.) 
Erothymia: Wait a minute! I'm in charge here! Nobody does 
anything until I say so. 
Plato: Do as I said. Bring your captain here. This woman 
will not hurt her, not in any way. Now put this thing 
away. (Erothymia looks furiously at Plato and 
sheathes the sword. Exit fourth crew.) 
Erothymia: What in Hades do you think you are doing? 
Plato: You know something about me, but you don't know 
that I know you know it. My knowledge of what you 
think I don't know will keep us all safe. 
Erothymia: You are playing with me, mister. Don't do it. 
Plato: Then stop your nonsense and play by different rules. 
Erothymia: Whose rules? 
Plato: The rules of reason. 
Erothymia: You are an idiot. 
PlatO: Everyone come here and sit down. (All three groups 
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sit around the base of the crater, on which Plato is 
standing.) Dion, why do you obey this woman? 
Erothymia: Don't answer! 
Plato: He is a man. He can speak for himself. 
Erothymia: Not around me, he can't. 
Plato: Madame, you have a problem. 
Erothymia: Oooh, Mister know-it-all thinks I have a problem. So 
what's my problem? 
Plato: It will become clearer and clearer. 
Erothymia: Maybe you have a problem. 
Plato: I have many. Which one did you have in mind? 
Erothymia: Me. 
Plato: Maybe so. Let me ask all of you. What kind of 
problem does this woman present to me? 
Speusippus: She quite clearly represents a problem for your theory 
of justice. 
PlatO: She hasn't heard it yet. You have, but she hasn't. Do 
you think she has any premonitions about what kind 
of problem she is? 
Xenocrates: I suspect she does. 
Edoxus : She's a victim of something. Someone has hurt het 
badly. She has wounds and bruises on her psyche. 
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Plato: Heavy scarring is more like it. She mistakes the scars 
for healthy tissue. She's a victim, but she won't admit 
to it. She thinks she's special. 
Xenocrates: All victims think they are special. 
Speusippus: It's their protection against forgotten pain. Pains like 
shame and guilt. The original wound is shame. 
Erothymia: Stop it! All of you! One more word and I will kill 
you. This time I mean it. 
Plato: You can't kill us. You need us. You need us at many 
levels. 
Erothymia: I'm one iota away from killing you. 
PlatO: You need us at a level you have not yet discovered. 
(Enter fourth crew with Alethea. Alethea is wearing a 
blue robe, delicately trimmed in gold fur and 
feathers, and an elaborate gold bonnet. Her pure 
blonde hair cascades down to her waist when she 
removes the bonnet. Plato bows deeply, then kisses 
both her hands. Erothymia tries to push Plato aside 
and brandishes her sword at Alethea.) 
Erothymia: Give us your money and leave. Leave and never come 
back. 
Alethea: And go where? In an infinite universe all points are at 
the center. I am always at home. 
Erothymia: (Puzzled.) There is something strange about you. 
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Alelhea: I am sure he does not think so (touching Plato). I am 
familiar to him. And he is familiar to me. 
Plato: I worship you. You are Alethea. You are living truth. 
Erothymia: She's an outlandish bimbo. (Plato decisively grabs 
Erothymia's wrist and locks her elbow with his other 
hand.) 
Plato: Drop the weapon. 
Erothymia: If I drop it now I will be back latet with another one. 
Plato, you'll regret this. 
Plato: Drop it. Drop it to the ground and leave. 
Alethea: I would like to try something. Please release your grip. 
(To Erothymia.) You can use your weapon on me if 
you wish. But if you do, you will destroy something 
you need. Have you read his book on love? 
Erothymia: Who needs books? 
Alethea: You do. Let me tell you something. 
Erothymia: Go right ahead. 
Alethea: Fitst, everyone but him and you should leave. I am 
dismissing my crew. Now you do the same, if you 
would, please. 
Plato: I agree. Friends, I will meet you back at the ship. 
(Exit Xenocrates, Eudoxus, and Speusippus.) 
Alethea: Now them, if you would be so kind. 
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Erothymia: 
Alethea: 
Erothymia: 
Alethea: 
Erothymia: 
Alethea: 
Both: 
Alethea: 
Both: 
Plato: 
Alethea: 
But I keep the sword. 
Those without love need reason. Those without 
reason need justice. Those without justice need force. 
I believe she is asking you to leave. (Exit Dion and his 
crew.) Thank you. The rest of you know what to do. 
Go, my friends and make peace with the others. 
(Alethea's crew exits.) We have much to say to each 
other, much to learn from each other. 
We have an argument to finish. 
About what? 
About justice. I say that justice is a forced condition 
we would all rather do without. We conform only 
because it serves our interest. He says that justice is 
an objective, universal quality...some kind of real 
property. 
Do you both agree on the meaning of the word? Do 
you agree that justice is order and regulation? 
Yes, we do. 
So you must disagree about the nature and source of 
justice. 
Yes, we do. 
Hence we disagree profoundly about its value. 
But surely you agree that justice is a virtue. 
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Plato: We have not got that far yet. 
Alethea: But it must be. A virtue is nothing more than a 
quality or excellence that makes something work 
well. It is what makes the parts of a system work 
together for a purpose. I mean, our crews must work 
in unison to sail our ships well. 
Erothymia: True. 
Alethea: So why, then, don't we analyze something that is 
working optimally and find the virtue of justice in it? 
Then we can talk about its value. What are the four 
cardinal virtues? 
Erothymia: Wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. 
Alethea: Let me ask you, Plato, if we were to analyze a 
completely fine and beautiful society, or better yet, a 
completely fine and beautiful soul, wouldn't we find 
the virtues in either one? Then couldn't we decide if 
these virtues make for happier societies and happier 
persons? 
Erothymia: If I may, let me point out that we may soon grow 
weary—especially him. 
Plato: By the dog, you are right. Perhaps we should draw 
this portion of out discussion to a close simply by 
naming the cardinal virtues, then pick up the thread 
of the argument tomorrow. I suggest we go back to 
our respective ships for the rest of the day and make 
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Alethea: 
Erothymia: 
Plato: 
Alethea: 
Erothymia: 
Alethea: 
Plato: 
Erothymia: 
Alethea: 
passage to Syracuse tomorrow. I am inviting both of 
you to sail with me. After we have made way I will 
explain what I mean by dikaiosune. 
I agree. 
I can't leave my crew in another's hands. 
We can sail with you, in that case. I trust my crew. 
I am of the same mind. We will sail on your ship. 
Now what are the names of the virtues? 
Their names are easy: we all know them. They are 
Sophia, Andrea, Sophrosune, and Dikaiosune. Some 
other words for Sophia are wisdom, knowledge, 
insight, and understanding. 
Some other words for Andrea are courage, endurance, 
steadfastness, and strength-of-spirit. 
Some other words for Sophrosune are self-control, 
temperance, discipline, and restraint. 
And as I recently discovered, some other words for 
Dikaiosune are Tightness, orderliness, proportion, 
and lawfulness. Most people would prefer to use the 
word justice. 
Let's leave it at that for now. Tomorrow I will hear 
more about virtue. Then we can recognize why 
dikaiosune is a virtue, and if its possession makes the 
good polis happy. 
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PlalO: And if its presence in each psyche makes its owner 
happy. Do not forget, it is the just individual which 
is uppermost in my mind. The individual ranks first 
in our concern. The health and goodness of the state 
is important, but philosophy is pointless if it fails to 
point the way to the good life for all members of the 
state. I would even say that the purpose of the state is 
to provide the best conditions for each of us to 
achieve happiness. I think about justice, however, 
because I need to care for my own soul above all else. 
Alethea: That said, let us go back to our respective ships. A 
new day is coming, and we must greet it with fresh 
minds. 
Both: Agreed. Right. No disagreement here. (They all 
move off. Music up. Lights slowly to black. The 
volcano glows red. There is a barely audible rumble. 
Music down.) 
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Scene Three 
Sounds of waves. Lights slowly up. On the deck of a sailing ship. 
Alethea: 
Xenocrates: 
Alethea: 
Xenocrates: 
Alethea: 
Xenocrates: 
Plato: 
Her crew has the sails well trimmed for the course. 
Indeed, the beating seems right and the sails are 
flying firm. 
Where is Plato? 
He has been in a contemplative trance. He will be 
here soon. You know, I've been wondering whether 
or not we will complete our blueprint for the ideal 
state before we put in at Syracuse. 
You must be especially keen to see it finished, being 
a constitutional and legal theorist. 
You are right. I need a constitutional model and 
some general laws, but they always arise from 
concepts and principles which only philosophy can 
provide. All practice is merely applied theory. All we 
make and all we do is nothing more than the 
implementation of ideas, so we must labor with 
courage, honesty, and gteat skill to ensure that we 
have the true theory. (Enter Plato.) Thete is only one 
way to be good and many ways to be bad. 
And, I would add, only one way to be right and 
many ways to be wrong. Good morning to both of 
you. 
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Both: Good morning. 
Plato: Where are the others? 
Xenocrates: I'll fetch them. (Exits) 
Plato: Shall we finish last night's discussion? I've had more 
thoughts than there are waves off this bow. By your 
leave, I will summarize them in the hope we can 
move from dikaiosune in the state to its presence in 
the soul. 
Alethea: By all means, continue. (Fade wave sounds.) 
Plato: Let me search for justice in society first. On the larger 
scale it will be easier to see. In fact let us construct the 
finest possible society, one that is smoothly 
functioning and flourishing, then ask how it achieved 
its order. Tell me how you think it arises in a society. 
How do cities arise in the first place? 
Alethea: I think because we need each other. There are many 
things we want that we cannot provide for ourselves. 
Plato: Why not? 
Alethea: Because none of us has the time to do everything. 
And none of us is talented at everything. Some have 
talent for healing, some for carpentry, some for 
fishing, and so on. So we band together and co­
operate in helping each other. 
Plato: Good. The smooth operation of the polis will come 
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from two things—people will specialize at some 
particular work, and their specialty should be what 
they are best at. 
Alethea: That is not hard to agree to. But who will oversee the 
entite polis? Who will fight for it and maintain its 
internal functioning? 
Plato: Obviously, there will be a separate military class to 
guard the society against intruders and to maintain 
civic order. Those in the military will be true 
warriors, distinguished for their gallant service to 
public harmony and security. On our two principles, 
they must specialize in the military arts and nothing 
else, and they must be of the highest courage and 
character. In fact, their work is so important, 
requiring such extreme dedication, self-sacrifice, and 
self-discipline, that they should live together on a 
military base with its own special way-of-life. 
Alethea: Now we have two separate classes, the producing-
consuming class and the warrior class. But who will 
decide which people go into which class? And who 
will decide the particular rights and obligations of 
each class, or their lifestyle? Who will decide which 
policies—foreign or internal—the warrior-class 
should enforce? 
Plato: It would have to be a third class. One class would be 
the providers of goods and services, a second would 
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execute orders to fight and enforce the regulations of 
civic order, and a third would make the regulations 
and decisions. 
Alethea: That makes good sense. Someone has to frame the 
constitution and laws and guide the whole society. 
Keeping to our two principles, they should be those 
who are naturally best at leading and governing, and 
they should do nothing other than lead and govern. 
(Enter Erothymia.) 
Plato: Good morning. 
Alethea: Good morning to you. Are you rested? (Erothymia 
does not respond.) 
PlatO: What's wrong? (She still does not respond.) 
Alethea: You may speak if you wish. We were talking about 
the ideal society. 
Erothymia: Why didn't you wait for me? 
PlatO: Why weren't you here when we started? 
Erothymia: I don't want you talking to him alone. He is still my 
prisoner, you know. 
Alethea: It's your ship. We will respect your wish. 
Erothymia: It's not a wish, it's an order. 
PlatO: Can we say "Hello" in passing? 
Erothymia: Don't be ridiculous. 
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Plato: How about the weather? Can we talk about the 
weather when we are alone? 
Erothymia: Watch out, mister. 
Plato: Of course, we could always go to your ship to talk 
and leave her here. 
Erothymia: You are not going anywhere until we get to Syracuse. 
Alethea: Women do not usually talk to a man like that until 
after they are married to him. 
Erothymia: Really. You don't say. 
Alethea: Would you like to contribute to the dialogue? 
Erothymia: Well, I hate to interrupt your private little chat here. 
Alethea: It's not private. We were not talking about you in any 
case. 
Plato: Even if we were, you wouldn't need to worry, 
especially if I were talking to Alethea about you. 
Erothymia: You should never talk behind my back. I don't like it. 
Plato: If you were talking to Alethea, I would want you to 
talk about me. 
Erothymia: What is so special about her? 
Alethea: This is infantile. We have important work to do. He 
was telling me that in the noblest, finest society the 
four virtues would be manifestly present. So we 
began the mental construction of the kallipolis, the 
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ideal state. Our first conclusion was that the state has 
three distinct classes: the working class, the military 
class, and the ruling class. 
Plato: Since we were speaking earlier of a military class, let's 
think of the state in terms of a fighting ship. There 
would have to be one group to provide the food, 
make the uniforms and weapons, construct the ship, 
repair the sails, provide and administer medicines for 
the wounded, and so on. None of them would be 
aboard the ship. Once the ships needs are met, it 
would go forth and do battle. The crew on it would 
do nothing but sail the ship well and fight defensively 
or offensively. All those aboard the ship would be 
courageous, highly disciplined, physically fit, 
aggressive and decisive in their craft. They must also 
be able to restrain their aggression at will, capable of 
diplomacy and tactfulness when necessaty. The 
analogy here is complete when we remember that the 
ship needs one captain, and only one. The captain is 
ultimately responsible for everything, including 
when to fight and why; tactics and strategy in battle; 
helmsmanship and navigation; the co-ordination of 
the crew; maintenance of discipline, safety, 
procedure, and the ship's fighting trim. (Enter 
Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Eudoxus.) 
Speusippus: Keep talking. We can pick it up. 
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Alethea: Why would the crew willingly submit to the 
Captain's commands and orders? 
PlatO: Alethea, you touch here on the central claim in my 
argument. I will have to expound it at length. For 
now, I will say only that the Captain maintains 
authority because of proven superiority. The Captain 
is obeyed out of reverence. The Captain is simply the 
best: the finest in character, in intelligence, in 
military wisdom and tactical judgment, in courage, 
in nautical skills of all kinds, and in knowledge. Like 
a wise and benevolent God, the good Captain is 
worshipped and obeyed by the whole crew and all its 
providers. I will say more on this later, but for now 
that is my answer. 
Erothymia: I cannot let this go. Who picks the Captain? How 
does the Captain make the rules and commands? 
How does the crew know that the Captain is the 
wisest and best of people? 
PlatO: I promise, I will get to all that. 
Erothymia: (Almost angry) No, I want to be told now! This is 
important! 
PlatO: Curb your spirit and be gentle. I need to make a 
further point. Please be satisfied for now with a 
question, and I will soon address your concerns. Tell 
me, Xenocrates, do you think the crew should tell the 
Captain which policies to institute? 
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Xenocrates: 
Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
That would be foolish. 
Or how to navigate? 
That would be outlandish. 
Or when to return to port? 
I see your point. 
Do you think the crew should pick the Captain? Or 
its own jobs on the ship? 
Of course not. The Captain picks the crew, and 
assigns each a task. 
And do you think the workers who provide and 
service the ship should pick either the crew or the 
Captain? 
Of course not. What does a beautician know about 
warfare or about commanding warriors? 
So warriors and commanders, at the very least, 
should be selected on some basis other than popular 
vote. 
Yes, I see. If the working class or the warrior class 
selected the commanding class, the commanders 
would nor be selected for their character or 
knowledge, but for their ability to satisfy the wants of 
the voters. We don't elect the Gods, so why should 
we elect the Admirals? 
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Erothymia: I was not elected. 
Alethea: You got there your own way. 
PlatO: There is a difference between the ways things are and 
the way they ought to be. I am not talking about how 
rulers and commanders in fact come to power. I am 
thinking of the perfect society, and hence I must 
think exclusively about how rulers and commanders 
should be selected. 
Erothymia: Well, at least we agree it should not be by popular 
vote. 
Plato: We agree on how it should not be, but we will no 
doubt disagree on how it ought to be. Now, if I 
promise to say much more later on that point, will 
you let me proceed on another? 
EudOXUS: We can all grant that. 
Plato: Good. Let us return from the metaphor of the ship 
to the polis itself. I ask you, Eudoxus, if a polls were 
completely fine and beautiful and good—like a 
person—what basic qualities would it exhibit? 
EudOXUS: The four cardinal virtues, of course. 
PlatO: All our friends in other schools, and thoughtful 
people generally, agree that thete are four qualities 
that mark any beautiful or noble human entity. 
Anything humanly good possesses these four 
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characteristics or features. Consequently, if our city is 
good in all its details, all of which I have written 
down for future discussion, it will exhibit them. Let 
us call each of these qualities or features an arete. 
Speusippus: People would call them virtues. 
PlatO: Yes, but that is a weak word. I prefer the word 
excellence. Other people may prefer words like 
'strength' or 'capacity' or 'power'. Whatever word we 
use, an arete is any excellence or power which causes 
someone or something to fulfill its purpose, that is, 
to realize its nature or to flourish in its proper 
function or work. For example, the proper function 
or work of the mind is to think and discover truth. 
So high intelligence would be a primary arete of the 
mind. The work or purpose of a soldier is to fight 
and guard, so courage would be a primary arete of the 
soldier. If anything has its proper arete it will 
function smoothly, efficiently, effectively. In the 
finest polis we say we should find each arete which, by 
the tests of experience and the contemplation of wise 
thinkers, would be an excellence in a thriving, 
flourishing social organism. Which would you like to 
discuss first? 
Alethea: Let us begin with the oldest one, Andrea. 
Xenocrates: I can speak on that. Homer mentions the arete of the 
hero, of someone who overcomes immense obstacles 
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in quest of a worthy goal. The hero is worshipped for 
his Andrea, for his singular excellence we call courage 
or fortitude. He overcomes everything, including 
temptations to flee from pain or give in to pleasure, 
in order to achieve victory. Courage is the arete that 
causes anything to discharge its fighting function 
well and emerge victorious. 
Plato: Where is it in the finest city? 
Xenocrates: In the army, naturally, since the warrior class has the 
work of warfare. Not in the rulers? Not in the 
producers? No, that arete is specific to the warriors. 
Speaking only of the state, each class has its own 
work, therefore its unique arete. 
Plato: What about Sophia?. 
Alethea: I can speak on that. Can we agree to call it wisdom? 
All: Yes. Agreed. 
Alethea: Understanding, insight, knowledge, or whatever 
others call it, Sophia has at least three components. I 
believe they are, first, the possession of proven facts 
and truths, second, sound practical judgment or 
good insight, some would say solid common sense, 
and, third, the ability to grasp the primary, 
undemonstrable truths without which we could not 
think or act. I believe it is the second of these we are 
most concerned with. That kind of sound judgment 
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or practical insight is the arete which causes us to 
thrive and do well in running our household, in 
doing business, in the tactical and strategic aspects of 
warfare, in punishing wrongdoing, in deciding what 
is enough in anger or pleasure or exercise, but most 
of all in the art of governing. 
Pla to : So if the state is as perfect as possible, where is its 
wisdom? 
Ale thea : It could be nowhere else but in its leadership. If the 
state is governed well, which it would have to be if it 
is completely good, it would be governed by wise, 
intelligent, knowledgeable, and insightful rulers. We 
can remember our ship analogy here. 
P la tO : So wisdom is the arete of the rulers, or at least the 
primary one. And sophrosune? 
E u d O X U S : We all admire men and women who are sophrosune, 
but what do we mean by it? I think we mean that 
sophrosune is the excellence by which we maintain 
mastery over our animal nature—its instincts, 
irrational desires, primal appetites, and natural 
passions. When someone is "out of his mind" or "out 
of control" they have no sophrosune, but when they 
"keep their head" they have it. If someone is "in 
control" they have mastery over themselves. With 
sophrosune, the best part is regulating an inferior part, 
and regulating means it is giving regulations or rules 
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for the inferior part to follow. So sophrosune chooses 
one part to submit to the rightful authority of 
another part which is naturally fit to govern. It is 
something like good discipline. 
Plato: Where is it in the state? 
Xenocrates: Well, it is a willingness by the many to be ruled by 
the wise, so it is in the relations between the classes 
rather than one particular class. It is something like 
the relations between the gods and their followers. 
Religious people honor and worship their gods and 
carry out their wishes, in humility and respect. 
PlatO: I agtee, that is a hard word to define. But sophrosune, 
or self-control, is clearly an arete. Now, may I speak 
on dikaiosune?. We have found three of the four 
virtues in the polis, so whatever remaining feature is 
most excellent must be the last virtue. Clearly, the 
polis is good because it also exhibits order, harmony, 
and lawful regularity. This is precisely dikaiosune. But 
where does this orderliness and lawfulness come 
from? From nothing other than reason and wisdom, 
from the part that is naturally fitted to guide and 
rule. Just as the Captain imparts order to the ship by 
making rules and issuing commands, the rulers use 
their knowledge, skill and moral superiority to guide 
and govern the warriors and producers. Eudoxus, let 
me ask you something. What would you think if the 
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eye were to try to hear, if the nose were to try to see, 
or if the ears were to try to taste? 
The result would be chaos and disunity. 
What if soldiers were to try commanding the 
generals, or students were to administer schools, and 
administrators were to do the teaching? 
Again, dysfunction and disorganization. 
Now what if the wise were to bake the city's bread, 
the cobblers were to rule, the lyre players were to 
fight, and the fighters were ro try to heal the sick, or 
govern the city. Wouldn't that be like the soldiers 
running the army, or the mentally ill running the 
healing temples? Wouldn't the result be the same? 
Exactly the same. It is the opposite of dikaiosune. 
It follows, doesn't it, that dikaiosune is the virtue that 
permits the best at ruling to rule, fighting to fight, 
and the best at providing goods and services to 
provide them. This is similar to sophrosune, except 
that once everyone knows and accepts their place in 
the polis, no-one upsets the natural order by trying 
to do the work of another. The work of the ruler is 
to rule, the warrior to fight, the producer to 
produce. This is more important than it sounds. It 
has the grave consequence that neither the warriors 
nor the workers can tell the rulers what to do; nor 
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can they decide who the rulers will be or what rules 
the rulers can make. The workers and warriors are 
simply not free to rule. 
Xenocrates: So when we get to Syracuse we must tell Dionysius 
the Elder that if he wants the most just society he 
must not let the people rule, nor the generals. He 
must give all the power of ruling to the wisest and 
best. 
PlatO: Yes, the ruler must have God-like powers to govern, 
but only those who are God-like in nature would be 
given that power. The ruler would have to be aristos, 
or superhumanly good and vastly superior. Political 
power must be concentrated in the very finest men 
or women, and the very finest men or women must 
be required to have political power. Only then will 
the polis be dikaiosune. Then it will be balanced, 
proportionately and unified. 
Erothymia: Can you describe the aristos man or women in greater 
detail? What makes them aristos? 
El ldOXUS: Before he answers that, I want to ask Plato what he 
meant when he said that he wanted to get to the 
individual psyche, and what dikaiosune is in the soul. 
I bet that if we had a portrait of the just person we 
would be closer to understanding who should rule, 
because the aristos character would be the best, 
therefore the most just. 
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Plato: Yes, in the finest polis power must be given to 
someone who is at least the most just. Remember, 
'just' now means 'controlled by reason and wisdom'. 
Eudoxus, you may wish to discourse on this subject. 
E u d O X U S : I defer to Xenocrates, whose views are more polished. 
Then I can fill in the rest. 
Xenocrates: This will indeed be difficult. I shall start by repeating 
that the finest polis has three classes: the large class of 
workers, the smaller military class, and the very small 
ruling class. We found wisdom in the ruling class, 
courage in the warrior class, discipline or self-control 
in levels of authority, and justice in the 
apportionment of functions to each appropriate 
class, such that each class does its own task excellently 
and only its own task. Now these three classes of 
society must be the larger expressions of different 
aspects of human nature. What else could they be? If 
we investigate, we should find aspects or parts of the 
psyche which the three classes express. Assuredly we 
do. We find parts roughly corresponding to the terms 
Body, Mind and Spirit. Let's start with Mind, and 
call it the Reasoning part. This is the part which uses 
logic and objective thinking processes to reach true 
beliefs. For example, I can use controlled observations 
and do repeatable experiments to prove that we 
should not drink the sea water outside our vessel just 
as convincingly as Eudoxus can use logic to prove 
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theorems in geometry. But reasoning alone cannot 
stop me from drinking it. Suppose I was dehydrated 
and fiercely thirsty. I would want to drink the water, 
as people sometimes do. Now I have a conflict 
between what I want and what I know. What is it in 
me that "gives in" to the desire, or else "stays loyal" to 
reason? Is it not some third part of me, distinct from 
both reason and desire? What is it in me that resists 
all kinds of temptations arising from things like lust, 
fear, or anger, so that I can feel proud of myself for 
resisting them? What is it in me that weakens and 
gives in to those same temptations, causing me to feel 
shame or guilt for doing so? Isn't it a third thing, a 
kind of mediator between desires in the body and 
thoughts in the dispassionate mind? 
El ldOXUS: If this helps, we can imagine an entity which only 
thinks and calculates with no desire, and we can 
imagine an entity which only desires but has no 
reason. If we were to put them together, how would 
they interact? I don't think they could, because pure 
thought would be unaffected by desire, and desire 
would be deaf to reason. So there would have to be a 
broker between them which has a share in each and 
which consistently guides desire according to wisdom 
and logic. 
Xenocrates: What would you call it? 
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Erothymia: It must be the will. We say that strong-willed people 
resist temptation and weak-willed people don't. 
Speusippus: But what makes the will strong or weak? From 
where does it get its energy to overcome immense 
desires and side with dispassionate teason? Or to 
repeatedly cave in to feeble appetites and desires in 
the face of overwhelming proof that they would 
cause harm? Look, the strongest and biggest part of 
us is the desire for pleasure. As drunkards and 
reckless lovers know, the desire for pleasure is 
greater than the fear of pain. So what has the 
strength to restrain desire, or to give it free reign 
when appropriate, when desire is unmoved by 
reason? What gives energy or power to the will? It 
cannot be reason, because reason by itself issues in 
conclusions, not actions. Try this example. Let's put 
Xanthippe right here and put Andrea right here. 
(He brings Erothymia and Alethea downstage and 
positions Plato between them. All lights down 
except a spotlight on Plato.) Suppose Plato were to 
meet a fiery, wild, hyper-erotic temptress. She is 
pure appetite and desite. (Spotlight up on 
Erothymia.) Suppose that Plato's appetitive part 
desires her more than he has desired any women he 
has ever met, or could meet. She uses all her charm 
and seductive sexual power on him. (Erothymia 
begins her burlesque movements and unbuttons her 
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tunic, looking alluringly at Plato.) In the absence of 
reason, he would simply attempt to gratify his lust 
as any natural animal would. He would not even 
"give in". He would be determined by raw, blind 
desire. But Plato also has reason. (Spotlight on 
Alethea.) Through the use of his rational part, he 
can think and calculate logically. The rational part 
can inform him of objective facts. 
Alethea: The woman you desire is someone else's mistress. If 
you so much as wink at her you will end up dead. 
Hence, you must not yield to your desire. 
Erothymia: But you want me. I will give you more and rarer 
pleasures than you ever experienced before. They will 
be stronger than the sword of Damocles. Oh, Mister 
Philosopher, come and enjoy me. I will be yours, all 
yours. 
Alethea: It is not in your best interest to succumb to her erotic 
entreaties. An afternoon of pleasure will actually 
bring you to ruin. Listen to me, rather than her. 
Speusippus: Will Plato wink at Xanthippe? Not if his will is 
firmer than his phallus, and not if it can put his 
desire under the dominion of his knowledge. But 
what makes his will firm? Indeed, does he have some 
mechanism of willing at all, or does he have some 
sort of vital energetic kind of power which listens to 
both reason and desire? (Lights up.) 
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E u d O X U S : I see what you mean. It is more like a power he can 
summon when necessary and relax when necessary, 
something similar to the aggression a warrior can 
activate when reason decides it is right to do so, or 
which he can restrain when reason dictates it. Why 
don't we call it spirit, rather than will? After all, we 
talk more of the competitive spirit at the Olympian 
games, than the competitive will. 
Plato: And we describe people as lacking in spirit, or high-
spirited, or mean-spirited, or as kindred or beautiful 
spirits, rather than beautiful wills, and so on. We do 
not say the Will is willing but the flesh is weak, we 
say the spirit is willing. We tell people to curb their 
spirits, not their wills. 
Xenocrates: And what do we call this spirited part of ourselves. Is 
it our temper? 
P la tO : Not quite. The name for it is thymos. One aspect of 
thymos is temper, yes, such that we can lose our 
temper when thymos is out of control and anger is 
rampant, but being angry is only one expression for 
it. It is certainly the aggressive part, and it is certainly 
the willing part, and it moves out to act or not, but 
it is more mutli-faceted than that. Why don't we 
agree to call it 'spirit' and refer to it as thymos? 
Alethea: Well done. Now we see there are three divisions in 
rhe psyche: Reason, Desire, and Spirit or Will. 
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Clearly, wisdom is found in the rational part, courage 
is found in the thymos part, discipline or self-mastery 
is found in the right alignment of the parts so that 
Desire and Spirit automatically obey the dictates of 
Reason, and justice is found in the contribution of 
each part to the whole without being interfered with 
by the other two. In other words the psyche will be 
orderly and unified, integrated and harmonious, a 
functional whole, with its three divisions cooperating 
as allies rather than competing as enemies. 
El ldOXUS: Now I can see the shape or form of dikaiosune more 
clearly, without even knowing which particular 
actions or rules or people exhibit it. Now that I see its 
formal nature I can decide which ones fit it and 
which don't. I can think of the nature of dikaiosune 
in terms of a mathematical formula, knowing which 
numbers fit it and which don't. And I can see it even 
more clearly when I consider someone who lacks it. 
He or she would be dysfunctional, neurotic, 
disorganized, disunified, and most of all unhappy. 
Go back to Xenocrates' example. If dikaiosune is 
lawful orderliness and balance imparted by reason, 
what would happen when we lose it? Suppose Plato 
were to make himself grossly drunk with wine, which 
would be the suicide of reason. We would see thymos 
take over first, aggressively pursuing the object of his 
desire. The more he drinks, the more he dissolves 
137 
PLATO'S A t T A t A T 
thymos until finally there is nothing left but a lusting 
animal with neither reason nor will. Propelled by 
instinct and appetite, he would end up physically 
sick, punished by the mistress's lover, cut off from 
affection, and banished from a just society. 
E r o t h y m i a : Not so fast. We cannot reach the end of Plato's 
argument yet. Before we can prove that the just 
person is happier—whether he is known to be just ot 
not—there are three points I find troublesome. 
Without further proof and evidence I cannot accept 
them. (Xenocrates, Eudoxus, Speusippus, and 
Alethea huddle in a group, conversing in whispers.) 
Pla to : Yes, there is much more to be said. But we can 
address yout concerns. I can probably guess what 
they are. After all, your theory of justice begins and 
ends with biology. It is perfectly true of a troop of 
monkeys. 
E r o t h y m i a : Yes, I see that. But I believe that we ate indeed 
sophisticated monkeys, endowed with the extra 
ability to calculate our own best advantage. 
P la tO : What are your concerns? 
E r o t h y m i a : The first is that I am not convinced of the reality of 
thymos. The second greater problem is that even if 
thymos is real, and not only a verbal fabrication, I 
don't know if reason is able to rule both it and out 
purely animal nature or that it should. But the 
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biggest problem is this. Suppose that thymos is real, 
and so is blind desire. What guarantees that the 
rational part possesses genuine knowledge and 
wisdom? How would the other parts be shown that 
reason's claims to knowledge are incontrovertibly 
true? And by what test would we determine who 
really has this knowledge and who merely thinks they 
do? 
Plalo: Formidable challenges indeed. If I cannot convince 
you on these points I will gladly concede the 
argument to you and I will adopt your theory of the 
nature and value of justice. 
Erothymia: That would be reasonable and honorable. 
Plato: With which point would you like to begin? 
Erothymia: They are interconnected. I say that reason does and 
should operate in the service of animal desire. It is 
just another tool for getting what we want with as 
little effort or discomfort as possible. It merely 
thinks out the means to the predetermined, 
irrational ends posited by desire and instinct. There 
is nothing else for it to know. When there are 
conflicts between the social rules constructed by 
agreement and facts derived from experience, desire 
will always win out if it is strong enough to make 
reason forgetful. Either that, or reason decides that 
defecting from agreements and defying experience 
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will be to our advantage. And desires usually yield 
only to stronger desires: the desire to seduce a 
maiden is over-ruled by the desire to avoid painful 
retribution after reason has calculated the 
probability of such unpleasant consequences. There 
is nothing in between. Either, as most often 
happens, desire floods and erodes reason, or reason 
subdues desire with predictions of painful 
consequences. And then the desire to avoid pain 
becomes stronger than the desire for pleasure. I 
suppose we should start on that point, since 
without it you would not have a theory of justice. 
Pla to : I agree. I would have to revert to your model if 
thymos is not a real part of the psyche, and I would 
then be forced to revise my view of reason. I would 
rhen have to view it as a practical instrument of the 
appetites, as a mechanism for getting more of what 
you crave at the expense of others. But what would 
convince you, if not my former argument? 
E r o t h y m i a : Try to give me an example of pure thymos 
independent of reason and desire. 
P la tO : Would you say that children and animals are without 
reason? 
E r o t h y m i a : Well, they are without logic and objective reason. 
P la tO : Good. Would you say that animals have the same 
desires as other animals, and likewise children? 
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Erothymia: If you mean desires to eat, stay warm, eventually 
reproduce, accumulate goods, and destroy aggressors, 
yes. 
Plato: So if they are both without reason and equal in 
desires, and if I can point to distinctive differences 
among animals and among children, would you 
agree that this is some third aspect in their nature? 
Erothymia: Do you mean differences in strength, or in body 
shape, or in diet? 
Plato: No, differences in their psyche. 
Erothymia: I would agree, in that case. 
Plato: Have you ever observed that some dogs are very 
lethargic and placid, while others are savage and 
fearless? 
Erothymia: No doubt. 
Plato: Would you call one kind low-spirited, the other 
high-spirited? 
Erothymia: Yes, we usually talk that way. 
Plato: And do you observe the same in children? Some are 
frisky or cranky or over-active, while others are 
subdued or withdrawn or quiet? Don't you refer to 
the former as having lots of spirit and the latter as 
being spiritless? 
Erothymia: I accept your point. This drive or motivation, this 
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variation in temper, must be something other than 
desire ot reason. 
And think of soldiers in combat or boxers at the 
Olympic games. Apart from knowledge and skill, 
coupled with a desire to win, what do they need to 
overcome their opponents? 
You want me to say thymos. 
Can someone know the principles of combat, but 
lack the aggression to fight? 
Yes, certainly. 
Can they also have a deep wish for the laurels, but 
lack the fighting spirit? 
Again, yes. 
And what do they have to restrain when the 
competition is halted? 
Their aggression. Granted, it is a third thing. I see it 
in lovers too. They may have intense desire and keen 
intelligence, but without a strong will they do not 
win the mate. It is a third thing. 
Now to the harder question. Is reason capable of 
subduing and guiding both thymos and raw appetite? 
And should it do so? In answering this, I am really 
defending my theory of dikaiosune and attacking 
yours. Oddly, I will be appealing to the very thing I 
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am attempting to defend, namely reason itself. You 
will be reasoning with me. Then I shall prove that 
what you have used is the natural ruler of your soul 
and the only source of order within it. If you please, 
I will approach this in a roundabout way. I will 
answer your third question next. Can you repeat your 
third question? 
Erothymia : What is the guarantee that reason has genuine 
knowledge or wisdom, and what tests would show it? 
PlatO: If I can successfully answer that question, I am sure 
I would have thereby answered your second one. 
Like a worthy king or army general, or like the 
respected captain of a team, teason would have the 
authority to rule if it proves itself not only superior 
to thymos and desire, but also that it has the 
knowledge and skill to make its followers happier 
than anything else can, that it actually knows how to 
have a prosperous life. If I can prove that, I am sure 
the workers and soldiers in the polis, as well as the 
Appetites and Spirit in the psyche, would beg the 
finest and best to lead them. 
Erothymia: If you can prove that, you have made your case. (The 
othets turn their attention back to Plato.) 
PlatO: Reason must become the ruler, or rulers must 
become complete in reason. Power and rationality 
must coincide. At the very least, knowledge and 
1 4 3 
HflTOl i l l t l l l 
wisdom must be in the same hands as political or 
personal power. 
Xenocrates: Absolute power? Doesn't absolute power corrupt? 
PlatO: Only if the soul of the leader is corruptible. In the 
morally best it would not be, therefore power would 
not corrupt it. That comment forces me to focus my 
discourse. I grant you that a leader must be the finest 
of human beings in many ways, but for now we will 
confine our attention to the highest, the best kind of 
knowledge. Let me repeat that the most superior 
man or woman is aristos. This aristos person would 
have superhuman intelligence, skill, wisdom, 
courage, self-control, justice, charm, and so on. I 
will speak of this later. But without demonstrable 
knowledge this person would not be suitable to rule, 
so we must concentrate first on that. I must show 
what knowledge is, that some people possess it, that 
some possess the kind of knowledge required to tule, 
and that we can know who they are. Speusippus, you 
are a biologist, so let me ask you this: If you had a 
sttange pain in your stomach would you go to a 
street juggler to find out what is wrong? 
Speusippus: Not likely. 
Plato: Or to have it cured? 
Speusippus: Certainly not. 
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Plato: Why not? 
Speusippus: Because I would have no way of telling whether or 
not the juggler knew anything about medicine. 
Plato: And you, Eudoxus, if you had a problem in geometry 
you could not solve, would you take it to an Olympic 
wrestler? 
Eudoxus: No, for the same reason. 
Plato: So if your thoughts were confused or inconsistent 
you would go to a logician—in this case an expert in 
mathematics—to have them corrected? 
Eudoxus: Yes, I would. 
Plato: And the same for you, Xenocrates, if you had a legal 
problem? Would you go to a lawyer? 
Xenocrates: Certainly. 
Plato: In these cases of medicine, science, and law, what 
separates the experts from the opinionated? 
Speusippus: The fact that they are more likely to be right in what 
they say. 
Plato: Couldn't the juggler be right in a diagnosis? Or 
would his being right be due to lucky guessing, 
perhaps, or due to the fact that he was told 
something by someone more expert than himself? 
Speusippus: What is wrong with being right by accident? 
I 4 C 
P L A T O ' S U T J U f l l 
Eudoxus: 
Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
Plato: 
Xenocrates: 
Nothing, but the chance of being consistently right is 
extremely low. 
More important, we cannot say that the juggler 
really knows what is wrong with you. He just 
happens to say something true. His opinion 
accidentally matches the truth. We would have to 
go to someone else who is truly knowledgeable to 
get a demonstration of why he is right. In addition 
to being right he must have some reasoned account 
which proves or explains why he is right. So, 
Xenocrates, if someone said to you that wearing a 
purple toga is illegal in Sparta, what would you ask 
him first? 
I would say "Are you sure"? 
Imagine now that I am that man, and I say "Yes, I 
know it". 
How do you know it? 
An oracle told me. 
How does the oracle know? 
Since the oracle is not here, I will say that I have a 
strong feeling. 
Feelings may cause beliefs, but they don't prove 
them true. I have had many strong feelings, but the 
belief was false nonetheless. 
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All right then, I am sure because most people 
believe it. 
Most people believe that Dionysius was born from 
the thigh of Zeus. Does that make it true? Most 
people believe the river Meander flows 
simultaneously in opposite directions. Does that 
make it true? 
I just gave you a set of reasons. Why won't you accept 
them? 
Because they are not justifying reasons. The belief is 
not made right by them. 
Who would know which reasons make a belief right? 
Someone who has thought carefully about the rules 
of evidence, I suppose. Someone who has studied 
the nature of knowledge and the criteria for it. 
Philosophers. Lovers of wisdom. 
You are a philosopher. What would you accept as a 
good reason? 
I would consult the legal code of Sparta and look for 
the law that makes purple togas illegal. Or, I would ask 
a Spartan lawyer whom I trusted to know the code. 
Are you saying that there must be something real 
against which you measure your belief to see if it is 
true or not? 
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Xenocrates: Yes. 
Plato: In this case the objective reality is the Spartan legal 
code? 
Xenocrates: Yes. Either the law is there, or it isn't. If it is there, my 
belief is true and justified; if it isn't my belief is 
simply false. Either it is there, or not there, and not 
both. I may think it is there when it is in fact not, in 
which case I merely have an opinion on something, 
not knowledge. 
PlatO: So knowledge is a belief about anything whatsoever 
which is both true and shown to be true by objective 
evidence. 
Xenocrates: I can easily agree to that. (Erothymia sits beside 
Alethea.) 
PlatO: Would you say that any belief whatsoever can be 
called an instance of knowledge if, and only if, the 
claim it proposes conforms to reality, to the way 
things actually are, and if the evidence establishes this 
conformity to an acceptable degree? 
Xenocrates: Yes, but I would say that the evidence may not 
establish it to a perfect degree in all cases, but only to 
a degree which is higher than that for alternative 
beliefs. 
E u d O X U S : Mathematical proofs establish it to a perfect degree. 
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Pla lO: Still, you would agree that it is reality itself that causes 
a belief to be true or false. If all proof was like that of 
mathematics, we would have perfect knowledge. 
El ldOXUS: Yes. So knowledge is the conformity of reasoned 
belief to the way things really are, independent of 
the belief. Doesn't this mean that if there is no reality 
to which a belief can conform, then that belief 
cannot be an instance of knowledge? Wouldn't it be 
a mere belief, or merely an opinion? If I said that 
Minotaurs have a hundred teeth, and if Minotaurs 
do not exist, then my belief about Minotaurs could 
never be knowledge, because there is nothing in 
objective reality to make the belief true. 
PlatO: Fine. I could then say that Minotaurs in mythology 
have a hundred teeth, and I would be right or wrong, 
depending on what a check into Mythology reveals. 
Nonetheless, it is something distinct from my belief 
that makes it true and something distinct from my 
belief that shows it to be so. Are we all agreed on that? 
All : I see no problem. Agreed. I concur. 
PlatO: Now you must listen carefully. This is all-important. 
We said that dikaiosune is a kind of regularity or 
order imposed on a city or a soul by reason. We said 
that it is the rule of wisdom, and that wisdom at least 
includes knowledge. Speusippus, would you say you 
know Eudoxus? 
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Speusippus: Yes, I know Eudoxus like I know Athens. 
Pla to : Is that knowledge in the strict sense? 
Speusippus: I would say it is more like familiarity or acquaintance 
than strict knowledge. (Erothymia and Alethea start 
to eye each other. They exchange intense glances. 
Erothymia eventually rests her hand on Alethea's 
forearm.) 
P la tO : So let us eliminate that. Eudoxus, do you know how 
to swim? How to make wine? How to pilot a ship? 
E u d O X U S : I know how to do all those things. 
Pla to : Even though they are all extremely important, don't 
all these examples of knowing how to do something 
presuppose a knowledge of certain facts and truths? 
E u d O X U S : They do. Like knowing how to rule presupposes 
knowledge of certain facts and truths. 
Pla to : Then let us set aside for the moment acquaintance-
knowledge, and how-to knowledge, concentrating on 
knowing that certain things are true, and others not. 
We will have to be careful with this. Speusippus, do 
you think that if something is known to be true, it 
would be universally true? 
Speusippus: What do you mean? 
Pla tO : I mean that a true belief is always true and 
everywhere true, that is, it is true regardless of who 
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utters it, or who believes it, as long as it correctly 
portrays reality. The belief'Speusippus is breathing' is 
true if, and only if, you ate breathing, and if you are 
indeed breathing it would be true for everyone, 
everywhere. Whoever knows that 'Speusippus is 
breathing' is true would say exactly the same thing as 
everyone else who knows it, no matter who they are 
or where they are or when they say it, because the 
reality is that you are actually breathing. Of course, if 
you stopped breathing, by the same token, everyone 
who knew that would also know that the statement 
'Speussipus is breathing' is false. 
Speusippus: I believe I follow that. 
PlatO: Hence, if our rulers are to have knowledge they must 
possess true beliefs recognizable by anyone else who 
takes the trouble to investigate them. 
Speusippus: Indeed, otherwise they would have only opinions. 
PlatO: Because reality is the same for everyone. 
Speusippus: Yes. 
PlatO: If knowledge is possible, then there must be an 
objective reality to be known. We agreed on that. It 
follows, then, that if there is no objective reality, then 
knowledge is not possible. Yet we require knowledge 
in our rulers. So it is necessary to prove that there is 
something knowable by them. 
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Speusippus: What do they have to know? (Erothymia and Alethea 
are now holding hands.) 
PlatO: They have to know what justice is, and they have to 
know what makes justice good, or what makes 
anything good, including people, laws, constitutions, 
works of art, educational policies, and of course all 
the virtues. 
Speusippus: Plato, that is an impossibly tall order. 
Plato: But suppose I could prove that there are realities that 
make beliefs about goodness, justice, and so on, true. 
Then wouldn't knowledge of them be possible? 
Speusippus: It would be, by all we have agreed to so far. 
Plato: Suppose I could prove something even more daring, 
namely that these realities are indestructible and 
timeless. I could also say that they are perfectly 
stable, meaning that they never change and they exist 
eternally. 
Erothymia: He's going to talk about his theory of Forms. I have 
already heard it. I would like to excuse myself. I need 
to talk to this woman. 
Alethea: My name is Alethea, and I gladly accept your 
invitation to convetse. But let me say that we have all 
heard Plato's theory of Forms. I have studied the 
theory in his books and his companions have no 
doubt discussed the theory extensively at his 
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Academy. The entire point of his proof of their 
existence is to show that there is a universal, 
unchanging form of dikaiosune. I agree that only 
those who possess knowledge of the Forms, above all 
the Form of the Good, are qualified to rule, and only 
those who regulate life by it will be happy. In a 
lengthy, demanding argument he has tried to prove 
there is a universal essence of dikaiosune by nature, 
not by convention. I admire all of you for having the 
mental stamina required to follow his argument. It is 
indeed difficult, and it takes as much character as it 
does intelligence to grasp it from start to finish. 
Speusippus: Now that you have accomplished that, it is not 
difficult for me to see that Xanthippe's second 
question is answered. If it is demonstrated that there 
are knowable objects at the most real or perfect level, 
and a few gifted minds can grasp them, it would be 
natural for the workers and warriors to ask these 
most knowledgeable to rule, just as we want the most 
knowledgeable to command a ship. 
PlatO: Let me re-emphasize that it is just as impottant for 
the rulers to be as superior in virtue and intelligence 
as they are in knowledge. Knowledge alone is not 
enough, even though it is absolutely necessary. 
Xenocrates: And necessarily absolute. 
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Plato: That remark shows that you understand what I have 
said. Once more, we have labored diligently and we 
have made good progress. Soon we will make 
landfall, so I suggest we relax for the remainder of the 
journey and quietly review all we have discussed. Our 
first task on going ashore will be to convince 
Dionysius to relinquish all control to a philosopher 
King or Queen, and that will be hard. 
Xenocrates: But what specific constitution and laws shall we 
instill in the Sicilian society? 
Plato: In the rightly ordered polis, as in the rightly ordered 
psyche, we formulate whatever laws are dictated by 
the form of dikaiosune. Those will be the laws which 
inculcate and preserve the order and harmony 
dictated by wisdom. Now rest. The more difficult 
part of our task is yet to begin. (Xenocrates, Eudoxus, 
and Speusippus exit. Sound of waves and music up. 
Slow fade of lights as Plato looks over the bow of the 
ship. One spotlight on Plato. Lights down.) 
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ACT TWO 
Scene One 
Morning. At the bow of Erothymia's ship. Music up. Enter Erothymia. 
She is wearing a white robe. She paces, then stares out over the water. 
She hums to the music. Paces again, then goes back to her vantage 
point. Enter Alethea. 
Alethea: Do not be startled. It is only me. 
Erothymia: Good morning. No, you do not frighten me. I feel no 
need to raise my defenses against you. I feel safe 
around you. How do you do that? 
Alethea: You wanted to speak with me again. 
Erothymia: My name is not Xanthippe. (Music down.) 
Alethea: We all know that. Plato knew it first. 
Erothymia: What? How did he know that? 
Alethea: The lips can chatter lies, but truth oozes from every 
pore. 
Erothymia: Why didn't he tell me? 
Alethea: He didn't need to. He has no need to embarrass 
anyone. He knows you will correct yourself when 
you are ready to. Even little lies serve a purpose. The 
lie is over when its purpose expires. 
Erothymia: We need to talk. 
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Alethea: I know we do. 
Erothymia: My name is Erothymia. I am Dionysius the Eldet's 
niece. 
Alethea: Plato suspected as much. So did I. That's why he 
knew you would not hurt him. He knew you would 
have to answer to your uncle. That's not all he knows. 
He knows you are deeply troubled about love. He has 
figured out that you can separate love and sex, but 
you cannot put them together. I believe you want to, 
but you don't know how. 
I can't. I never believed they could coexist. It was 
always one or the other. 
But you want to join them. And you have 
premonitions that Plato is the one you can do it with. 
If that's the case, you need to learn to love the same 
things he does. 
Erothymia: What's that? 
Alethea: Me. 
Erothymia: You? He loves you? 
Alethea: He loves what I represent. Tell me, when did love and 
sex veer apart for you? 
Erothymia: I don't want to talk about it. 
Alethea: Does that mean you can't talk about it? 
Erothymia: 
Alethea: 
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Erothymia: Maybe so...maybe so. 
Alethea: You said it was always one or the other—love or 
sex—and never both at the same time. 
Erothymia: That's what I said. 
Alethea: Have you ever loved anyone? 
Erothymia: I...I don't know. I have tried. 
Alethea: Has a man ever loved you? 
Erothymia: I...maybe...I...I'm not sure. 
Alethea: How could you not know? 
Erothymia: I knew what they wanted. 
Alethea: You knew they wanted sex. But you thought it was 
the only thing they wanted. 
Erothymia: Please, this is difficult. Maybe I should not have 
asked to talk to you. 
Alethea: Fate decided you had to. If you follow fate, it will 
guide you. If you don't, it will drag you. 
Erothymia: Please don't tell Plato that I spoke with you. 
Alethea: I can't promise that. You are asking me to promise to 
tell a lie. 
Erothymia: For me? Would you do it for me? 
Alethea: Friends are dear, but truth is dearer. 
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Erothymia: But you would be helping me. 
Alethea: No, I wouldn't. A conspiracy of lies will make both of 
us unjust. That doesn't help you, it hurts you. Being 
unjust is the same thing as being neurotic. 
Erothymia: But I want him to think that I don't know what he 
knows about me. 
Alethea: I see your strategy, but I won't agree. The most I can 
promise is that I will keep this conversation to myself 
unless he asks me directly. Hence, you do not need to 
wotry. He will never ask. 
Erothymia: How do you know that? 
Alethea: Because Plato is extremely smart. He will let you play 
your game until you defeat yourself. 
Erothymia: I am going to love him, you know. And I will get him 
to love me. 
Alethea: But you don't know what love is. How can you give 
it or receive it if you don't know what it is? 
Erothymia: I will. This will be different. 
Alethea: You can't make a man love you. And you can't make 
youtself love him. You can only let yourself follow 
when love calls. 
Erothymia: I can get a man to do whatevet I want him to. 
Alethea: Men will do ridiculous rhings for sex, but you can't 
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Erothymia: 
Alethea: 
Erothymia: 
Alethea: 
Erothymia: 
Alethea: 
make them love you. Want you, perhaps, but not 
love you. This is where your confusion lies. 
I know I can combine love and sex. I've done it 
before. (Erothymia moves to embrace Alethea. 
Alethea gently removes Erothymia's hands from her 
waist and holds them.) 
Yes, with women. But Plato is a man. Your biggest 
problem with him is that he is celibate. 
Celibate? He mentioned that. But why? 
Because his love of sexual pleasure is boundless, just 
like mine. He and I have both chosen celibacy 
because we do not want our desire for pleasure to 
displace our desire for truth and spiritual purity. You 
might say we don't want sex to interfere with love. 
There is no greater temporal pleasure than sexual 
pleasure, but we cannot be blinded by it. Our 
pleasures are eternal, or we want them to be, so we 
renounce temporal pleasures. We have to, because 
they are addictively powetful. 
You can't be serious. Sex is repulsive. Sex is just 
something men take from us. We give it to them only 
to get what we want. Then we hold out until we get 
more of what we want. I would never let them have 
it unless there was something in it for me. 
Really? What's usually in it for you? 
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Erothymia: Money, a nicer boat, jewelry... 
Alethea: What else? Surely you have obtained things other 
than money. 
Erothymia: Such as? 
Alethea: Such as revenge. Such as power over them. Especially 
if they are powerful themselves. 
Erothymia: I don't know what you are talking about. 
Alethea: I know you don't. That's why you continue to do it. 
That's why you are not happy. 
Erothymia: All I know is that I give them whatever they want and 
put up with the sex, as long as I get what I want. 
Alethea: And it never feels good? 
Erothymia: Never. I have never even...not once...I... 
Alethea: I know. It's alright. Come here. (Alethea sits on a 
bench and puts Erothymia's head on her lap. She 
repeatedly rubs Erothymia's temples and strokes her 
hair.) Who hurt you? 
Erothymia: I have never told anyone. I can't talk about it. 
It's...I...my head starts to ache. 
Alethea: There is a war going on in rhere. We can stop it if 
you wish. Or maybe it is better that you never bring 
this up again. Just go on as you have been. It's easier 
that way. Change is frightening and difficult, full of 
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perils—unlike the familiar. Perhaps you should not 
change and just persist with whatever has allowed 
you to survive so far and leave your ghosts in the 
closet. Naturally, it will cost you something. 
Erothymia: Cost me what? 
Alethea: Plato. Plato cannot love a victim. He has compassion 
for them, but he could not love one. 
Erothymia: I could play on his compassion. 
Alethea: You are confusing compassion with pity. You can't 
play on true compassion. True compassion is very 
demanding. Pity is arrogance and weakness. In 
fact, pity is demeaning to both the pitied and the 
one who pities. If Plato were to love you, his 
compassion would demand that you give up being 
a victim. 
Erothymia: I don't know how to do that. It's all I know. 
Alethea: If you don't, you will be trapped in cycles of 
manipulation, distrust, and cynicism. You will never 
be happy. You will go on using men for any number 
of things until you lose your charm and power, but 
you will never be happy. 
Erothymia: What do I do? I want him. 
Alethea: We will be in Syracuse in one more day, maybe two. 
When you get there, go to the healing temple and 
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stay as long as it takes. I will visit you regularly Plato 
is in no rush. He will still be here when you come out 
whole and clean. 
Erothymia: There is an easier way. You can help me. 
Alethea: There is no easy way to health. 
Erothymia: This will work. 
Alethea: I know what you are thinking. It won't work. You still 
have the mind of a victim. 
Erothymia: What was I thinking? 
Alethea: You were about to set up a game. You tell me. 
Erothymia: I was going to say we could both seduce Plato. We 
could get him to love both of us, then force him to 
choose between us. Right before we force his 
choice, you could tell him you found someone else 
and leave him to me. 
Alethea: I can't believe how such a brilliant woman could be 
so shallow. Besides, he already loves me. What we 
both want is for him to love you. (Erothymia gets up 
and starts pacing.) 
Erothymia: I did not understand that. Both of us want him to 
love me? What do you mean? 
Alethea: You have more to give him than I do. You can give 
him your mind, body, and spirit, all of which you 
possess in greater abundance that I do. I can give 
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him only my mind and spirit, and to a lesser degree 
than you can at that. 
Erothymia: Do you love him? 
Alethea: I admire him. I respect him more than any man I 
have ever met. I would rather have his company 
more than anyone else's. I would do anything he 
asks of me. If you want to call that love, then I love 
him. And you? What do you love most about him? 
Erothymia: His intelligence. His mind arouses me in every way. I 
love competent minds. 
Alethea: There are brilliant criminals too. Do they also 
arouse you? 
Erothymia: Oh, yes. The way some of them think...the way 
some of them plan their crimes... 
Alethea: Well, then, if you want Plato's attention you had 
better engage his mind. 
Erothymia: I think I may already have done that. I need to go 
further, in my own way. I'm sorry, but I must by­
pass the healing temples and do what I do best. I 
will surely elevate an intense intellectual encounter 
into a full joust. I can do that with competence and 
confidence. But just as surely I will burrow into his 
passions. I know they are there. I have to. That's 
what I am very good at. Moreover, I believe his 
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theory is wrong and mine is right. The only way to 
prove it to him is in actions, not words. 
Alethea: You are a strong-willed woman and your name suits 
you. I reluctantly agree that you will have to try and 
win Plato with the talents and tactics you have 
perfected. But I have some good advice for you. I 
would think about it if I were you. 
Erothymia: For the first time I will actually listen to someone 
else. I have confidence in you. 
Alethea: You know as well as I do what is wrong with you. You 
know that your feelings about sex are distorted and 
chaotic. However, you also know that imagining an 
idyllic union of sexual health and love is not enough 
to make it happen. Wishing does not change 
anything. Perhaps you are right—perhaps you can 
find what you want with Plato without going through 
the temple rituals, which you can probably see 
through anyway. Use your familiar methods with this 
man, if you wish, but I warn you that if they work 
you had better be prepared for love. Your preparation 
should consist of one thing. Before you do anything 
in Syracuse, you should avoid all contact with Plato, 
or with anyone, and think hard about this. You are 
not responsible for what happened to you in the past. 
However, you are responsible for your reaction to it 
from this day forth. The coping mechanisms that 
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worked for you in the past will not work for you with 
Plato. What will work is for you to fall in love with 
truth. You must become a philosopher like him. Your 
love of money, power, fame, and attention is a 
sickness. It's really compensation for your pain, for 
your secret shame and sense of worthlessness. Your 
only cure is truth. It is the one medicine that can cure 
you. Open yourself to it and learn to love it. Then 
your love for Plato will be dikaiosune. Sex may or 
may not be an element of it, but it will be different 
than what it is now. It will satisfy your spirit. 
Erothymia: I have had intimations of that. I have had glimpses 
into the fact that I need to change my thinking about 
sex and men. My beliefs are false. 
Alethea: Yes, but that will be part of a bigger change. That 
aspect of your thinking will automatically change 
when you change your whole worldview, especially 
your beliefs about human nature. You can do that 
only through philosophy. Your thinking to this 
point, if you can call it that, has been defensive and 
reactionary. Situations produced responses. I call this 
episodic belief. Philosophy cleanses you of them. 
And there are many you need to purge. They are 
outdated and useless. If you need to kill, kill them. 
Erothymia: I need to kill the part of me that thinks like a whore, 
that treats men like a whore does. 
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Alethea: Not quite. That part of you has tremendous talent 
and power. You wouldn't want to lose it. It is a very 
valuable resource. You need to elevate it and 
integrate it with justice. You won't lose it, you will 
transform it. It will happen on its own if you love 
truth and wisdom. Now I must go. 
Erothymia: Where are you going? 
Alethea: Back to my ship. They need me there. 
Erothymia: You won't come to Syracuse? 
Alethea: No, I am bound for other places. I see my ship is off 
your starboard quarter. The sea is flat, so a transfer 
should not be difficult. Can you arrange that? 
Erothymia: Do you really want to go? 
Alethea: It's not what I want. It's what I am obliged to do. 
Erothymia: I want to thank you. I have never thanked anyone 
before. 
Alethea: Forget the vanity. If you want to thank me, follow 
my advice. And love him well. 
Erothymia: I will. 
Alethea: I'm sure you will. (Alethea exits. Music up 
Erothymia stares thoughtfully over the bow. Light! 
down, except a muted spotlight on Erothymia 
Plato enters in the darkness and positions himsel 
on a ladder. A very dull, yellowish spotlight come: 
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up on his head. He fixes his gaze on Erothymia as 
she looks wistfully out to sea. Hold lights and music 
for thirty seconds. Very slow fade of both to black 
and silence.) 
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Scene Two 
The court of Dionysius the Elder in Syracuse. Dionysius the Elder 
and his son, Dionysius the Younger, are presiding over a drinking 
party. Among those present is Erothymia. The crowd is boisterous 
and rowdy. 
Elder Dionysius: A word, a word please, to my guests! 
Younger Dionysius: My father Dionysius, Ruler of Syracuse, wishes to 
speak! Quiet in the court please! 
Elder Dionysius: And my son, Dionysius the younger, wishes to 
address you too, after my speech. 
Younger Dionysius: Please drain the wine from your goblets and put 
them down so my father can be heard! Guards, please 
see to it that some order and calm prevail! (Some 
guards help the guests finish their wine and remove 
their goblets. One of the guests resists and is beaten). 
Elder Dionysius: I must now declare that the Festival of the Goddess 
Aphrodite be concluded. We have honored and felt 
her creativity and power, we have felt the curse of her 
attention, and we have appeased her frightful ability 
to deprive men of their reason. Now we must 
reorganize and await the entry of our distinguished 
guest from Greece. The philosopher Plato and his 
three friends have landed. They are here now, so I 
would ask you to clear the court and testore your 
daily order. (The guards start leaving) 
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Younger DionysiUS: Only those of the Inner Council shall remain to hear 
the philosopher out, and you, Erothymia, may 
remain also. There shall be six guards at each entry 
and a squadron posted at the city gates. 
Elder Dionysius: 
Erothymia: 
Elder Dionysius: 
Erothymia: 
Elder Dionysius: 
Guard: 
Younger Dionysius: 
Plato: 
Younger Dionysius: 
Our guest shall speak at my invitation. He will try to 
convince us to replace our constitution with one he 
says will make the city beautiful and fine. 
Will we question him? 
Yes, there will be questions. He is a philosopher, and 
he is used to hard questions. 
I shall put the first questions. 
We all agree, I'm sure, that Erothymia will put the 
first questions. 
Make way, make way! Plato has entered. (Enter Plato, 
Xenocrates, Eudoxus, and Speusippus.) 
Plato and friends, welcome to the court of Syracuse. 
Greetings from the polis of Athens to the citizens and 
court of Syracuse. 
What would you have us hear from you? We have 
heard of your greatness, and we wish to prosper 
from it. As you know, our polis is rife with enmity 
and discord and is threatened with revolution. The 
generals, too, are conspiring and so the constitution 
cannot be upheld. We have said that we must start 
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afresh and rethink the principles by which our polis 
is structured, then implement them if they are 
wisely reasoned. We shall listen earnestly and 
question honestly. What will be our starting point? 
PlatO: You have already suggested it. We must begin with 
speech and argument. There is no other way. We 
must reach a consensus of reason, for that is the only 
thing in which we all have an equal share, and the 
only thing which issues in unanimity when it is used 
lovingly and correctly. 
Erothymia: Reason bends and capitulates to the impulses of 
passion and appetite! Even if you could secure 
unanimity for your conclusions, those conclusions 
of cool reason are too weak to regulate and subdue 
the storms of desire, greed, fear, and jealousy! 
Younger Dionysius: We must hear the argument first, then we may 
question it! 
Erothymia: No, arguments are useless to begin with. They are 
merely polite violence, instruments of disguised 
passion. I can undo an argument in a wink. One flash 
of my breast has made perfect arguments crumble. 
PlatO: Does the argument nonetheless remain sound? 
Erothymia: Of course it does, but it is not important. 
Speusippus: This is the difficulty we encountered on the volcano. 
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Younger Dionysius: Please, let us hear the argument! 
Erothymia: 
Plato: 
Erothymia: 
Plato: 
Erothymia: 
Speusippus: 
Erothymia: 
Why should we agree to listen to arguments? Let 
nature take her course! 
If I believe in reason, then naturally I must use it to 
convince you to engage in rational argument. My 
colleagues and I have already worked out this 
aspect. May I then simply ask you to assume that 
reason must prevail, and engage you in a rational 
discussion about how to put it to the best use? 
Would you grant me that assumption? 
Why? Can you charm me into it? 
No, I am asking you to assume something for the 
sake of a discussion. Just agree to speak within the 
bounds of logic. 
What, no force? No bribery? I have no incentive, 
nothing to gain. 
You must appeal to the passions after all before you 
can motivate us to think logically. 
I for one am suspicious. If I agree to play by the 
rules of logical argument, you will end up 
humiliating me by defeating everything I say. And 
since I agreed to the rules of reason, I will have to 
abide the defeat—something I will not do. 
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Elder Dionysius: If you do not wish to deliberate with us, you may 
leave. But only if you wish. 
Erothymia: Make me! 
PlatO: Suppose I could prove to you that you and everyone 
else would be better off if you let reason guide you 
now. 
Erothymia: I told you, "proof" is a procedure I have not yet 
agreed to. 
PlatO: In that case, I'll offer you an incentive. I will 
guarantee you more happiness than you now have, if 
you just listen to my arguments. 
Erothymia: Let everyone take note that Plato is using bribery to 
lure us into logic! What if your arguments fail? 
PlatO: I'll give you everything I own. If I lose, you get my 
estate. If I win, you get happiness. 
Erothymia: Happiness? What is that? 
PlatO: If you don't know you should listen to me. My 
arguments form a long definition of happiness. I will 
convince you that dikaiosune is the highest state of 
happiness, and the best element in social living. If 
you don't know what happiness is, we need to start 
with some definitions. 
Xenocrates: For the sake of our distinguished listeners, we should 
start with our basic axiom. 
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P la to : Yes, let me begin by saying that the only cure for the 
ills and uncertainties of your polis is this: you must 
put all the power of ruling in the hands of the wisest 
and best. Your monarch must become a philosopher, 
or your best philosopher must become an absolute 
monarch, King or Queen, it doesn't matter. All that 
matters is that the finest philosopher must rule. The 
head must literally rule, and the Head of State must 
be the wisest and best. Wisdom and virtue must be 
given absolute power. Philosophy must guide the 
polis in the same way that it must guide your own 
psyche. 
E lde r D ionys ius : Who are these philosophers? What do they know? 
How do we tell who the real ones are and who is 
fake? 
Younger D ionys iUS: Everyone is a philosopher, everyone is a critic. No-
one is better than anyone else. Everyone's opinion 
counts. Perhaps the people should rule—the 
governor simply carries out their demands. 
Pla to : Now the challenge is clear. I must define the true 
philosopher and I must give you a method for 
determining who they are. 
E u d O X U S : And you must prove that only they should rule. 
P la tO : Yes. We can start by asking my friend Speusippus to 
outline for us the popular, uninformed view of 
philosophy and her practitioners. Then the truth can 
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be more easily seen. Can you tell us how the mob 
views philosophy? 
Speusippus: Most people think of philosophers as useless 
crackpots who live some kind of fairy-tale life with 
no appreciation of the real world and with no 
practical ability to function within it. In effect, they 
are thought of as failures who escape from real work 
and real problems into a fantasyland. A few others 
actually respect philosophers and regard themselves 
as being in love with wisdom too, but lacking 
training and formal study in it they mistake its 
fraudulent representatives for genuine philosophers. 
EudOXUS: Who are the impostors? 
Speusippus: They come in many forms. A few appear as 
prophets with magical powers and obscure 
teachings. A few others appear as advice-givers and 
soul-healers with esoteric rituals and unexplained 
ideas. Still others say they are messengers for the 
Gods, and they ask for blind faith. But the most 
common form by far comes in the guise of a so-
called educator who, for a fee, will teach you the art 
of persuasion. These sophists are those most often 
confused with philosophers. 
Erothymia: There is no distinction! All philosophy is sophistry! 
Nothing more than word-play! It is nothing more 
than gaining the advantage in an argument and 
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winning it by whatever means your opponent is 
foolish enough to give you! 
P la tO : We can prove you wrong. That is the central point in 
my argument—there is a crucial difference between 
loving wisdom and loving victory in arguments. 
Sophists have no regard for objective truth, since they 
don't believe it exists. Philosophers do. 
Speusippus: The point remains that only those who have studied 
philosophy extensively know what it is. And of those 
who have, many are corrupt. We have already 
decided that these who are to be called philosophers 
in the complete sense ate those who are not only 
superhuman in knowledge but those who are 
superhuman in character, skill, and intelligence as 
well. (Several guests now appear drowsy). 
P la tO : We say those are the few who should rule. High 
intelligence and formal training without an alliance 
with love, courage, self-mastery, wisdom, and 
particularly a just character is dangerous. There are 
clever but heartless tyrants, the opposite of the 
aristos man or women we say should rule. The 
ruthless ruler who exercises power through 
treacherous force and deceit produces disease in 
both himself and in the polis. The person who 
bullies or seduces others is as unhappy and sick as 
those he dominates. Without honor, without 
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justice, without conscience, the tyrant uses fear and 
bribery, as well as the illusion of paternalistic care, 
to use and control the people for personal greedy 
ends. I can show all of you that the polis which is 
ruled by a King or Queen of immense skill, of 
monumental wisdom and intelligence, of selfless 
dedication to the welfare of the people, of saintly 
character, is a polis more wholesome and healthy 
than any other kind of polis. And I can show you 
that the person with a just psyche, a person of loyalty 
and fairness, of trustworthiness and reliability, of 
courage and temperature, is a person more 
wholesome and healthy than any other kind of 
person. Any one of you in such a wholesome 
condition, in a condition naturally disposed to act 
in fair and just ways, would flourish and prosper in 
complete happiness and well-being. Yes, you would, 
all because your head, your logical mind, is given all 
the power to benevolently govern your fighting 
spirit and your bodily cravings. My colleagues and I 
have identified the form of dikaiosune. We define it 
as an orderly regulation of different aspects or 
functions. The regulation is imposed by wisdom 
and knowledge. Lawfulness arises from the law­
making function we call reason or rationality, whose 
ptoper office it is to impose true and wise 
judgements on our lawless nature. Justice is the 
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order imposed on chaos by the government of 
reason. Our argument will be complete when we 
isolate a social or individual nature totally 
unregulated by knowledge and wisdom, then 
compare it to one which is willingly obedient to the 
dictates of reason, when reason is reasoning 
perfectly. I will show that the just person or just 
society is six hundred and twenty nine times 
happier than the unjust one. 
Elder Dionysius: Audience and distinguished guests, an interruption 
if I may. This seems to be a fitting place to suspend 
the argument. We have feasted for three days and 
listened well into this evening. Plato and his 
cohorts may also need time to rest and reflect on 
what has been said so far. I propose that the thread 
of the argument be picked up tomorrow after a 
refreshing sleep. 
Younger Dionysius: I concur with my father. We shall reopen the 
argument tomorrow at lunch. I declare this session 
closed. (Everyone slowly disperses. Erothymia 
approaches Plato as he scribbles some notes in a large 
book. Eventually, everyone has left except the two of 
them. No stage lighting or set, other than a spotlight 
on each of them). 
Erothymia: So, we meet again. Are you surprised? 
Plato: No, not at all. 
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Erothymia: I knew who you were a long time ago. 
Plato: I realized the same thing. That's how I knew who you 
were. You are Erothymia. 
Erothymia: And you are who you said you were. I want to talk to 
you. 
Plato: Straight talk? Without the stage show? 
Erothymia: Straight. Without the show. 
Plato: I'm here. 
Erothymia: I love criminals. They are the most natural beings of 
all. Do you have an outlaw heart? (Plato looks at her, 
but does not answet). What about a wife? Do you 
have a mistress? (Silence). Have you ever had sex? 
(Silence). Would you like to have sex? 
Plato: I said without the show. 
Erothymia: This is all words, no show. 
Plato: Can't you see I'm busy? 
Erothymia: You don't know what to do with me. 
Plato: I don't want to do anything with you. I have my 
work to complete. 
Erothymia: You work has to include me. 
Plato: What do you mean by that? 
Erothymia: Your philosophy must have a place for me. 
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Plato: You said you were irrational. The only place for the 
irrational, in philosophy, is submission. 
Erothymia: To you? 
Plato: No, to rationality. 
Erothymia: Dion loves me. But I find him boring. He can never 
win an argument. 
PlatO: What does that have to do with rationality? 
Erothymia: He said he would kill for me. For that I find him 
useful. 
PlatO: Can't you kill for yourself? 
Erothymia: I already have. 
Plato: Who? 
Erothymia: I could kill you right now if I wanted to, but I don't 
want to. 
Plato: Who? 
Erothymia: It makes no difference. I just have. You are being 
nosey, like a child. 
Plato: One of the wonders of childhood is curiosity. You 
were just curious yourself. 
Erothymia: What kind of woman do you like? 
Plato: A just one. A wise one. One who keeps her cool. 
Erothymia: What kind of woman are you afraid of? 
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Plato: None. 
Erothymia: Please don't toy with me. 
PlatO: I'm not toying with you. I don't fear any woman. 
Please, let me think alone. 
Erothymia: Do you know what kind of man I cannot resist? A 
brilliant man who lusts without limit. 
PlatO: I lust for truth and clarity. 
Erothymia: A man whose lust is so great it cannot be measured 
but who can simultaneously contain it. Such men are 
intense. I want to find the most intense man ever. I 
want to push his lust to the breaking point and have 
him to myself. The greater his passion and the higher 
his breaking point the more I love him. Every man 
I've known either had too little lust or they broke too 
easily. I have broken many intense men. 
PlatO: You can't break me. 
Erothymia: Why would I want to? You have no lust. 
Plato: I have more than you could ever imagine. 
Erothymia: In fact, I heard that. Then show it to me. Give me a 
challenge I can't refuse. 
PlatO: Why? So you can find my breaking point? That 
would be entertaining for you, but stupid and 
disastrous for me. 
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Erothymia: If you can do it, there is something in it for you. You 
guaranteed something for me if I became convinced 
that dikaiosune would make me happy. You deserve a 
reward too if you can desire me without relief and 
without collapsing. 
Plato: What is it? 
Erothymia: Me. 
Plato: Why would I want you? 
Erothymia: Because all men desire me, but none has ever ruled 
me. I would let a man rule me if he had an insane 
desire for me and the power to control it. If he 
showed me all his strengths, I would give in. When I 
spot weakness, I give up. I get bored. 
Plato: Why should I trust you? 
Erothymia: You can't. That makes me interesting. 
Plato: You are dangerous. 
Erothymia: Yes, I am. Don't you like that? I do. I like treachery, 
danger, illicit passion, jealousy. 
Plato: What else? 
Erothymia: Ambiguity, chaos, heat. 
Plato: What else? 
Erothymia: Strife, drama, secrecy. 
Plato: Keep going. 
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Erothymia: Aggression, ambition, arousal. 
Plato: All, I suppose, beneath a mantle of social 
respectability and prudence. 
Erothymia: Only when I think it necessary. There are no rigid 
rules, except one. 
Plato: What is it? 
Erothymia: That you never give up. I'll push you farther than 
anyone—man or woman— has ever pushed you, and 
I will test your theory beyond anything you have evet 
imagined. Prove to me that your mind can rule your 
appetites. If you succeed, I will submit to you. If you 
fail, I will kill you. 
Plato: I'm not your man. 
Erothymia: Not yet. 
Plato: Not ever. 
Erothymia: It's too late. It's already started, and there is nothing 
you can do about it. 
Plato: Let me think about it. 
Erothymia: Thinking won't help. Your desire is already swollen. I 
see it in your eyes and I can see it here, between your 
legs. All I ask is that you never let it waiver or sag. I'll 
test it relentlessly. 
Plato: No rules? You drive a hard bargain. 
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Erothymia: It's not a bargain, it's a necessity. 
PlatO: But there have to be some rules. We have to be just, 
we have to be fair. 
Erothymia: This is a battle of passionate wills, a contest of 
intense desires. There are no initial rules for war. 
None. There aren't any until they are made by the 
competitors in some enforceable way, and their only 
value is in keeping the war going. The starting point 
is nothing more than desire and the will to compete 
in the medium of love. All rules adapt to that. We 
negotiate everything as we go, on the playing fields of 
lust. It will be a beautiful war, an intensely poetic 
war, a war of words, wills, and our worlds of whirling 
passions. You will love it. Plato, the Olympians have 
nothing on us. I can tell you one thing: either both 
of us win or both of us lose. There will be no single 
winner. 
PlatO: I've never met a woman like you. 
Erothymia: I hope I've never met a man like you. Strong willed, 
a strong and agile mind, strong loins. 
Plato: You are right. I've already taken up your challenge in 
spite of myself. That's how confident I am about 
virtue and about the rightful authority and ability of 
the intellect to govern. Now there is no backing out. 
But how can I be sure you won't back out? That you 
won't break the agreement to keep on going? 
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Erothymia: You don't need to be sure. Your drive and your desire 
are sufficient in themselves to keep you going. Being 
sure is irrelevant. In fact, being unsure is part of the 
charm. Doubt and danger drive the hero, not 
certainty and safety. 
Plato: So we are agreed? The games have begun? 
Erothymia: It's an emotional covenant, not a legal agreement. All 
we can do is admit that the feelings are fired and we 
will fuel them. We can no longer control them. 
Plato: The first thing you must do is listen to my best 
argument. 
Erothymia: Your best argument is useless against the logic of the 
loins. The first thing I am going to do is have 
volcanic sex with Dion. When the molten rush has 
stopped, I will think calmly about what I want to say 
in the assembly. Your dull and plodding arguments 
may have some effect on your dull and plodding 
audience, but an argument is actually intoxicating 
when it is fermented in the juices of carnal 
knowledge. 
Plato: No, I must speak on my own behalf! It is my 
argument, my theory. I must explain and defend it! 
Erothymia: And so you will. But this is now our argument. I can 
inspire both of us by making your part of it even 
better. Do you think you will sleep? 
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Plato: No, I will probably just think. 
Erothymia: You haven't mentioned how you feel about Dion, and 
I don't want to know. I would rather guess. 
Plato: If you think having sex with Dion will make you— 
Erothymia: —Quiet! I said I don't want to know. 
Plato: How do you feel about having sex with Dion? 
Erothymia: Do you really want to know? I don't think so. You 
don't just want to know in the way you want to know 
why the moon glows. You want to imagine it. 
Plato: Never mind. Do as you please. 
Erothymia: I'll tell you how I feel about it. I just want round after 
round of sexual pleasure from a man whose only 
talent is his ability to work like a horse. He can't even 
play checkers. If he could at least beat me at checkers 
after a night of love-making he might stand a chance 
of being in your shoes. 
Plato: So I will spend the night worshipping Sophia and 
you will spend it worshipping Eros. Whom do you 
think will be most rewarded at dawn? 
Erothymia: Neither, if we both get what we want. 
Plato: I want a decisive argument. 
Erothymia: You want a decisive argument for what? 
Plato: To prove that the love and acquisition of truth is the 
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highest pleasure life affords us, and that the 
knowledge gained from such a pursuit must reign 
supreme and absolute over the passions and 
appetites. Reason must be the arbiter and advisor for 
all opinions, and the Emperor of all feeling and 
desire. That is the essence of dikaiosune. 
Erothymia: I have an argument for you. 
PlatO: If your argument is sound, I will think of it myself. 
Sound arguments, irrefutable arguments, are sound 
everywhere and for everyone. Anyone who thinks 
objectively can recognize them independently. 
Erothymia: You might think so. But every argument terminates 
in a presupposition, some ultimate mystery. 
PlatO: Philosophy's job is to make the presupposition 
coherent and intelligible, to decide whether or not it 
is true or false. Philosophy reasons about first and 
ultimate principles. 
Erothymia: Every first principle is a wish, a postulate of passion. 
I know what your master passions are. That is why I 
can build some flimsy edifice of rationality around 
them and get you to believe that the arguments are 
sound, or even that you believe the arguments are 
what brought you to your belief. But I will then 
destroy the arguments you formerly thought were 
objectively valid. 
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Plato: How? 
Erothymia: By transforming your passions. 
PlatO: You are brazen. You announce your strategy befote 
you deploy it. But even if you didn't it would not 
work. 
Erothymia: I'll do it tomorrow. 
Plato: I dare you to try it now. 
Erothymia: Quickly? 
Plato: Carefully, but quickly if you wish. 
Erothymia: Would you fondle my breast as I speak? 
Plato: Of course not. 
Erothymia: That is the central thrust of my argument. Now I 
want a few thrusts from Dion. 
Plato: Wait. Let's hear a real argument. 
Erothymia: All right. Here's one for dikaiosune. Give me a verbal 
portrait of the perfectly just person. 
Plato: A well-ordered psyche, harmonious and unified, 
always directed by a fully competent intellect. I 
always say that if the intellect is to rule, it must be 
fully competent, that is, it must reason clearly and 
correctly, unerring in its discovery of facts and truths, 
and able to grasp the highest objects of knowledge. 
Erothymia: What are they? 
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Plato: The perfect Forms. Above all, the Form of the Good. 
Fve explained all that to you. 
Erothymia: And this knowledge regulates the just soul? 
Plato: Exactly. The just psyche is balanced and 
harmonious. The passions and appetites are 
benevolently guided by wisdom and the knowledge 
of what is good. Dikaiosune is an inward condition 
of the spiritually prosperous and healthy psyche. 
This beautiful inward balance automatically 
manifests itself outwardly in just actions, in just and 
balanced dealings and exchanges with others, in 
fairness, and in the prudential organization of one's 
overall life. The psyche which has justice has the 
whole of virtue. This is the psyche we call aristos, the 
one praised and admired by everyone. In it there is 
no anxiety or agitation by desires and passions. 
Erothymia: If dikaiosune is a virtue, or something excellent, or 
you might say a strength of character, then its 
opposite must be a vice—a kind of flaw or weakness 
or defect. Isn't that true? 
Plato: Yes, complete injustice would be the whole of vice. 
Erothymia: Describe for me, if you will, a completely unjust 
psyche. 
Plato: Completely lawless and unregulated. Governed by 
twisting, turning cravings and brute appetites. A 
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psyche without rules, without wisdom, without 
organization. A psyche full of natural chaos and strife, 
driven by the irrational, relentless, addictive desires 
for sex, money, and domination. It is the tumultuous, 
insatiable psyche, the rebellious, irrational, 
narcissistic, criminal soul—unwise and intemperate 
in the extreme. It is the uncivilized outlaw in every 
one of us, unrestrained by civility, manners or laws. 
Erothymia: In all of us? 
Plato: Undoubtedly. It roams when we dream, or when 
reason is disordered by drunkenness or madness. 
Uncontrolled by will or reason, the unjust psyche is 
pure bestial desire. 
Erothymia: I see. So this is yout first argument? The one we 
began on the island? You are comparing the most 
just and the most unjust psyche's, and making that 
the basis for your first argument? I mean, put these 
two souls side by side and ask which is happier? 
Plato: Yes, that was the first argument. There is no doubt 
who is happier. The unjust psyche has no purpose or 
direction. It is friendless and anxious, living in fear 
and uncertainty, driven to neuroticism by its 
insatiable cravings, never satisfied, never at peace, 
never knowing the stable pleasutes of reason. The 
completely unjust psyche lives a perpetual nightmare 
from which it cannot awaken. 
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Erothymia: That may be your judgment, but I know you are 
wrong. You have no proof. You merely assert it. I 
assert the opposite. How do we decide who is right? 
PlatO: I'll think about it. 
Erothymia: Think, think, think. How boring. While you think, 
life in all its dramatic splendor slips by you. 
PlatO: Thought is the only way. 
Erothymia: Look, I am going to undermine this argument I 
gave you with another argument, probably 
tomorrow. But I am going to thoroughly demolish 
your rationality itself in the contest you agreed to. 
If you love me, you will lose your mind and you will 
submit to the grip of my passion and mystery. I 
have to leave soon, but before I go I want to tell you 
something about your precious attachment to 
philosophy. When are you going to realize that 
there are no Forms? 
Plato: Without Forms, my thesis would admittedly be 
destroyed. There would be nothing for the purified 
intellect to know. 
Erothymia: Without Forms, your life would be destroyed. It 
would be pathetic, comical. 
PlatO: I suppose that without Forms philosophy would be 
futile. 
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E r o t h y m i a : Your theory of Forms is ultimately incoherent. But 
even if Forms were intelligible entities, or better yet, 
supposing then to be both conceivable and real, 
how on earth could your intellect ever perceive 
them? No, this search of yours ends up in some 
black hole in the mind. When you realize that, you 
will wave goodbye to philosophy forever and join 
me in the blistering drama of imagination, change, 
appearance, and passion. 
P la tO : I know the alternatives. I almost created them myself. 
E r o t h y m i a : You philosophers seem to think that there is one 
complete and final version of objective reality. One 
and only one catalogue of ultimate truths. You seem 
to think that if you persist long enough in your 
logical methods you will get closer and closer to the 
final articulation of all there is to know. You think: 
someday all philosophers will embrace the same set 
of true, proven beliefs. If only you can all find the 
perfect arguments, purged of all personal interests, 
cold-bloodedly dispassionate and impersonal, you 
will have an omniscient, God's-eye comprehension 
of everything. Then you will be sovereigns of the 
intellect and guardians of truth. You will be the 
custodians of metaphysical and moral knowledge, 
telling all us ignorant people to come to you with 
our beliefs so you can certify them as true. We will 
bring our beliefs to your tribunal, beliefs about what 
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is real, what is beautiful, what is good, and you will 
coolly tell us which ones to retain, which to 
relinquish. The trouble is, you know nothing, and 
nevet will, never can. Your philosophy is a 
pretentious charade. It just goes on and on in the 
same spot. The problem is, you presuppose that 
there is some eternal, immutable, and universal 
foundation to your reasoning. Don't you? 
Plalo: All knowledge must rest on something. 
Erothymia: So, try to prove to me what that foundation is. If it 
is truly foundational, on what other foundation 
would your attempt to prove it rest on? By definition, 
there could not be one. Plato, say farewell to reason 
and admit that philosophy is merely a quirky mental 
game, cteated by men like you. It's absurd! You have 
manufactured a mental obstacle course. The craziest 
thing about it is that you have built two things into 
it: the obstacle course, by its very nature, cannot be 
navigated and, by definition, cannot be completed. 
Philosophy is the paradoxical art of generating 
questions whose only answet is the generation of 
another question. You are permanently corralled and 
disabled by your own creation. And you can't 
dismantle the creation or fix it from within. All you 
can do is forsake it and divotce it. That's what I 
meant when I said you must bid it good riddance. 
Philosophy and its insane methods must die. 
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PlatO: My dear Erothymia, we will see. 
Erothymia: Maybe we will, maybe we won't. I'll leave you now to 
think about thinking. What do you think about that? 
PlatO: I think I'm finished thinking for now. 
Erothymia: You think you are finished thinking. If you are 
finished thinking, how can you think you are 
finished? 
PlatO: All right. I feel I have finished. 
Erothymia: You haven't even started to feel. (Music up.) 
Plato: Or so you think. 
Erothymia: Plato, you are demented. You seem to enjoy driving 
yourself crazy. Who drives and who is driven are one 
and the same. 
PlatO: An odd thought, isn't it? 
Erothymia: All your thoughts are odd. Even your even thoughts 
are odd. With that, I say goodnight. 
Plato: Say it. 
Erothymia: I just did. 
Plato: Goodnight. 
Erothymia: To you too. Goodnight. (Exits. Spotlight on Plato. 
Slow fade of music and spotlight as he scratches his 
head). 
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Scene Three 
The court of Dionysius. A large assembly of guards and auditors, 
including Speusippus, Eudoxus, and Xenocrates. 
Elder Dionysius: Call the assembly to order! 
Guard: Order! Order in the assembly! Quiet please! 
Elder Dionysius: We are gathered once again to hear the rest of Plato's 
arguments. If he persuades us, we will turn my title 
over to the ablest and most virtuous of philosophers, 
and that will be decided by Plato and his three 
colleagues. 
1st Member: What if we are not persuaded? Or what if a few of 
our best thinkers are not persuaded? 
Elder Dionysius: We could put it to a vote. 
2nd Member: How can we agree to let rationality tule by such 
irrational means? Voting means that numbers rule 
instead of wisdom. Who decides that voting will 
decide? We would first have to agree on the principle 
of voting. Since we can't vote on the principle of 
voting, someone will have to force it on us, and we 
are right back to where we started. 
3rd Member: The agreement to let philosophers rule would have to 
be unanimous. If Plato's arguments are valid and 
sound we would all be persuaded anyway, by Plato's 
own insistence. 
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1st Member: Only if we agree in advance to let reason rule us and 
our city. Unfortunately, that is exactly the point at 
issue. 
Elder Dionysius: Let us at least hear the arguments. (Enter 
Erothymia). Then we will have to find a way of 
deciding whether numbers or arguments, or 
something else, will determine who should rule. 
Where is Plato? Why isn't he here? 
Younger Dionysius: (To Xenocrates). I thought he was coming in with 
the three of you. 
Xenocrates: I haven't seen him since yesterday. 
E u d O X U S : He had two arguments left. We can present them in 
his absence. 
Erothymia: He had three. I have heard the first one, and I can 
repeat with certainty that it is not sound. Let 
Xenocrates expound the remaining two. 
Younger Dionysius: We should hear them from Plato. 
Erothymia: Plato is in a trance. He can't think or speak. I suspect 
he has lost his mind. (The assembly erupts in 
commotion). 
Elder Dionysius: Quiet! Order! What do you mean, Plato is in a 
trance! 
Erothymia: It's a fever of some kind. 
E u d O X U S : Where is he? 
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Erothymia: I left him in my quarters. I thought he was coming 
here. 
EudOXUS: Where were you last night? 
Erothymia: I was thinking. Now let us hear from Xenocrates. 
Elder D ionys ius : Yes, I decree that Xenocrates shall expound the two 
remaining arguments. 
Xenocrates: As you wish. The first argument is simple. It is based 
on Plato's view of human nature. He has shown that 
all humans have thtee dimensions or parts in their 
soul. They can be thought of as separate parts insofar 
as they have distinct objects of love and insofar as 
they have distinct kinds of pleasure when those loves 
are gtatified. Of course they all opetate within one 
psyche and consequently they cannot literally be 
separated, but we know they ate different functions 
whenever we experience each operating in isolation 
from the other two. The most powerful and primary-
part of the psyche is the purely biological one, the one 
we share with all other animals. It has no reason. It is 
driven by blind instinct and appetite. Sexual desire 
and competitive aggression are its purest expressions. 
The second part is reason itself, the part that thinks 
and pondets. Used correctly, it generates knowledge 
by using logical, disciplined methods. This part 
computes and calculates, separating true assertions 
from false ones. Alone, it does not dispose us to act 
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or react; it merely reasons things out well or badly. 
The philosopher, the scientist, the mathematician, 
and the lawyer usually have the learning and training 
to use this part skillfully. We can see clearly that we 
now have two different functions or dimensions in 
the psyche, since we have all experiences of pure 
animal desire without reasoning and pure reasoning 
without desire. Between these two parts is what we 
call thymos, will, or spirit, or the passionate part 
some refer to as temper. When I ask about someone's 
disposition—"Is it sweet?", "Is it nasty?", "Is it 
strong?"—I am asking about the nature and amount 
of their thymos. The simplest way to explain it is this. 
Our appetitive function is driven by the need to 
have animal pleasure and to avoid animal pain. Our 
reasoning function can accurately decide what will 
give us pleasure and what will give us pain. But 
sometimes we act against our knowledge, by doing 
things that give us pain or by not doing things that 
give us pleasure. Similarly, we sometimes fail to resist 
either pain or pleasure for a greater good. Our 
resolve or determination weakens. Why is that? It 
must be because some third part disposes us to act 
from desire instead of reason. The main point Plato 
wants to make, however, is that the psyche has three 
divisions. Each division loves different things, and 
each division has different kinds of gratification. 
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The lowest, most primitive part loves the pleasures 
of sex and all forms of sensual intoxication. For 
convenience, we can call it the money-loving part, 
because money is the easiest way to acquire all those 
pleasures. The middle part loves public acclaim and 
reputation for its courage and heroism. It loves 
honor and glory. I call it the fame-loving part. 
Thymos would rather be famous and popular than 
rich. The highest part, though, sacrifices both fame 
and fortune for truth. It is gratified only by 
knowledge, wisdom, and expertise. Now if I asked a 
money-lover, a fame-lover, and a wisdom-lover to 
tell me who had the best kind of gratification, 
undoubtedly each would argue for what each knows 
best and each would defend his own way of life. But 
who is qualified to judge correctly? Surely the one 
who has experienced all three forms of gratification. 
Plato's argument is that since the philosopher has 
experienced the pleasures afforded by all three parts 
of the psyche, and since philosophers consistently 
agree that the gratifications of the intellect are far 
better than those of either thymos or the desiring 
part, it follows that the life of thought and reason is 
superior to the other two. It the follows further that, 
because a person who is dikaiosune is ruled by 
reason, the just person is happier and superior to the 
less or more unjust one. 
iqq 
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Members: Excellent argument! Most convincing! I am 
persuaded. 
Xenocrates: I now defer the remaining argument to Eudoxus. 
E u d O X U S : This argument seems difficult to understand at first, 
but it is actually not. It is based on one basic 
metaphor whose simplicity and elegance is 
surpassed only by its profundity. Plato's most 
valuable insight is that Being is like a ladder. 
Everything is located on some rung on the great 
ladder of Being. The ladder is a series of steps and 
degrees from bottom to top, from lowest to highest, 
from least to most. For example, there is a scale of 
knowledge from absolute ignorance at the bottom 
to absolute knowledge and illumination at the top. 
This is because there is a scale of Being from 
absolute unreality and non-being at the bottom to 
absolute reality and complete being at the top. 
There are degrees of perfection...the most real being 
the most perfect, the least real being the least 
perfect. On this hierarchy of Being, there are 
degrees of beauty, degrees of justice, degrees of 
knowledge and degrees of pleasure. All this because 
there are degrees of Being or Perfection. Plato's 
argument is that the lower the objects of your 
attention are on the scale of Being, the less real your 
pleasure is in being attached to those objects. If you 
live in a world of illusion, your corresponding 
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pleasures are illusory too. The just person knows the 
highest realities of all—the stable, eternal Forms— 
and accordingly has the most real pleasures of all. 
That's it. 
Younger D ionys ius : That's it? 
EudOXUS: Well, I can fill it in if you wish, but that is essentially 
it. 
1st M e m b e r : How can one pleasure be more real than another? 
Pleasure is pleasure. They are all equal. 
EudOXUS: What would you rather do? Dream about 
Erothymia's beauty or physically embrace it? 
1st M e m b e r : I would say embrace it. 
EudOXUS: Similarly you would rather encounter the perfect 
universal Form of Beauty than perceive an imperfect 
instance of it. The eternal Form is more real than the 
temporary instance, and the temporary instance is 
more real than this fleeting dream. The Beautiful 
will not change and it lasts forever. Erothymia 
someday will not be beautiful and she will die, while 
Beauty itself endures. 
Erothymia : Of course I must perish! Everything is perishable! 
Nothing is permanent, nothing is stable! Heraclitus 
was right! All things are in constant flux and 
alteration. You, me, this chair, everything is dynamic 
and changing, appearing for an absurd moment or 
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two then disappearing. These arguments are 
preposterous! Go back to your revelry. (Enter Dion). 
Get back to the enchanting theatre of sensation, 
swim again in the waters of change. 
Dion: Where is that man! Where is that treacherous Plato? 
Erothymia: Dion, you are interrupting. 
Dion: I don't care. Tell me where he is. I'll kill him. 
Speusippus: What's going on here? 
Elder Dionysius: Someone warn Plato. (A guard exits). 
Erothymia: You had it coming. 
Dion: He can't do this to me! Your are my woman. Where 
is he? 
Erothymia: Never mind. Now be quiet and let us talk. 
Dion: I'm not moving until you tell me where he is. I'm 
going to strangle the life out of him. 
Eudoxus: Would someone please tell us what's happening? 
Who is this man? 
Dion: You shut up, or I'll damage you too. Erothymia, 
come with me immediately, or I'll deal with you 
here and now. I'm not fooling. Plato is a dead man. 
(The assembly gets restless). 
Erothymia: Either you leave, or I'll tell them everything. Then 
you will be a dead man. Look at who is here, and 
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think of what I can get them to do. I'm giving you a 
chance to be quiet, and if you have any brains at all 
you will take it. (More commotion in the assembly). 
Dion: Just tell me where I can find him. Nobody tries to 
steal my woman! 
Erothymia: You idiot, I was never your woman! 
Younger Dionysius: Guards, shackle this man. We all know how 
dangerous he is. Whatever he has to do with Plato, I 
don't know. But we have suspected he has been 
plotting for months to overthrow my father. This 
public disturbance is enough to have him arrested. 
Shackle him! (Dion is overpowered by four guards 
and taken away). 
Elder Dionysius: This is disgraceful. Come now, let us return to 
reason. Everyone calm down please. (The tumult 
dies down). I apologize for the disturbance. My son 
and I will meet with Erothymia later to sort out 
whatever it is that has to be sorted out. Meanwhile, 
let's get back to our debate. Where were we? 
3rd Member: Eudoxus was saying that the rewards of being rational 
and just are at a higher level of reality than the 
rewards of desire. 
Erothymia: Gentlemen, there is no point in going any further 
with this. Plato cannot concentrate any longer. His 
reason has been dismembered, for better or for worse. 
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His intellect hanging on a crucifix of passion, by his 
own choice. He can't help you. 
Younger Dionysius: Send another guard after the first one. We must bring 
Plato here. (A guard exits). 
Elder Dionysius: Without Plato's final summation we can't possibly 
decide whether or not to install a new ruler and 
constitution. 
Erothymia: Either way, it won't work. You and your ministers 
will never relinquish power to philosophy, and, 
assuming you would be willing to, the philosophers 
would have no interest in it. 
Xenocrates: What if his arguments prevail? 
E u d O X U S : We still have the problem of deciding how to get the 
public, and the government, and most of all the 
military to let them prevail. 
Speusippus: It's the same problem you and I have in getting our 
desires and our fighting spirit to let rationality 
prevail. Reason seems to go out the window 
whenever the desires or passions are ignited. Reason 
lasts only as long as the appetites and temper are 
calm. 
Xenocrates: And that is precisely Plato's point. Dikaiosune 
requires that one's desire and temper be moderated 
and subdued by reason. 
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EudOXUS: More than that. Plato is saying that dikaiosune 
requires that each division of the psyche performs 
only its own function as well as possible. The 
primitive appetites must pursue the basic necessities 
for survival, not the least of which is the acquisition 
of bodily pleasures. Thymos must protect and defend 
with its courage. Reason must rule and guide with its 
knowledge. If desire or spirit were to rule reason, the 
result would be injustice. 
Xenocrates: That is correct. But what we must now emphasize is 
dikaiosune in the state. It requires that the wisest and 
best rule, that the most courageous and self-
disciplined rule, and that the best artisans and 
craftsmen do the work of the state. The hardest thing 
for the working and warrior classes to accept is the 
fact that they will not and should not rule. 
Erothymia: Wait a minute. Does this mean that Plato would 
allow me to be a doctor or a teacher? 
Xenocrates: He would expect it. He would expect you to do 
whatever you are best at. If you had natural abilities 
and talents for something, that is what you will do. 
But the rulers will decide that, not you. 
Erothymia: Does it also mean I could be a warrior? 
Xenocrates: Of course, as long as you had courage, fighting 
prowess, self-discipline, superior intelligence, and all 
the other virtues of a warrior. 
2QC 
H f l T O ' i m u n i 
Erothymia: And Plato would let women rule the state if they 
were the wisest and noblest of persons? 
Xenocrates: Exactly. 
Erothymia: He says this in his writings and discourses? 
Xenocrates: Repeatedly. 
Erothymia: Has any man ever had the courage to propose such a 
thing before? It's almost scandalous. 
Xenocrates: Plato was the first. He is ridiculed for it, but his 
theory of dikaiosune makes it necessary. It is simply 
reasonable. The logic of his argument demands that 
men and women be treated equally, in equal 
proportion to their talents and intelligence. It's not 
the only thing he is ridiculed for. 
Erothymia: What else? 
E u d O X U S : Sexual abstinence in the military, except for 
rationally controlled reproduction. And the warriors 
will have no private property. The females will also be 
free to fight or rule because the state will have those 
who are best at parenting raise the young. 
Erothymia: Do you mean state-run, universal day-care? 
Something like that? 
E u d O X U S : Something like that. 
Erothymia: This is very interesting. Anything else? 
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E u d O X U S : No marriage in the fighting and ruling classes. Only 
in the working class. Marriage and private property 
would be the rewards for appetitive natures. Since 
they are motivated by appetite, they cannot see the 
rational basis for a renunciation of sexual and 
material pleasures. 
Erothymia: Are you sure Plato says all these things? 
Xenocrates: Absolutely sure. We have heard them several times 
over a long period. 
Erothymia: And he is sincere? He really believes them? Seriously? 
Xenocrates: No man on the planet is more sincere that Plato. No-
one is more serious. 
Erothymia: So he really does allow reason to make the policies. 
Xenocrates: Right. Reason does its work in governing wisely, 
skillfully, and virtuously. Spirit and appetite execute 
the orders of reason. That is why Plato insists that 
reason can govern only when it works perfectly and 
possesses true knowledge. 
Erothymia: And you are sure that women can rule, if they are 
able? 
EudOXUS: If they are able. If they can think clearly and reason 
correctly. 
Erothymia: Has anyone heard of Plato's whereabouts? 
Elder Dionysius: Guard! Is there any news? 
207 
P L A T O ' S A U A U T 
Guard: There is a rumor down the street that Plato is in a 
taverna. Someone says he was seen drinking wine and 
talking of escape. 
Erothymia: Send another guard to get him! Bring him here! 
2nd Guard: He's on his way. He's nearly here. 
Elder Dionysius: He can make his final summation. Then we will 
disband for a few days to weigh all the arguments. 
Younger Dionysius: We may not have to. The conspiracy is gaining 
control. There may be no government left in a few 
days. 
Elder Dionysius: We can't worry about that now. 
2nd Guard: He's here! 
Erothymia: Bring him to the front of the assembly. (Enter Plato 
and a Guard. Plato is in disarray, and appears drunk). 
Give him some tea. (She rips off part of her tunic, 
exposing one breast). Here, make this moist. (A 
guard dips the cloth in a bowl and wrings it out. 
Erothymia bathes Plato's face and smoothes his hair). 
PlatO: Are you keeping our agreement? 
Erothymia: More than ever. 
Plato: So am I. I'm insane with desire. 
Erothymia: I know. 
Plato: Who is winning? 
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Erothymia: Both of us. 
PlatO: I'm beginning to have doubts. 
Erothymia: About me? 
PlatO: No, about my arguments. 
Erothymia: Don't worry now about the arguments. As long as 
your love and desire for me keep growing stronger, 
we'll find a way with the arguments. 
PlatO: You said you would kill me if I couldn't convince you 
with arguments. I'm going to commit suicide. 
Erothymia: I never once said that. I said I would test your theory 
to the limit. I said I would pit passion and appetite 
against reason. If my reason defeats your reason, it 
doesn't mean you have to give up reason, only that 
you need to revise your theory using more reason. I 
said I would kill you only if my passion could 
dissolve your reason and make it surrender to 
passion. And has it surrendered yet? No. Will I make 
the struggle worse? Yes, Will you win? Yes. Then I 
will surrender to you, and to your strong mind. 
Plato: I need some rest. I feel weak. 
Erothymia: We'll find out how weak you are. (Speaking to Elder 
Dionysius). I request that you and your son dissolve 
the assembly. Plato cannot speak with feeling or 
clarity to those he does not know or trust well. He 
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needs to speak with me alone. We will work it out 
together, and whatever fruit our struggle bears we 
will pass on to you. You can make use of it as you see 
fit. Plato must learn that it is not his job to think out 
the ideal society then install it. His job is to love me 
and let me love him. So I would ask you kindly to 
please leave us now to get on with our real task. 
Elder Dionysius: Very well. The session is over. We'll reconvene when 
necessary. (Those assembled exit, conversing). 
Erothymia: Plato's three friends can stay or leave, as they wish. 
Xenocrates: I think we will leave. (They exit. All lights to black, 
except for spotlights on Plato and Erothymia.) 
Erothymia: Are you drunk? 
PlatO: Yes. I've been up all night. 
Erothymia: Doing what? 
Plato: Thinking of you. Wanting you. Deciding to leave. 
Erothymia: Why? 
Plato: Because two people want to kill me. 
Erothymia: Is that the real reason? 
Plato: That and the fact that passion might be more 
powerful than intellect. The fact that philosophy may 
be a hoax. All I've lived for might be an illusion. 
Erothymia: Where does the problem lie? 
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PlalO: With the Forms. I don't know how to prove they exist. 
Erothymia: Would it change anything if they don't? Would your 
life be any different? Would the world be any different? 
PlatO: I don't know. 
Erothymia: Without the Forms, wouldn't we still have wisdom, 
courage, self-control and justice? Wouldn't there still 
be aristos men and women to rule? Your theory of 
justice in the state and in the soul would still hold, 
but the foundations of it would need reworking. I 
know it can be done. 
Plato: Justice requires knowledge, and knowledge requires a 
real object. 
Erothymia: I didn't sleep with Dion, you know. 
PlatO: It doesn't matter if you did. No rules, remember? 
What matters to me is to rescue reason so philosophy 
can keep its rightful place. 
Erothymia: Suppose you couldn't. What then? Suppose no-one 
could. 
PlatO: I'd go to a volcano and jump in. 
Erothymia: That would be cowardly. Plato, you are so extreme. 
Look, we can come to a good compromise if you are 
willing to. You can keep your reason, I can keep my 
passion, and we can both give much of what we have 
to the other. 
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Plato: I see nothing wrong with that. But how can I keep 
my reason without Forms? 
Erothymia: Tell me, did reason guide you to the conclusion that 
if a woman is as capable as a man at doing 
something, she should be asked to do it? 
Plato: Of course. 
Erothymia: And that strong, intelligent men and women can be 
lovers without being matried? 
Plato: That too. 
Erothymia: Don't you see that logic can guide both of us to such 
sound conclusions without resorting to some 
mysterious, other-worldly Form? 
Plato: It's not that simple. 
Erothymia: I'm willing to listen. 
Plato: Besides, there is a more important problem. 
Erothymia: I know. 
Plato: What do you think it is? 
Erothymia: Not whether or not reason can rule, but whether or 
not it should. 
Plato: That's about it. 
Erothymia: Assume for the moment that the Forms exist, and 
further that you can know them, and further that 
you can prove to everyone else you know them. 
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I wouldn't grant those assumptions, but I'll assume 
they are true. Then we could agree that reason is 
capable of ruling. But the question of whether or not 
it should is left untouched. Now assume those three 
assumptions are false. I would still say reason is 
capable of ruling in some way, but how do we 
determine whether or not it should? Maybe it should, 
in some way and to some extent, but how do we 
decide that? That's our problem—yours and mine. 
Plato: Let's work it out. 
Erothymia: How? With reason? With passion? 
Plato: With both. 
Erothymia: With both, you say. I want you to do something. I 
want you to go to where they are holding Dion and 
confront him. I want you to convince him, by 
whatever means, not to overthrow my uncle. Would 
you do that? 
PlatO: How would I do that? 
Erothymia: You figure it out. You might have to kill him. 
Whatever you have to do, just do it using all your 
wits. 
Plato: For you, I'll do it. It's a just cause. 
Erothymia: There is something else, even harder. When were you 
planning to return to Greece? 
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Plato: When the work here is done. We thought it would 
take three to four weeks. 
Erothymia: Fine. Stay here for one month. I want you to sleep 
beside me every night of that month. We must sleep 
naked. No matter what I do, no matter how much I 
plead, no matter how much you beg, we must not 
have sex. Will you do that? (Music up.) 
PlatO: I can try. 
Erothymia: I didn't ask if you can try. I didn't even ask if you can. 
I asked if you will. 
Plato: (Pacing). I see what you are doing. Will you give me 
one day to think about it? 
Erothymia: No. You must answer now. No thinking. Be decisive. 
Plato: My answer is yes. 
Erothymia: You will have me for as long as you want me. I am 
sure of that. Just do those two things. (Music full.) 
Plato: Will you come with me to Greece? 
Erothymia: Yes. When we are together for good, we have to find 
and keep our compromise. See this? (She cups her 
breast). 
Plato: I can see nothing but that. 
Erothymia: Think about it for a month. 
Plato: I'm sure I will. (Lights to black. Fade music.) 
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Scene Four 
On the volcano, at dawn. 
Erothymia: (Crawls to the lip of the volcano, peers in, crawls 
back). Did you really give serious consideration to 
jumping in? 
Plato: Briefly, yes. 
Erothymia: Do you realize now that if you ever jumped in I 
would have to jump also? 
Plato: I would have to do the same thing too, if you 
jumped. We can't live apart or alone now. 
Erothymia: How did you get Dion not to depose Dionysius? 
Plato: I sweet-talked my way past all the guards. I told 
them I had to have a confidential meeting with 
him. I had to use a little bit of force on him, and 
when I had him pinned I put a small slit on his 
throat—just enough to scare him. I said I would cut 
off his whole head if he ever took another step 
toward Dionysius. Then I left him with an open 
offer to get psychological counsel ftom me 
whenever he asked for it. He accepted the offer. He 
needs help. 
Erothymia: And me? How did you resist my temptations? It must 
have been awful. 
PlatO: I let my mind tule, and my will obeyed. 
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Erothymia: You must have struggled like a Titan. Your appetite is 
huge, your desire is immense. 
Plato: It wasn't easy. 
Erothymia: We still have a lot to wotk out, you know. 
PlatO: Do you mean on the reason-passion question? I will 
never give up reason, or my faith in it. 
Erothymia: Neither will I. I would like to convince you to 
modify your concept of it, but it doesn't have to 
abdicate. That would be insanity in the most literal 
sense. You must realize that I like reason too. I admire 
it when it is beautifully used. After all, it works. But 
it doesn't work the way you think it does. 
Plato: Can you explain that? 
Erothymia: Why did your attempts fail in Sicily? Why couldn't 
you install teason as the ruler of Syracuse? Why was 
everyone skeptical about letting philosophy rule? 
PlatO: Probably because they weren't sufficiently trained in 
logic to see the soundness of my arguments. 
Erothymia: Plato, I love you. So I'm saying this without malice. 
It was not due to the inadequacy of your arguments, 
even though they are inadequate. 
Plato: Where is the inadequacy? 
Erothymia: There are two. The first is that there is no Form of 
Justice. The second is that your account of social and 
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Plato: 
Erothymia: 
Plato: 
Erothymia: 
Plato: 
personal ethics is wrong simply because there is no 
Form of Justice. 
First things first. Can you prove to me that the Forms 
don't exist? 
I don't have to. Maybe I could, but I'm not obliged to 
because you are the one asking me to believe 
something extraordinary and mysterious. It's only fair 
that I listen to your reasons and dispose of them. I 
don't have to provide reasons for believing in the non­
existence of something. If you believe that the Form 
of Justice exists, give me your reasons. If your reasons 
aren't good enough, I will not be moved to adopt your 
belief. So far, I have undermined each reason you gave 
me—to your satisfaction I might add. 
But could you, if I asked you, give me some 
arguments which show that the Forms do not exist? 
Or more strongly, that their existence is impossible? 
Yes, I could do two things. I could show that if you 
believe they exist, then certain paradoxes and 
incoherencies follow. To get rid of the paradoxes you 
would have to get rid of the belief which entails 
them. After that, I could show you that there is 
something inherently unintelligible in the belief 
itself. 
Let me tell you something about philosophers. What 
they long for is one elegant, decisive argument which 
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conclusively settles an issue. They don't want a gaggle 
of suggestive arguments. They want one 
overwhelming argument. So do me a favor. Instead 
of undermining my reasons for believing in Forms, 
why don't you take the further step and give me youi 
reasons for not believing in them? If you can do that, 
I'll never believe in them again. 
Erothymia: And will you give up your theory of justice? 
Plato: Yes. 
Erothymia: Will you then agree with me? And with Speusippus? 
Plato: Yes, ot with something very similar. 
Erothymia: Then I'll try my two approaches. The first one says 
that if Forms exist, then we have an unacceptable 
consequence. If we cannot live with the 
unacceptable consequence, we must eliminate our 
belief in Forms. 
Plato: What is the unacceptable consequence? 
Erothymia: Your Forms were introduced to solve a problem. 
However, they introduce another problem much 
greater than the one they were to solve. 
Plato: What is it? 
Erothymia: The Forms are meant to explain appearances. They 
are the supernatural Realities behind the natural 
Appearances. This means they cannot have any of 
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Plato: 
Erothymia: 
Plato: 
Erothymia: 
the properties of Appearances, otherwise they would 
just be a part of what they are supposed to explain. 
In fact, supernatural Reality must be so different 
from natural Appearances that the properties of each 
realm must be contradictory. You now have two realms 
with opposite characteristics: changing/unchanging; 
visible/invisible; material/not material; in time/ 
timeless; spatial/nonspatial; immanent/transcendent; 
perfect/imperfect. You have made the separation so 
complete that there is no possible bridge between 
them. The natural and the supernatural cannot 
connect. Why? Because whatever connects them 
would have to be either natural or supernatural, and 
these are precisely what cannot be connected to each 
other. Or it would have to be some third kind of 
Being. But by your exhaustive division of everything 
into Reality and Appearance, there cannot be some 
third kind of Being. Either there is or there isn't. If 
there is, your theory is false. If there isn't, your 
theory is unintelligible. 
That seems decisive. How do we explain Appearances? 
By other Appearances. There is nothing else except 
other natural Appearances. 
What else? 
This one is short. Tell me, are your Forms perfect or 
imperfect? 
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PlatO: Perfect. That's why they can't change. 
Erothymia: Absolutely perfectly Perfect? 
PlatO: Absolutely perfect. 
Erothymia: And the Form of the Good is the source of all theit 
perfection? 
PlatO: The Form of the Good is infinitely perfect. 
Erothymia: Can the imperfect be the cause of the perfect? 
Plato: No. The imperfect would have to contain 
perfection if perfection were to issue from it. To say 
that imperfection contains perfection is nonsense. 
Erothymia: So imperfection must come from perfection. 
PlatO: It's beginning to look that way. It would seem that 
imperfection is a kind of degeneration or decline of 
perfection. 
Erothymia: And Appearances are unreal and imperfect? (Plato 
nods in agreement). And Appearances are caused by 
Forms? (He nods again). Then tell me this. Why 
would perfection become imperfect? Why would 
supernatural Reality cause natural Appearances to 
exist? Why doesn't the perfect simply remain perfect 
in itself and cause no imperfection? 
PlatO: I don't know. 
Erothymia: You can't know! Whatever the aspect of perfection is 
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which causes imperfection would have to be an 
imperfection. The perfect is imperfect. Now your 
belief is incoherent. 
PlatO: Reason is in ruins. 
Erothymia: No it isn't! It works beautifully in the realm of 
Appearances. Notice I said it works. Use your reason 
naturalistically and you can cure diseases, tell time by 
the stars, make ships sail into the wind, ferment 
wine, grow better olives—all manner of things! But 
when you displace reason from its natural home in 
the realm of Appearances, it becomes a sleepwalker. 
Don't give up on reason. Just give up its pretensions. 
PlatO: After all the mind-boggling events of the last few days, 
I feel ready to agree to that. I will compromise with 
you, as long as you are willing to reserve a place for 
reason. I'll be reasonable. Will you be reasonable too? 
Erothymia: Plato, your passions and appetites are more than 
enough for me. And I can see now they are perfectly 
compatible with reason. I always thought that of 
reason or passion, one would have to be forsaken for 
the other, but now I see that isn't true. All we have 
to do is revise your idea of reason and my idea of 
desire. With the help of thymos, your intellect can 
walk arm-in-arm with my desire, and both will 
benefit. Neither has to rule continuously, and 
neither has to submit constantly. 
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PlatO: But would you agree that neither should do the work 
of the other? 
Erothymia: Up to a point, I would. I can see that desire and 
passion can never discern truth. But I can see also 
that only in men like you can truth resist and over­
ride desire. In the majority, it is simply too weak. The 
same goes for thymos. And even in your case, there is 
always the possibility your reason may crumble. 
PlatO: This is the most difficult thing I have ever had to 
admit, but hete it is. Without Forms, and with the 
dominance of appetite and desire in the majority of 
people— 
Erothymia: —Interruption! And with the possibility of the 
temporary dominance of irrational desires and 
passions in the most reasonable of people— 
Plato: Yes, without Forms, with the rule of blind appetite in 
most people, and with the possibility of reason being 
temporarily dislodged in the most rational of people, 
I have no choice other than agreement with your 
social contract theory. Dikaiosune will have to be a 
social contract with a Platonic-Erothymian twist. 
Erothymia: Ethical values exist by nomos rather than byphysis. 
Plato: That's right. There are no moral values or rules until 
they are created by us and agreed on. 
Erothymia: You could think of moral principles as a form of 
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etiquette, or as the rules that regulate a sport. Their 
validity derives entirely from a shared willingness to 
abide by them. 
PlatO: Remembering though that some rules make sense 
and some don't. They exist for a reason. They must 
serve our basic interests and needs. 
Erothymia: And our most basic interest and need is to be happy. 
It would follow that we could all agree to those rules 
which are most likely to advance our happiness. 
PlatO: This is where we part company with Speussipus. 
Being a biologist, he seems to think of humans as a 
tribe of marauding apes. Social contracts are moti­
vated, for him, by fear. But apes have no sense of 
happiness. 
Erothymia: Therefore no sense of ethical rules which sustain it. 
Rules for the jungle do not make complete sense for 
the polis, although a few do. 
Plato: Let's spend our time making a list of all these rules 
and present it to the court at Syracuse. 
Erothymia: I don't think so. Everyone can do this on his own, 
and I believe everyone would end up in agreement 
on what the best rules are for promoting happiness. 
We need only ask ourselves individually what rules 
we would want to be respected so our personal 
happiness remains secure. Each of us should reach 
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the same conclusions. Fundamentally, there would 
then be only one, essential, unrevisable principle of 
ethics. It would be that once the revisable rules are 
made and the agreement struck, the agreement must 
be kept. Morality is only as good as a person's word. 
PlatO: That's a problem, since it would undoubtedly be to 
someone's advantage if he or she could defect from 
the agreement without detection. 
Erothymia: Let's solve that problem this way. Let's create a 
contract between you and me alone, leaving 
everyone else out of it for now. A kind of marriage 
covenant, if you will. Then we will figure out how 
to ensure compliance with the covenant. Whatever 
we figure out for ourselves would be valid for 
everyone else, since they have the same basic 
interests and needs. They would reason just like us. 
Plato: All right then, a contract for two. Let's decide how 
to co-operate in the pursuit of our happiness. 
Whatever undermines your pursuit or mine we shall 
define as wrong and unjust, whatever promotes it 
we shall define as right and just. 
Erothymia: This is actually quite simple and straightforward. 
PlatO: It is. For example, you like to act on your desires and 
passions. If you believe that is where your happiness 
lies, you would not agree to any rules which would 
prevent you from doing that. Correct? 
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Erothymia: Correct. 
PlatO: In fact, you would want rules which would assist you 
in doing that. 
Erothymia: Correct. 
Plato: And you know that I want to act on my desire too? 
Erothymia: Of course. 
Plato: Suppose my desire were to humiliate and abuse you? 
Erothymia: If you acted on it, my happiness would be 
jeopardized. That desire would interfere with the 
fulfillment of my desire. So I would ask you to agree 
to a rule, namely, do not humiliate and abuse me. 
PlatO: Suppose your desire were to humiliate and abuse met 
Erothymia: I would have to promise not to, in exchange for your 
same promise to me. 
PlatO: So there is our first rule. Don't you see how easy that 
is? It all comes down to which promises we make to 
our mutual advantage. The promises would actually 
be unbelievably simple and few. We can both say 
what they would be without thinking much about it. 
Erothymia: There you are. You believe your happiness lies in the 
pursuit of truth. So you would naturally want a 
promise from me to let you think privately, without 
coercion or stress. Since you see that as essential to 
your happiness, you would ask me to promise it. In 
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return you would have to promise it to me. Now we 
are willing to make two promises, to the benefit of 
both of us. In each case, each of us would have to 
yield on something, give up on something, for a 
greater benefit. Each of us will exercise constraints, 
and both of us will get what we want. 
Plato: To simplify, we could say that we will promise each 
other to allow each to get what he or she wants but 
only to the degree that it doesn't stop the other from 
getting what they want. That is the point at which 
constraint and self-control would have to begin. We 
each promise to give up something for something 
better. Do you like to tell lies? 
Erothymia: Sometimes. 
Plato: Does it make you upset when someone lies to you? 
Erothymia: Very. 
Plato: So you would be happier being told the truth? 
Erothymia: Yes, even if it hurts a bit initially. When someone lies 
to me I feel murdered. 
Plato: Would you like me to promise not to lie? 
Erothymia: Of course. 
Plato: I am made unhappy by lies too. Would you make the 
same promise to me? 
Erothymia: I will. 
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P la tO: There, we have a contract. 
Erothymia: You were right about something. We pretty well 
know already what promises to make to each other. 
We would probably make them automatically, 
without thinking. They are so obvious. Why don't we 
fill them in later and present them to Syracuse as a 
model for ethics? Right now, we have the problem 
you raised. 
Pla tO: I said the essence of motality is keeping your promise 
and sticking to the agreement. How can I trust you 
to stick to the contract? How do I know you won't 
make a promise and voluntarily break it later? 
Erothymia: Because you love me. You don't want to wrong or 
harm me. And I love you. It's not a problem. 
Plato: But everyone doesn't love everyone else. People want 
to break their promises. Let's make a distinction here. 
There is the problem of what to do with people who 
want to keep promises, but can't, and what to do 
about people who make promises with no intention 
of keeping them. It's the latter I'm worried about. 
How do we convince everyone, first, that everyone is 
better off if each keeps promises? 
Erothymia: You simply have to prove to them that they would be 
happier if everyone stuck to the agreement. 
Plato: Some would reason like this though: It would be to 
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my advantage for everyone else to stick to their 
agreements, but not for me to stick to them. Come 
back to our contract. Suppose we agree we would 
both be better off if we each set aside some money in 
a personal estate, so the other would be taken care of 
after the first one dies. We both see the benefit of that 
to ourselves, so we promise to do it. But I think: if 
she keeps her promise, but I don't, I will end up 
better off. I can have more of my own money while I 
live, and even more money if I live longer than her. 
How would you convince me to keep my promise? 
Erothymia: Hmm. I see what you mean On a social scale it's the 
same problem. We could prove to all the squid 
fishermen that if they all over-fish there would 
eventually be no more squid, hence no more fishing. 
Reason would show them that their living would be 
guaranteed if every squid fisherman promised to 
limit his catch. But reason would also show the 
outlaw fisherman that such a promise would be to his 
advantage as long as everyone else kept it except him. 
Plato: What do you do about these two examples? 
Erothymia: In our case, show you that if I were to reason the 
same way there would be no estate. Similarly, I would 
show the fishermen that if everyone reasoned like the 
outlaw, there would be no fish. Right back where we 
started. Rationality would have to prevail. 
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Plato: 
Erothymia: 
Plato: 
Erothymia: 
Plato: 
Erothymia: 
But on your view, desire will usually undermine 
reason. Remember, it only needs to happen once for 
the contract to be broken. How do we ensure 
unanimous consent to the dictates of reason, and 
unanimous conformity to the agreements it makes? 
When reason is undermined, we must addtess the 
irrational instincts. 
Do you mean enforcement by fear and threat? 
Precisely. 
But then people will be forced to live up to 
agreements they don't agree to. Isn't that the end of 
the social contract theory? 
Not exactly. I am going to make one major 
concession to your original theory of justice. Someone 
will have to reason out a contract which any rational 
person would agree to. To that extent, reason and 
political power must coincide. The basis for reason 
would be, however, everyone's self-interest and 
happiness—not the Form of Justice. Then, for those 
who cannot be reasonable and rational, laws which 
embody rational promises will be made and 
enforced. This will work because most people are 
rational, and most of them will accept the dictates of 
reason. They will see to it that those who are 
irrational, or those who voluntarily defy reason, will 
pay a penalty for breaking the promises and 
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agreements demanded by every reasonable man and 
woman. Those who are unwise, unjust, cowardly, 
and lacking self-control will be punished, or 
reformed, the moment they damage the happiness of 
others. 
Plalo: For a person of desire and passion, you certainly 
think very clearly. (Music up.) 
Erothymia: And for a person of intellect, you can certainly love 
and lust very intensely. Come here. (She takes his 
hand, and they stroll to the edge of the volcano. They 
kiss passionately, then hold each other). That was our 
contract. 
Plato: I made it when I met you. I had no choice. 
Erothymia: (Looking into the volcano). Plato, would you make 
me another promise? Would you promise never to 
jump in? 
Plato: No, I would never promise that. I would promise not 
to jump in only as long as you were with me to hear 
the promise. If you were gone, I promise I will jump 
in. 
Erothymia: (Chuckling). That seems reasonable. I'll promise the 
same. (They embrace. Lights to black. Hold and fade 
music) 
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